A juridical analysis of directed-energy weapons in the earth-space arena by Fessler, Edward Anthony
A JURIDICAL ANALYSIS OF





SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Or THIS P»Gt (Whmn Dafa Ir.ntmrmd)
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE KR.AIJ IN', rHU( Tlf INSRKFORC COMPLETING pf)RM
1 l>tfO«> NllMliKH 2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. * mCl'IIHT'l C AT »LOO NUUKII
4. TITLE fand Subitum)
A JURJDICIAL ANALYSIS OF DIRECTED-
ENERGY WEAPONS IN THE EARTH-SPACE ARENA
S TYPl OF »(Pr,R! 4 PERIOD COVEREO
THESIS
S. PERFORMING ORO. REPORT NUMBER
7. author^.;
FESSLER, EDWARD A.
S. CONTRACT OR GRANT HUMBERT
• PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND AOODIli
GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
WASHINGTON, D.C.
10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT, T ASK
AREA • WORK UNIT NUMBERS






1). NUMBER OF PAGES
1RR




16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (ol thl. Koftotl)
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTKJN UNLIMLTED
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (ol th. eaalracl ortimtod In Block 20, II dttlwonl Irmm H.pon)
IS. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
IS. KEY WORDS (Conllnuo on nmn .10m II noeoommrr mnd Identity *r •lock nmxioor)
JURJDICIAL ANALYSIS, DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS, EARTH-SPACE ARENA
20. AI1TRACT fCoillfwt an rtrwM ilA II nteanar aol Idwilf)' t? Uoct maktij
NONE
DD i j an*71 1473 COITION OF I NOV «S IS OBSOLETE
(Page 1) 1/N 010 2-014- S60 I I LJKCL&SSSECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS F»9I (Whom D— Bnlto*n
T189585

Approved for public release;
distribution unlimited.





B.A. June 1967, Northwestern University
J.D. June 1970, Northwestern University
A Thesis submitted to
The Faculty of
The National Law Center
of The George Washington University in partial satisfaction
of the requirements for the degree of Master of Laws
September 30, 1978
Thesis directed by
William Thomas Mallison Jr.




I. THE ADVENT OF THE DIRECTED-ENERGY WEAPON 1
A. The High-Energy Laser 3
1. Research and Development 3
2. HEL Characteristics and Capabilities 7
3. Limitations and Countermeasures 14
4. Strategic Implications 18
B. The Particle-Beam Weapon 21
1. Research and Development 21
2. PBW Characteristics and Capabilities 27
3. Limitations and Countermeasures 28
4. Strategic Implications 30
II. ASSUMPTIONS, ISSUES AND METHODOLOGY 33
A. Fundamental Assumptions 33
B. The Legal Policy Issues 36
C. Methodology 37
III. CONTROL OF DIRECTED-ENERGY WEAPONS THROUGH THE COMPREHENSIVE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 41
A. General Principles and the Evolving Customary Law 42
B. Conventional Regime: The Outer Space Treaty 52
C. The Contemporary Law of Strategic Arms Control 77
1. The ABM Treaty 78
2. Ancillary Provisions and Forums for Claims Assertion ... 87
3. Claims Evaluation 90




IV. CONTROL OF DIRECTED-ENERGY WEAPONS THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 97
A. The Law of Armed Conflict as an International Regime 99
1. Principles and Collateral Concepts in the Customary Law . . 99
2. General Weapons Control in the Early Conventional Law . . .108
3. The Impact of Modern Warfare 114
B. A Framework for Analysis 120
C. Application of Controls in the Existing Customary and
Conventional Law 124
1. Claims Based on Fundamental Institutions 124
2. Claims Based on Progressive Principles 130
D. Controls Applicable to Analogous Weaponry: Incendiary
Devices 138
1. Scope and Limitations of the Analogy 138
2. Claims to Weapons Prohibition Per Se 141
3. Claims to Restricted Use in a Regime of Weapons
Control 144
4. Claims to Limitation on Use and Target Selection 146
E. Evolving Conventional Law Controls 152
1. Contemporary Criteria for Weapons Control: Protocol I . . 153
2. Prospective Developments in Weapons Control 166
a. Conventional Weapons 167
b. Weapons of Mass Destruction 168
F. Summary 173




All source material employed in the research and preparation of the
following study is unclassified. The writer neither sought nor
accepted access to any classified information in connection with
this project. Except as explicitly indicated, any description,
analysis or opinion expressed herein is exclusively that of the
writer and in no way reflects the views of the United States
Government, its departments, agencies, branches or services or




THE ADVENT OF THE DIRECTED-ENERGY WEAPON
The task of maintaining minimum order, understood as freedom both
from severe deprivations by unauthorized coercion and violence and
from expectations of such deprivations, has long been recognized as
one of the most difficult and frustrating problems of mankind. The
newly acquired access to space under conditions of a highly disunited
world arena and the existence of apocalyptic weapons of mass destruc-
tion can only magnify the already formidable difficulties of this
problem. Man's penetration into space has not only immensely expanded
the area of human interaction, transforming the earth arena into the
earth-space arena, but has also in parallel evolution brought about
the development of many new instruments of violence which greatly
aggravate both the threats to minimum order and the difficulties in
establishment of appropriate techniques for its maintenance. Recent
technological developments . . . have brought any target in the earth
arena within quick reach of unbelievably destructive means of violence.
McDougal, Lasswell, and Vlasic
An intense arms competition between the two superpowers, the Soviet
Union and the United States, has been the preeminent challenge to the
maintenance of minimum public order since the close of World War II. Through
both bilateral arms control negotiations between the superpowers and a
variety of related multilateral agreements involving additional state
participants, the minimum public order system may recently have been




enhanced if strategically significant instruments of coercion are controlled,
these initiatives have sought to prohibit or limit arms through restraints
upon the size, type, use and even areas of deployment of major weapons systems.
These initiatives have assumed that such restraints serve the minimum public
order by reducing incentives to compete in research, development and production
of advanced weapons of mass destruction.
While these efforts have provided at least a minimal restraint on the
existing instruments of mass destruction, they have not served particularly well
to discourage overall arms competition between major participant states.
Evidence is mounting that the specter of a terrifying new mode of warfare
designed to function in an expanded earth-space arena has arisen on the
technological horizon. Although much of the available information on this new
mode of warfare is subject to strict government classification, an increasing
quantity of unofficial, technical and scientific literature is piercing the
veil of secrecy surrounding the development of such "Star Wars" weaponry as
high-energy lasers, particle-beam death rays, plasma jets and antisatellite
2interceptors.
The inventory of weaponry under development includes an extensive variety
of futuristic devices, some of which may soon exhibit the potential to shatter
the strategic equilibrium between the principal powers. Some of the technological
innovations which even now pose an imminent and fundamental challenge to the
continued maintenance of minimum public order are classified under the generic
3heading of "directed-energy weapons." To assess a few of the more signifi-
cant juridical implications arising from the advent of directed-energy weapons,
it is useful at the offset to consider the circumstances which surrounded their
discovery and early development.
An application of pertinent international law to these devices requires
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at minimum a broad general understanding of their technical capabilities,
characteristics, limitations and probable military impact. A sufficient
resource of unofficial technical literature is now available to permit this
preliminary survey of the directed-energy weapon.
A. The High-Energy Laser
1. Research and Development
A means of directed-energy propagation which has received broad recog-
nition in recent years is the process referred to as "light amplification by
stimulated emissions of radiation," commonly known by its acronym, "laser."
As a result of quantum physics research during the 1950's, it was discovered
that a beam of intensely concentrated and directed light had a variety of useful
applications in both science and industry. Peaceful applications of the laser
developed through early research included precision measurement, surgery,
4
communications, computation, manufacturing and construction. These peaceful
applications of the laser as well as a limited number of tactical military
uses developed for it, including precision guided "smart bombs" employed in
the later years of the Vietnam conflict, used relatively low intensity light.
As basic research continued to probe this new form of energy propagation,
it became increasing apparent that lasers of greatly increased intensity had
significant military potential and were particularly efficient in the near
vacuum of outer space. Both superpowers demonstrated an early interest in
the high-energy laser's military potentialities and initiated significant
research and development programs. In a 1966 United States Air Force test
conducted at Kirkland Air Force Base, New Mexico, the potential destructive
force of the high-energy laser was impressively demonstrated by using a beam




1960' s, the U.S. Department of Defense had been persuaded of the high-energy
laser's overwhelming weapons potential. In Fiscal Year 1968, Congress appro-
priated $8 million for a program of basic research and development. By Fiscal
Year 1973, research and development funding levels had increased tenfold to
Q
$85 million.
During this early period, each of the three U.S. military services imple-
mented its own research and development program specially tailored to the
respective organization's particular mission. While the Army experimented with
the concept of a land-based electric discharge laser (EDL) , the Navy pursued
basic research into chemical lasers for possible shipboard use in antiaircraft
or antimissile defense. The initial Air Force research program concentrated on
yet a third concept, the gas dynamic laser (GDL) which it was hoped might prove
9
effective in such military applications as heavy bomber defense. Additional
research with its principal focus upon more advanced outer space applications
was coordinated by the Defense Department's Advanced Research Projects Agency
(ARPA) , an organization typically tasked by the DoD with higher risk defense
research and development programs.
While United States high-energy laser research and development programs
expanded rapidly in the late 1960's and early 1970's, the Soviets pursued a
similarly ambitious effort. In 1974, the Central Intelligence Agency estimated
that the Soviets were spending approximately the equivalent of a billion dollars
a year for high-energy laser research and development. Available assessments
of Soviet laser research vary considerably and are no doubt subject to sometimes
unreliable intelligence estimates. Nevertheless, there are strong indications
the Soviet Union has a keen interest in developing a space warfare capability.
In this connection, the Soviets are thought to be pursuing an active high-energy
laser weapons research and development program.

Evidence is increasing that this competitive research and development
thrust may soon produce operational weaponry with devastating potential. Accord-
ing to one report, the Soviet Union was prepared in early 1978 to commence testing
a series of hydrogen fluoride high-energy laser weapons at its Sary Shagan
facility near the Chinese border. The Sary Shagan facility is considered by
some intelligence experts as a principal location for Soviet antiballistic
missile research. A number of new facilitites observed at the site are believed
indicative of Soviet aims to develop high-energy lasers or other directed-energy
12
weapons possibly using a particle-beam or microwave radiation. High-energy
laser tests at the Sary Shagan site are believed to be part of the overall
Soviet program to develop an effective means of incapacitating or destroying the
critical outer space resources of adversaries. Such a capability would be
13
strategically important in the event of any future war. Possibly corroborat-
ing evidence of Soviet advances in this area may be inferred from reports
indicating that some U.S. experts believe a recent Soviet rocket launch series
14
actually tested space vehicles designed to carry laser weapons.
The United States is clearly taking Soviet research and development efforts
seriously. A large number of U.S. aerospace and technical companies are now
under contract to the Department of Defense to improve satellite "survivability"
i and develop defenses against attacks from lasers or antisatellite interceptor
! vehicles. The Perkin-Elmer organization is developing a satellite optical
! sensor known as the "Laser Radiation Receiver" (LRR) for use in the detection and
classification of overt radiation aimed at disrupting sensitive satellites.
Aerojet Electro Systems is under contract to research and develop measures to
counteract laser jamming of space vehicles. The TRW Corporation's Defense and
Space Systems Group is using simulation testing to investigate satellite vulner-




is reportedly engaged in evaluating laser countermeasures. These and other
government contracts are a clear indication that the United States Government




There is also mounting evidence that the United States programs, while
continuing to focus on fundamental technological problems, have succeeded in
developing at least experimental high-energy laser weapons. Although these
devices are not prototype weapons per se , they do demonstrate the potential
application of this new technology to defense missions. The U.S. Army has
developed a mobile test unit (MTU) which employs an Avco-built electric discharge
carbon-dioxide laser installed in a LVTP-7 Marine Corps amphibious-landing tracked
vehicle. The MTU underwent tests as early as 1975 at the Redstone Arsenal
Missile Test Range to check both reliability in rough simulated battlefield
terrain as well as specific high-energy laser (HEL) target tracking efficiency.
The Army has also pursued research and development of a helicopter mounted
1 Q
laser weapon (HEMLAW) and" certain infantry laser devices (INLAW). Additionally,
the Army carries on research into laser vulnerability.
Another indication of the relatively advanced stage of U.S. experimental
laser weapon research is the U.S. Air Force's Airborne Laser Laboratory (ALL).
The ALL employs a Boeing KC-135 jet aircraft as a platform for an experimental
gas-dynamic laser. Although the ALL was never intended as a prototype for
an operational weapons system, its GDL device has been fired in flight for
periods of from twenty to thirty seconds. Such tests demonstrate at least the
potential for carrying directed-energy weapons aloft as antiaircraft or anti-
missile bomber defense systems. As of 1975, the Airborne Laser Laboratory
19
was considered the most advanced of the military testbed facilities.
While there is as yet no official indication of the U.S. Navy actually
installing a high-energy laser or HEL on board a vessel, disclosures have

suggested that a fleet defense test weapon is under development in cooperation
with TRW and other defense contractors. Recent success in developing an
efficient chemical laser has been the impetus for funding the construction of
20
the Navy's sophisticated "Baseline Demonstration Laser" (BDL)
. The Navy
system is reported to employ a deuterium fluoride chemical laser. A number of
additional related programs are also underway to study ocean propagation, anti-
21
ship missile defense and related areas of HEL research.
Estimates suggest that by the end of the current decade, the United
States will have spemt approximately three-quarters of a billion dollars on
22
research and development of the HEL. The ultimate question facing decision-
makers concerned with eventual acquisition of these devices will probably hinge
on factors related to cost effectiveness, military strategy and policy. To
appreciate some of these key factors, including the central policy question
of the legality of such weapons, it is important to consider the known capabil-
ities, characteristics and limitations of the HEL as an instrument of coercion.
2. HEL Characteristics and Capabilities
The official secrecy surrounding government sponsored research into
high-energy lasers makes an appraisal of their probable characteristics and
capabilities difficult. Because of both this government classification and the
fact the HEL is new to weapons development, some level of extrapolation is
necessary in discussing prospective systems. It is certain however, that a
number of different types of high-energy lasers are considered to exhibit
weapons potential. While this study will tend to generalize as to the overall
concept of a HEL, it is useful to understand that to some extent, the character-
istics, capabilities and even limitations of this category of directed-energy
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weapon may depend upon its particular features or the means by which it
propagates its beam.
One of the prominently mentioned systems used in propagation of
destructive laser energy is the "eximer laser." The eximer laser generates
its beam by use of electrically excited rare gas halogen (RGH) or alternatively,
some other rare gas. This particular system emits laser beam energy in
the visible and ultraviolet parts of the spectrum. Eximer beams can direct
considerable force at a target and are considered strong possibilities for
ground-based use against hostile satellites. A principal attribute of the
23
eximer laser is its relatively small optical system. Some alternative
laser systems are hampered by cumbersome optical components.
One of the first systems developed in the U.S. program was the gas
dynamic laser (GDL) . Early model gas dynamic lasers used carbon dioxide as
an operative gas heating it to high temperatures and causing it to expand.
The carbon dioxide was then cooled by supersonic passage through nozzles with the
resultant high energy being' given off in a continuous wave through a mirror
24
cavxty. Although it was initially thought that the GDL system might prove
promising, subsequent research indicates it has definite drawbacks. The system
requires substantial- amounts of fuel or power and also must be fed with expend-
25
able lasing gases. In addition, there are problems in heating the working gas.
i As noted, the U.S. Air Force ALL testbed facility employs a GDL system. The
most likely applications for the GDL are in permanent ground-based weapons,
I aboard ships or possibly on large bombers. In view of its consumption of
resources, it is less attractive for use on board spacecraft. Moreover, where
light, mobile military vehicles are required, the GDL system is too demanding
of both resources and limited space to be an efficient weapon.
In addition to these systems, the United States is intent on further




The EDL possesses the advantage of being able to propagate energy employing
either continuous wave or successive pulses. It also has the advantage of
relative simplicity when compared with alternative lasing systems. This system
transmits a shorter wavelength beam which authorities report physically permits
more efficient propagation and focusing. The principal disadvantage of the
EDL devices developed to date is their voracious appetite for electric power
which is not easily provided on board mobile military vehicles or platforms.
Because of its characteristics, the EDL system is most likely to find applica-
tions on board larger military vehicles such as ships and heavy bombers or in
permanent land-based facilities. Some effort is being made to develop more
efficient generators, capacitors and other electrical power equipment. If this
effort is successful, the potential military applications of the EDL could increase
greatly.
The most promising of all high-energy laser systems now under develop-
ment is the chemical laser. Considerably more complex than some of the alterna-
tive systems, the chemical laser uses chemical reactions to achieve power
outputs. This system can propagate its directed-energy through hydrogen
fluoride or a variety of other substances which generate a beam with little
27
external electrical resource demand. Chemical lasers have been developed
which produce pulses of 200 billion watts for 20-billionths of a second. Such
forces are sufficient, even in a short pulse, to vaporize metal and produce
28
! destructive shock waves in the target. These systems operate at shorter
wavelengths (2.6 to 5 microns) than alternative systems, a technical feature
which reduces atmospheric attenuation and increases thermal damage effects to
the target.
The principal drawback to present generation chemical lasers is that they
may require hard-to-handle chemical reactants which may prove corrosive or
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dangerous to combat personnel. Nevertheless, chemical laser beams can be
more intensely focused for any given size optics, show good atmospheric propa-
gation characteristics and can be generated from smaller, lighter, more mobile
29
components. The characteristics and capabilities of the chemical laser
make it a probable choice for an extensive variety of mobile weapons applications
including aboard spaceborne systems.
These and other laser propagation systems under development exhibit a
number of distinctive operational features. Conventional and even sophisticated
nuclear or thermonuclear weapons systems often require considerable personnel
resources for their operation. Combat personnel may be required in such processes
as loading, maneuvering, target selection or analysis and execution of the
actual firing orders. In contrast, it is probable that advanced laser weaponry
will be employed to its best advantage when used in a fully automated, computer
guided mode. Threat analysis, target selection or prioritization and the
decision to fire may all be programmed into an integrated weapons system. This
may be particularly true if the weapon's principal mission is one of limited
deterrence or response to a preceding act of aggression.
While the probable automation of laser devices will significantly reduce
the analysis and response time which results from human decision-making, the
laser system itself will effectively eliminate the usual payload delivery time
factor through direct transmission of its coercive force to the target at the
30
speed of light. Whereas conventional explosive devices, chemical and
I
bacteriological agents and even nuclear or thermonuclear warheads achieve their
| effect by means of a delivery system which necessarily requires a lapse of time
between the decision to attack and the arrival of the coercive force on target,
the high-energy laser continuous wave or pulse is instantaneously beamed to the
target in the form of pure energy, a concept completely unique to warfare.
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The fact that such a weapon fires no mass also means it requires no heavy or
31
sophisticated adjustment mechanisms to compensate for inertia. The zero
time-to-target characteristic may also have the effect of preventing the target
under attack from taking defensive action. It may be possible for a directed-
energy attack to be perpetrated without giving an adversary target the opportunity
to shield itself, take evasive action or launch a defensive counterattack from
the same point.
Yet another important characteristic of the high-energy laser is its
precision controlled targeting capabilities. Using a measured burst of focused
energy, it may eventually be possible to precisely and discriminately aim the
32
coercive force against only the selected objective. However, the technical
literature admits that present generation experimental lasers may create most
undesirable ancillary injury. The U.S. Navy in developing its Baseline
Demonstration Laser expressed concern that injury might occur to personnel on
board friendly ships and aircraft in the vicinity of the powerful chemical lasing
device. The firing of powerful laser systems can cause both cornea damage to
the eyes and other forms of personal injury in zones outside the selected target
33
zone itself. Although this problem may be solved by friendly personnel
wearing special goggles to attenuate the HEL radiation to safe levels, such
solution may be ineffective if the laser is used in the vicinity of noncom-
batants not similarly equipped.
Relatively little information has been publicly disclosed describing
the specific destructive effects of the high-energy laser beam on various
targets. What is known, however, is that direct destruction occurs when the
intense light creates a thermal reaction in the target. This brings on melting,
incineration or vaporization of the objective depending upon exact composition of




from the creation of shock waves in the target. In addition to these effects,
the HEL may cause secondary destructive reactions to occur. A plasma which is
sometimes created when a high intensity beam vaporizes metal may itself generate '
destructive X-ray radiation. Such X-ray radiation will under certain circum-
35
stances produce structural damage to delicate spacecraft or aircraft components.
Presumably, excessive amounts of such X-ray radiation absorbed by the human body
would also result in significant personal injury.
In addition to the potential for eye damage and typical burns which result
from the HEL being used against personnel targets, other personal injury may occur.
The body will also sustain personal injury resulting from the shock effects often
generated by a laser weapon. In addition, pressure injuries may result as well
as special effects to particular tissues. The HEL is also thought to have
36
somewhat unusual effects upon the body's blood chemistry. In general, use
of an HEL weapon against personnel will tend to produce substantial personal
injury much of which will be extremely painful if not lethal.
At least two characteristics of the HEL beam destruction are particularly
unique and bear mention for purposes of assessing the overall legality of these
new systems. First, the laser's thermal and shock effects on particular targets
and individual target components is apt to vary considerably with wavelength
of the beam, whether it is continuous or pulsed, the speed of the target through
a medium and the chemical composition of the target. As a result of a series
of complex processes which are setup when a beam strikes a particular target,
these various factors will greatly influence the type and extent of target
damage. For example, in the case of an aircraft, it is likely that destructive ^
lasing would initially result in the vaporization of the plexiglass canopy.
This occurs because the canopy is made of a material which tends to ablate sooner
37
than the largely aluminum body of the aircraft superstructure itself.
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A related but distinct characteristic affecting laser destruction is the
variable impact of impulsive (shock) loading on a rapidly vaporizing target.
Shock waves are thought to be a counteraction to the "blow-off" of the cloud of
vaporized material which is generated when the laser pulse hits the target causing
the onset of thermal destruction. Whether these shock waves are created and the
degree of their intensity in turn is a function of many of the same factors which
38
determine the laser's thermal effects on the target. Hence, the creation of
shock destruction in the target may, as in the case of thermal damage, be a
somewhat controllable function of such variables as beam intensity, wavelength
and target composition.
Initial tests have demonstrated that in general, impulse waves transmitted
to easily ablated materials such as plexiglass and lucite may cause 100 times the
shock potential experienced in materials such as aluminum and titanium. The
import of this phenomenon is that lasers may produce destructive effects on their
targets in ways which are subject to great variation depending upon particular
circumstances. In the case of an aircraft, this phenomenon would probably bring
initial disabling damage about through canopy shattering. Such circumstance
would subject the crew to imploding debris and rapid depressurization. Disabling
damage to a surface vehicle, vessel or even spacecraft might occur instead
through direct thermal damage or in consquence of shock waves acting upon some
other vulnerable component. In other words, it should not automatically be
assumed that effects of a HEL weapon on one type of target will necessarily
match the effects on another. This could be important if, for example, decision-
makers wished to avoid the use of HEL weapons against personnel. Although in
surface warfare, lasers could be expected to cause direct thermal and shock
injury to ground troops, personnel in aircraft would probably be disabled by
indirect effects brought on by antiaircraft lasing. At such time as decision-
makers consider possible limitations on the use of the HEL weapons, many of these
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complex effects and interrelationships will have to be studied carefully.
3. Limitations and Countermeasures
While the high-energy laser demonstrates substantial potential as a
destructive force, it is still subject to a number of important limitations.
These limitations are the result of a combination of basic physical phenomena,
technological barriers, environmental or meteorological conditions and probable
defensive countermeasures. A set of noteworthy limitations stemming from
physical phenomena and concomitant technological barriers is currently the focus
of intensive research. These limitations are sometimes classified under the
39headings "propagation" or "attenuation."
One aspect of the propagation or attenuation problem entails the
absorption of beam energy by water vapor and carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.
This problem is particularly troublesome in the lower atmosphere and, in
particular, in areas of great humidity such as over or near large, bodies of
water. Other forms of absorption, scattering and beam spreading, are induced by
particulate matter naturally suspended in the air and variations in the
40
refractive index along the laser beam's path resulting from density variations.
Researchers have also discovered a phenomenon known as "thermal blooming"
which occurs when air in the beam's path is heated by radiation energy causing
41
a change in the index of refraction and defocusing of the beam. Developers
are probing yet another limitation characterized by a self-defeating plasma
created in the beam's path. This plasma is generated artificially by the electri-
cal breakdown of the air between the laser source and its target. The plasma
absorbs the greater part of the laser's destructive energy and serves to
42
shield the target. Plasma may also be generated when certain types of
materials within the target itself vaporize creating a protective reflective or
energy absorbing cloud. The resultant vaporized cloud tends to again reflect or
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absorb the greater part of the laser's energy defeating the beam's impact on
the target.
Propagation or attenuation problems are amplified by ambient meteorologi-
cal or environmental conditions such as fog, rain, snow, clouds or even common
43
air pollution. These limitations have caused Philip J. Klass and other
technical authorities to speculate that while the laser may be ready for use
in the near-vacuum of outer space, it may be some years before it can be
efficiently employed in the denser parts of the earth's atmosphere. Skeptics
point out that the limitations on laser propagation are such as to render it
too unreliable to be used as a source of air defense or in any other capacity
in the traditional terrestrial theaters. They argue that no military commander
would want to depend upon any weapon which could only be efficiently utilized
44
in ideal weather or atmospheric conditions. If it is assumed that these
various terrestrial based limitations can not be overcome in the foreseeable
future, then the HEL skeptics may make a persuasive point. However, there is
no contesting the fact that major participants continue their research and
development programs into overcoming these various limitations. This
continued effort tends to suggest there must be some cause for optimism that
the most troublesome problems may eventually be overcome.
The high-energy laser also has certain limitations related less to the
physics of the beam and more to the operation of the weapon itself. At the
present time, many types of lasers still require more electrical power than can
be efficiently and economically generated on board a highly mobile military
vehicle or platform. Weapons developers could increase the size of the laser's
supportive platform to accommodate increased power generation equipment.
However, by doing so they also tend to increase costs of construction and opera-
tion of the vehicular platform. Moreover, enlarged platforms tend to be

16-
less maneuverable and more vulnerable to defensive counterattack. A closely
related problem which plagues some HEL systems is the necessity for large,
high-power optics. Critics also note that lasers will almost certainly
demand more sophisticated precision pointing and tracking mechanisms if they
are to efficiently keep their beam locked-on to their targets long enough for
45
thermal and shock destruction to occur.
One further physical drawback of the HEL weapon is the necessity that
it be operated in a line-of-sight with its target. Unless reflective inter-
mediate supports are used, a laser weapon must be in a direct line-of-sight path
with its military objective. This particular limitation tends to emphasize the
defensive role of the high-energy laser over its potential offensive roles.
Since offensive weaponry carriers the attack to the enemy, an attacker wishing
to use the high-energy laser as a weapon must deploy his device so that it
has a straight shot at the target. Obviously, such deployment and maneuvering
of the HEL device complicates the military mission and imposes additional
requirements on the military planner.
Available defensive countermeasures also represent a limitation to the
HEL weaponry. Any action by a defender which increases the attenuation could
be employed as a countermeasure. Within the earth's atmosphere, countermeasures
might include smoke screens generated by standard smoke generators. Potential
space targets could be surrounded with an artificial cloud of small aluminum
particles to reflect and disperse incoming HEL beams. Alternatively, these
potential target vehicles could be equipped with an outer skin made of highly
reflective material designed to redirect the beam energy. Potential targets can
also be "hardened" by making them of material which does not ablate easily and
by placing delicate components toward the less exposed interior of the vehicle.
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Development of these various countermeasures is advancing beyond the experimental
stage. Authorities reveal that most, if not all, U.S. defense oriented navigation,
reconnaissance, early-warning and communications satellites to be launched in
the next ten years will receive electrical power from internal nuclear sources
or fuel cells vice the more vulnerable, exposed solar panels previously employed
47
to power space satellites.
A rrumber of less direct countermeasures are also prominently mentioned.
Decoy vehicles, particularly in space, could serve to confuse the potential laser
attacker, immeasurably complicating target acquisition and analysis. Certain
potential targets could also be made more manueverable and be programmed to
take evasive action when under laser attack. In the instances of essential
military resource satellite systems, it has been suggested that a latent redund-
ancy be created by launching so-called "dark satellites" which could not be
easily tracked and which would remain essentially hidden in orbital space zones
48
until activated by a coded command from a possessor participant. Proponents
of these clandestine space resources argue dark satellites would be immune from
attack until such time as the HEL equipped attacker became aware of their exist-
ence and could get a fix on precise coordinates for purposes of targeting.
Without question these various limitations and potential countermeasures
represent significant barriers to the production, deployment and possible use
of the HEL weaponry. Nevertheless, significant progress has already been made
to resolve many of the technological and apparent physical barriers. Many
experts in the field are convinced that most of these drawbacks will eventually
be overcome by participant developers. Defense systems authority William J.
Beane, while admitting formidable technological limitations exist, nevertheless
contends that if the past decade is any indication, the principal problems
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standing in the way of an operational HEL system will be successfully overcome.
Beane concludes an analysis of the strategic implications of the high-energy
laser in these words:
To be sure, there is no certainty at this time as to when a
breakthrough will be made on the feasibility and practical use
of a high-energy laser. Nor is it possible to predict what effect
it may have on existing strategic weapons systems. But few will
deny that the solutions to the problems will be met, and that its
impact will be tremendous on the international community. One
can easily forget that less than twenty years ago only a few
years before the first ballistic missile submarine was deployed
in November 1960-technically competent people deemed the Navy's
Polaris weapon system impossible. The forging of this new, revo-
lutionary technological instrument may well hasten the transi-
tion from the Nuclear Era to the Laser Age.
The ongoing U.S. Defense Department program to improve space vehicle
survivability against high-energy laser and other forms of antisatellite attack
provides tangible evidence in support of Beane ' s contention. It is
unlikely that this substantial defense effort would be made if military and
intelligence planners did not consider the laser a credible threat to U.S.
space resources. Additional evidence which strongly suggests that limitations
are not viewed as an immutable barrier to eventual operational weaponry arises
from the fact that while the U.S. Defense Department's overall budget request
for HEL devices dropped by 10% to $150 million in figures submitted in early
1977, ARPA's appropriation request for "space-based lasers and related technol-
ogy climbed 16% to $24.9 million from figures presented for the previous period.
4. Strategic Implications
Despite its limitations, the laser's lethal capabilities are conducive
to a wide range of military applications. Beane ' s analysis catalogues a few
of the more apparent applications:
A listing of possible strategic uses of high-energy lasers would
read as follows: satellite destruction, blinding or defense;
burnout of space sensor systems; point defense (antiship missile
defense); detonation of nuclear warheads; disruption of radar and
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communications networks; range detection, bomb destruction or
defense; ICBM or SLBM missile defense either by destroying
the missile (second stage) while in flight or by damaging or
setting off the warhead in space. The results of laser research,
test and development to date suggest that such uses are to be
more ruled in than ruled out.
Beane's inventory, while far from exhaustive, illustrates a few of the more
apparent military applications of the high-energy laser. As Beane notes,
the high-energy laser may eventually find its place in the surface and atmos-
pheric theaters. However, its first major challenge to the minimum world public
order system will almost certainly result from its introduction into the
functional orbital zones above the earth's atmosphere referred to as "near-
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earth space" or simply, "near space."
Ground or seaborne lasers designed for use against targets in near space
as well as spaceborne lasers themselves may eventually have the capability to
provide a credible defense against major weapons delivery systems such as the
ICBM, manned bomber or even cruise missile. An even more immediate impact
stems from the increasing dependence of the Soviet Union and the United States
upon sophisticated meteorological, navigational, early-warning, reconnaissance,
communications and earth resources satellites. The development of a device
capable of rapid incapacitation or destruction of such essential space vehicles
raises a series of troubling questions as to the continued dependability and
stability of the existing strategic balance of power between the superpowers
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and their allied blocs.
The potential efficiency and coercive capabilities of the high-energy
laser influenced William Beane to cite from authority James Canan's The
Superwarriors
_,




Like the atom bomb, the high energy laser has the potential of
producing a revolutionary change in weapon systems that could
alter prevailing concepts and tactics of warfare. When perfected,
the high-energy laser could abruptly 'upset the balance of today's
offensive and defensive tactical and strategic weapons, supersed-
ing all of them as the penultimate defender and destroyer, capable
of turning men into messes of mush, their machines into molten
metal. '
With particular reference to the political impact of the spaceborne HEL on
world community perceptions, George H. Heilmeiser, Director of the U.S. Defense
Department's Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) , testified before the
House Armed Services Committee in early 1977: "It is my belief that the high-
energy laser in space could represent a Sputnik like event - a technical
achievement which could influence the perceptions of foreign countries as to who
is the leader in defense-related technology." Even more recently, statements
submitted to the 95th Congress pursuant to the Arms Control and Disarmament Act
observed: "There is little doubt that laser weapon development is considered
to be an area of military technology having both high priority and prestige
value in both the Soviet Union and the United States."
In short, it is clear that the advent of high-energy laser weapons
capable of operating in or through the near space theater will greatly enhance
the possessing participant's technological resources thereby increasing its
bases of power. Moreover, possession of HEL weaponry may well serve to
enhance the apparent military prowess of participant states. The increase
of these participant bases of power may in turn increase the expectations and
perceptions of strategy or policy options available to state decision-makers.
These new weapons may also precipitate certain changes in the minimum world
public order system through the modification of existing claims and counter-
claims. The high-energy laser will almost certainly give rise to new sets of
-.
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claims particularly oriented toward coercion in the earth-space arena.

-21-
B. The Particle-Beam Weapon
1. Research and Development
Another type of directed-energy weapon is the category classified as a
"particle-beam weapon" also referred to by some sources as an "atomic death
ray," a "heat ray," the "charged-particle beam" or simply by its acronym "PBW."
Until very recently, information relating to the particle-beam weapon was
almost completely limited to highly selected participant elites in the scienti-
fic, defense and intelligence communities. Whether the PBW is technically
feasible within the immediate future and to what extent one or both superpowers
are engaged in research and development has been until recent months a matter of
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great
. controversy in U.S. defense and intelligence circles. It is not the
purpose of this study to attribute credibility to either of the major positions
taken in this strategic debate. What is important however, is that most
experts agree the particle-beam weapon, like its counterpart the high-energy
laser, remains a distinct technical possibility in the not too distant future.
Even those skeptical of claims that the PBW is operationally imminent in the
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Soviet Union, acknowledge development of the device is just a matter of time.
A general description of the PBW category of directed-energy device is
provided in the Fiscal Year 1979 Arms Control Impact Statements as follows:
The term particle beam weapon (PBW) refers to a range of concepts
for devices using directed beams of charged or neutral particles at
high energies as projectiles to inflict damage. The particles in
question can be electrons, protons, heavy ions, or neutrons. Parti-
cle beams are produced either in circular or linear accelerators or
combination of the two types. Moreover, particle beams can be stored
in circular rings and released for specialized applications such as
PBW. Particle beam weapons can also be designed using lasers; these
would use highly intense, coherent light sources to develop a reduced
density channel to enhance particle beam propagation.
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Particle-beam weapons of this description are subject to considerable variation
depending upon the operational mission, the type of beam to be projected and
the source of electrical power. However, based on current speculation, it
is possible to describe some of the more important components of one variety
of particle-beam weapon, the so-called "charged-particle beam" or "CPB."
The considerable power requirements necessary for the system would be
generated by a component employing the use of either conventional or nuclear
explosives to create a plasma. The plasma is then converted into electricity.
Alternatively, banks of six to eight large jet engines might be employed to
generate required electrical power. The electrical power generated by one of
these means would then be stored and reemitted by a bank of capacitors and
transformers to operate a beam accelerator. This unit, at least in the case of
a charged-particle beam, would send waves of electrons (cyclotron eigenmodes)
down its length where small groups of protons would be added. Finally, in
initial test models, a hydrogen cooled "drift tube" could be employed to test
propagation and the destructive power of the proton enriched waves created
in the accelerator unit. An operational weapon would eliminate the drift
tube, replacing it with an aiming-tracking mechanism for directing the beam.
Such an aiming-tracking mechanism might use magnetic forces to direct the
beam from the barrel of the accelerator to the selected target.
According to retired Major General George J. Keegan, former head of U.S.
Air Force intelligence activities, the Soviet Union has conducted intensive
and costly research for at least ten years to develop an operational CPB capable
of directing a powerful beam of particles at enemy missile warheads and orbit-
ing space vehicles. The Soviet program is thought to be particularly concen-
trating on the charged form of particle-beam weapon, to wit, the "CPB."
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As evidence of the alleged Soviet CPB program, General Keegan claims
that a U.S. Air Force/TRW Block 647 defense support system early-warning satel-
lite equipped with scanning radiation detectors and infrared sensors has detected
evidence on seven occasions since November 1975 which would tend to indicate that
charged-particle beam tests were conducted at a high security Soviet nuclear
research facility 35 miles south of Semipalatinsk in the Republic of Kazakhstan.
According to General Keegan, satellite sensors detected large amounts of
gaseous hydrogen with traces of tritium in the upper atmosphere on these
occasions. General Keegan and those who support his view contend that these
substances would be expected biproducts of charged-particle beam testing. They
argue that large amounts of liquid hydrogen are probably being used by the Soviets
as the medium which cushions the controlled detonation of small nuclear bombs
employed to create an electricity generating plasma. Moreover, the CPB propo-
nents argue that considerable amounts of liquid hydrogen would be necessary to
cryogenically cool the drift tubes used to test the beam. The tritium detected
is thought to be a residue from the actual nuclear explosion of the generator
itself.
64
General Keegan claims reconnaissance satellite photographs evidence a
variety of impressive underground and surface facilities located inside a
high security area within the Semipalatinsk test site itself. The observed
facilities include one and possibly two steel spheres measuring approximately
eighteen meters in diameter which have been sunk into granite caverns. Keegan
believes these spheres are necessary to capture and store energy from nuclear
explosions or pulse power generators. A large reinforced concrete building
measuring 200 by 700 feet is thought to house associated support equipment.
As still further evidence of the alleged Soviet thrust to develop a CPB, General
Keegan claims that the TRW early-warning satellite stationed over the Indian
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Ocean monitored a test conducted in an area of natural dome formations at
Azgir in Kazakhstan near the Caspian Sea in late 1976. He contends that the
Azgir test site is under the direct control of the Soviet National Air Defense
Force, the PVO Strany . He believes the PVO Strany is developing a new, far
more powerful fusion-pulsed magnetohydrodynamic generator at this site to power
the Soviet charged-particle beam itself.
Aviation Week and Space Technology writer Clarence Robinson, in support
of the Keegan claims, asserts that the Soviets have already committed the
equivalent of $3 billion to their particle-beam weapons development program,
$500,000 of which is invested in the Semipalatinsk test site alone. Robinson
argues intelligence information which suggests the CPB development program has
now been placed under the direct control of the PVO Strany, the branch of the
Soviet armed forces responsible for antimissile and antiaircraft defense, may
indicate the Soviets are nearing the point of producing an operational weapons
system. Robinson recounts in considerable detail what he considers to be a
most careful technical analysis by a group of young physicists assembled by
General Keegan to independently gather and evaluate intelligence data on the
possibility of a Soviet CPB technological breakthrough. The physicists are
reported to have concurred with General Keegan that the Soviets might well
have achieved the series of technological breakthroughs essential to attaining
CPB operational capability in the near future.
Evidence possibly corroborating these claims has been independently
released by Sweden's Defense Department. A report issued by Dr. Lars-Erik
De Geer of the National Defense Research Institute in Stockholm, notes radio-
isotopes which could not be attributed to any known source were detected on
five separate occasions, in late February, March, April, May and July of 1976,
in the air over Sweden. ' The report indicates that the unexpected and
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unusual mixtures of isotopes were found to be Neptunium-2 39 and Molybdenum-99
,
usually biproducts of atmospheric fallout from nuclear explosions. The
presence of these isotopes however, could not be attributed to any recorded
nuclear or thermonuclear tests conducted during these general periods of time.
Through checks with nuclear generating and research facilities, Dr. De Geer was
further able to rule out the possibility of an accidental discharge from either
government or commercial research or reactor sites. Dr. De Geer speculates that
the isotopes could have been produced by tests using an explosive generator
to develop power. The power produced would in turn be used to drive an acceler-
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ator producing the drive for a charged-particle beam.
Although much of the controversy concerning the particle-beam weapon has
surrounded Soviet activities at the Azgir and Semipalatinsk sites, there is
at least some evidence of United States interest in a similar type of directed-
energy weapon. U.S. research and development into particle energy concepts has
been underway in connection with a variety of applications for about three
decades. Until recently, the principal use of the particle beams has been
research surrounding fundamental physics. Much of the research work has been
carried out on an unclassified basis with extensive exchange of informa-
tion between interested nations. Early applications of the particle-beam
concept have been in food sterilization, polymerization of plastics, radiography,
and cancer therapy.
The initial U.S. interest in using particle beams as weapons related
devices developed during the 1950 's when research focused on applying the concept
as a means of breeding fissionable materials for military purposes. At least
partly as a result of this research, it was suggested the particle-beam might
itself be eventually developed into an efficient weapon. Perhaps the first
U.S. program to directly pursue the particle-beam as a potential weapon was




one report, subsequently abandoned the PBW as impractical. Neverthe-
less, there are strong indications research and development have continued in
a number of related areas.
As confirmed by the Fiscal Year 1979 Arms Control Impact Statements,
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and all three branches of the
U.S. military services are exploring the potential of particle beam technology
for a variety of applications. In a heavily censored report on the U.S.
programs, the statement concerning directed-energy programs confirms a direct
interest in the use of these devices in ballistic missile defense (BMD)
,
as a satellite-borne antisatellite weapon, for shipborne antimissile systems and
finally for various airborne and spaceborne applications. Funding for
research and development programs for the three military services excluding
ARPA for 1979 is estimated at $12.7 million.
Probably the most costly and publicized research and development program
is the Navy's "Chair Heritage" effort. The Navy sought $7.1 million in Fiscal
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Year 1979 to continue work on the Chair Heritage and related PBW research.
The Chair Heritage project is reportedly engaged in continued exploratory develop-
ment of beam weapons with an emphasis on accelerator research. A series of
experiments using a scaled down advanced test accelerator unit will supposedly
be completed by the Navy in August 1978 allowing a transition to an advanced
75developmental phase. The details and potential mission of the Chair Heritage
development device have not been made public. However, the 1979 Impact Statement
suggests the Navy research program hopes to verify certain features of a system
7 £*
by approximately 1982.
Related U.S. Government sponsored research is reportedly aimed at
perfecting an "auto-resonant accelerator." The auto-resonant accelerator when
fully developed would have the capability of generating low-cost, extremely
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intense beams of high-energy heavy particles. Austin Research Associates has
been funded to research means of directing energy the equivalent of pounds of
TNT at the speed of light to remotely located blast targets. While these
and other known U.S. Government programs are most probably still in the feasi-
bility study and exploratory research stages, they nevertheless suggest a
significant commitment to the eventual development of a directed-energy weapon of
at least equal potential to the high-energy laser.
2. PBW Characteristics and Capabilities
The particle-beam weapon, whether it uses a directed stream of electrons,
protons, heavy ions or neutrons, will probably exhibit many of the same
capabilities and characteristics of the proposed high-energy lasers. Like the
HEL, the PBW when developed will transmit force to its target at the speed of
light. A PBW, however,, transfers its energy at essentially 100 percent effici-
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ency. A PBW could be repeatedly redirected and refired at the same or
varying targets within a short span of time. It is likely that this weapon
:
would be utilized in a semiautomatic or fully automatic mode employing the use
of sophisticated computers and tracking instruments to identify, prioritize, aim
and fire at potential targets. Accordingly, like its laser counterpart, the
particle-beam weapon when deployed may well be programmed so as to reduce or
eliminate human decision-making and provide for a minimal time response against
all appropriate targets once the initial authorization to execute operations is
given. If employed in a defensive mode, even the initial order to fire may
be eliminated allowing the programmed PBW to respond to perceived hostile acts
directed against the possessor participant or its resources.
The particle-beam weapon's destructive force can be distinguished
from that of the laser in a number of particulars. The HEL weapon's
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destructive force can be substantially reduced or even eliminated altogether when
its beam is transmitted through the atmosphere because of physical, environmental,
meteorological or other conditions. However, attenuation, beam dispersion,
refraction, reflection and other adverse physical phenomena do not present a
problem for PBW pulses fired into or out of the atmosphere. The particle-beam
weapon may be employed regardless of cloud cover, fog, rain, snow, suspended
particulate matter in the air or any of the other influences which tend to
79diminish the impact of the high-energy laser beam. Theorists speculate that
whereas cloud cover, fog, snow, rain, reflective surfaces and artificial clouds
of metallic particles may serve to protect targets against laser attack, the
PBW could penetrate almost any known material or configuration causing intense
80
destruction.
Since high-energy lasers have been fired under laboratory and field
conditions, it is possible to assess their destructive effects on particular
targets. Unclassified information is not available however with regard to any
possible PBW tests. Any appraisal of this weapon's effect upon various types
of targets, personnel or materiel, is largely speculative. However, the
limited literature on the subject suggests target destruction may occur
Q 1
through blast effects or shock waves created in the target.
3. Limitations and Countermeasures
While the PBW has fewer drawbacks than the high-energy laser, it is
nevertheless subject to limitations and defensive countermeasures. Assuming
the various developmental and physical barriers to constructing an operational
beam weapon can be successfully overcome, skeptics still point to the substan-
tial difficulties in scaling the device down to a size and weight which would
facilitate a cost-effective, mobile weapon. The requisite capacitor banks,
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transformers and power generation facilities even with today's relatively
82
advanced technology tend to be massive. If the PBW is to have more than
a ground-based defense mission, relatively mobile systems will have to be
designed. Since the PBW, like the HEL, is essentially a line-of-sight weapon,
such mobility would be critical in offensive military missions.
A second technical problem which will have to be overcome is the
go
propensity of the particle-beam to be deflected by the earth's magnetic field.
Since the extent of this effect may be complex and difficult to predict,
weapons developers must pursue systems which either compensate for or are not
adversely affected by these magnetic forces. Again there is some reason to
believe that eventually, technological barriers in this area can be overcome.
Skeptics of the particle-beam weapon argue that those who contend the
device would be useful in antiballistic missile and air defense systems ignor
the complexities of the particular military missions. Two critics of the claims
regarding alleged Soviet development of an operational CPB assert that the
limited resolution capacity of conventional tracking radars added to beam bending
caused by the earth's magnetic field makes using this type of device for air or
missile defense "like trying to shoot at a bullet coming toward you on a foggy
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day while your gun hand is shaking and the wind is blowing." Authority
Clarence Robinson counters this argument by noting that it may be possible in
missile defense to use a shotgun-like, rapid beam firing sequence aimed at
relatively predictable ballistic missile transit lanes to interdict incoming
warheads
.
It appears at least some defensive countermeasures may be available against
the particle-beam weapons. Again the use of decoys may make targeting far more
difficult by greatly increasing the number of potential targets and complexity
of range-velocity problems. Alternatively, defenders may be able to use

M-
"deflectors extended from potential targets" complicating or at least slowing
o /:
the actual task of target destruction. Another countermeasure showing some
potential is the use of nuclear explosives to artificially ionize the atmos-
phere for the purpose of deflecting the attacking particle-beam. Even if
beam particles are neutral, the ionized and dispersed gas from the top of the





Despite major technical problems which most probably are still to be
overcome, it would be naive to rule out the possibility of PBW development.
Once effectively developed, the particle-beam weapon could prove at least as
effective against important strategic and tactical targets as the high-energy
laser while being hampered by fewer limitations. As in the case of the high-
energy laser, elimination or the threat of elimination of strategic delivery
systems can not help but influence participant expectations and perceptions. A
participant in exclusive possession of an operational PBW would enjoy a quantum
increase in its bases of power. Again, the entire fabric of the existing
strategic balance between the superpowers could be severely strained by the
advent of such a weapons system.
The potential PBW probably shows even greater promise as an efficient
weapon than the laser. The fact it can operate in terrestrial theaters or
in space with equal destructive effect obviously makes it attractive to military
planners searching for multipurpose, multi-theater weapons. The weapon's
reliability may be relatively constant through the entire earth-space arena;
whether in near space, terrestrial zones or a combination of the two. Once
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a mobile weapons system can be achieved, even the line-of-sight limitation of
the PBW will have been overcome allowing virtually unlimited mission capability.
Perhaps even more than the HEL, the PBW could prove a precise and controllable
weapon. These features represent two clear advantages over most conventional
devices and existing weapons of mass destruction.
Noting the import of the particle-beam weapon to U.S. defense policy, one
aviation industry publication observed:
Senior U.S. scientists and engineers believe that this nation
is on the verge of a heated debate over the strategic implications
of charged-particle beam development in the Soviet Union and the U.S.
'That debate is just getting under way and it is likely to rival
the "fortress America Great Defense Debate" in 1952 involving Taft
(Sen. Robert A. Taft) , the B-36 bomber and strategic defense poli-
tics,' one U.S. official said. OC(oo
One of the more dramatic perceptions of the impact of the alleged Soviet
charged-particle beam upon the strategic balance between the two superpowers
is articulated in an Aviation Week and Space Technology editorial by Robert
Hotz:
There also is an element in the Pentagon that can visualize
the eventual Soviet deployment of the directed-energy beam
weapon as the end game of an intricate chess exercise that
began with the 1972 negotiation of the anti-ballistic missile
treaty, which effectively stopped not only U.S. deployment
of an anti-ICBM system but also most of its significant
ongoing research and development. The hypothesis for this
chess game, which ends in the early 1980's with the trium-
phant Soviet shout of 'check and mate,' involves the U.S.
finding its strategic deterrent ballistic missile force stripped
of any defensive system, with the Soviets using their anti-
ICBM directed-energy beam weapon to negate any U.S. retalia-
tion and a strong civil defense shield to minimize damage
from the few warheads that might penetrate. S q
While this foreboding perspective is perhaps recounted for maximum persuasive
impact on Hotz's readers, it nevertheless illustrates at least perceptions of
of strategic imbalance and instability which could result from the deployment
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of a particle-beam weapon. It may well be that the perceptions of the body
politic and ruling elites in participant states as to their state's relative




ASSUMPTIONS, ISSUES AND METHODOLOGY
Some experts were of the opinion that, because the effects of
potential future weapons could have important humanitarian
implications, it was necessary to keep a close watch in order
to develop any prohibitions or limitations that might seem
necessary before the weapon in question had become widely
accepted. (sic)
Conference of Government Experts on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
(Lucerne, Switzerland, 1974)
A. Fundamental Assumptions
The advent of first generation directed-energy weapons now appears
irrevocably imminent. With destructive force of a character and mode not
previously experienced, the introduction of directed-energy weapons is far more
than merely another notch upward in the arms race between the superpowers. So
unique are their qualities and so far reaching their impact upon participant
state strategies in the earth-space arena, that it is crucial to subject these
|
new instruments of warfare to thorough examination. It seems particularly
important that this examination be accomplished on a prospective basis rather
than after costly and politically entrenched decisions are made regarding
production, deployment and use of these new weapons systems.
In pursuing an examination of directed-energy weapons, it is important
to identify certain fundamental assumptions, some of which may be retained
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while others are disgarded to facilitate an analysis of maximum objectivity.
Initially, it is assumed that the world generally exists in a state which the
prominent international legal scholar Professor Myres McDougal refers to as a
"minimum public order" and from which it is disadvantageous to deviate except
in so far as such departure is in pursuit of an improved or optimum world public
order system. Professors McDougal, Lasswell and Vlasic perceive the minimum
public ord"er in the earth-space arena in these terms:
The fundamental constitutional principle of minimum order, so
painfully and tentatively established for the earth arena in recent
times by the United Nations Charter and other authoritative expres-
sions, would thus appear no less indispensable, in all its detailed
nuances, in man's newer, expanding earth-space arena. Most compre-
hensively stated, this principle of minimum order embraces, it may
be recalled, both a negative policy of minimizing coercive changes
and a positive policy of promoting the shaping and sharing of values
by persuasion. In its negative formulations, the principle seeks
to prohibit any unilateral use of intense coercion by one community
against another as a deliberate instrument of special interest. In
its positive formulation, the principle seeks to promote that stabil-
ity in expectations of freedom from arbitrary coercions which is
indispensable to the fullest cooperative activity in the produc-
tion and distribution of values. For the better achievement of
this overriding objective of minimum order, whichever way it may
be formulated, the general community seeks to establish further,
both that major coercion is made its monopoly for inclusive deci-
sion and that, even so controlled, major coercion is but seldom
applied, and then only in the most urgent common interest. noyz
Underlying the legal policy issues and claims analysis which follow" is
the assumption that the maintenance of minimum public order is a desirable
threshold objective for participants in the earth-space arena. It is
further assumed participants will pursue enhancement of exclusive, and occa-
sionally, inclusive, interests through institutions which reflect their expec-
tations and perceptions. Exclusive interests are taken to include the partici-
pant's interest in protecting its security, health, well-being and other values
from external attack as well as its desire to assert unilateral competence
93
over at least its activities in the earth-space arena. Inclusive interests
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are considered to encompass the objective of minimization of unauthorized
violence or coercion between or among participants. Inclusive interests also
include the enhancement of shared competence over activities in the earth-space
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arena as well as the promotion of change through peaceful, persuasive mechanisms.
An assumption is also made that legal policy issues should address, and the
claims analysis be considered in the context of, what has been termed the "earth-
space aren'a." The earth-space arena is taken to include the three terrestrial
theaters of participant military activity: the land, the oceans and the atmosphere.
Additionally, this arena of interaction incorporates a fourth theater referred
to as near space. In certain instances, the arena may reach out to even more
distant areas of outer space. However, it appears the most immediate significant
encounters will be experienced in the terrestrial and near space theaters.
Implicit in this probable eventuality is that the interrelationship between near
space and the terrestrial theaters is often of great import. This import stems
from the fact that many of the directed-energy i^eapons under research and develop-
ment are being designed for comprehensive use throughout this expanded arena.
Moreover, some of these devices may be particularly deployed in one theater, for
example near space, for expected use against targets in another theater, perhaps
surface land facilities. Participants appear to be seeking instruments and
countermeasures which will function from, to and within all four theaters in the
expanded earth-space arena.
While these assumptions are acknowledged at the outset, at least one
prejudice must be exposed and avoided in a juridical analysis of this type.
While it might be convenient and indeed expedient to assume the destructive
potential and unique capabilities of the innovative directed-energy weapon are
inconsistent with the maintenance of minimum world public order, it would be a
myopic analysis which proceeded on this premise. The directed-energy device must
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be viewed in the total context of controlling participant strategies and relevant
experiences in the military, ideological and diplomatic spheres. The analysis
must consider existing military resources available to major state participants.
In analyzing this weapon and its implications to the maintenance of minimum
order, it is important to note the impact existing arsenals have upon the earth-
space arena while speculating as to the effect of a basic change brought on by
the addition of any new coercive device.
In short, by suppressing the commonly held assumption that innovative
weapons of great potential force necessarily impose negative effects upon the
minimum order system, the directed-energy device may be considered not only for
its destructive capabilities, but also in light of any positive influence it
might have in promoting what Professor McDougal refers to as "stability in
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expectations of freedom from arbitrary coercions." While change, particularly
in a form which brings with it elevated potential for destruction of values, may
imply undesirable instability in the minimum order system, such change must
also be recognized as affording new opportunities to those perceptive enough to
grasp them.
B. The Legal Policy Issues
With this understanding of the operative and inoperative assumptions
inherent to this analysis, it is possible to consider a set of legal policy
issues. The threshold question is the extent to which the comprehensive
international legal regime applied in the earth-space arena functions to prohibit
or limit participant research, development, testing, production, deployment and
use of directed-energy weapons. Closely linked to this consideration is the
examination of the extent to which the contemporary law of strategic arms




To the extent an examination of these issues suggests a reliable,
comprehensive and credible regime supportive of the minimum world public order
system and oriented toward an optimum world public order system, it might be
unnecessary to offer further analysis. However, to the extent the regime may
be deficient, a juridical analysis must query to what extent the international
humanitarian law of armed conflict applies to prohibit or limit the research,
development, testing, production, deployment and use of these new weapons.
Having considered the applicable prohibitions against and limitions on directed-
energy weapons provided by these bases of international law, it is important
to evaluate the participant strategies or policies which should be maintained,
developed or pursued to enhance the objective of an optimum world public order
system. What institutional changes are suggested as a possible means either
to restore equilibrium in the minimum world public order system or for the
purpose of advancing toward an optimum world order system embracing extensive
value sharing and minimum unauthorized coercion?
C. Methodology
A consideration and proposed resolution of the various legal policy
issues can effectively be pursued through an evaluation of the institutional
bases for participant claims and counterclaims. With respect to an examination
of each of the issues, it is important to identify the key participants, to
understand their respective interests in the issue and appraise their positions
to the extent they may be known. Unfortunately, to date participant states
engaged in research and development have generally avoided taking official positions
concerning these weapons. Accordingly, analysis of the respective participant
positions, even those of the key superpowers engaged in the principal research and
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development , will have to depend largely upon an evaluation of analogous
circumstances and potentially applicable doctrine. Nevertheless, at least
some preliminary participant interaction seems to be focused on the problems
posed by directed-energy weaponry and is available as a basis for claims
analysis.
For purposes of analysis, claims relating to the permissibility and
impermissibility of new weapons may be divided into two broad categories. The
first of these categories includes claims supporting the prohibition per se
of specific weapons or categories of weapons systems. However, it is not suffici-
ent to merely acknowledge that a claim establishes a prohibition. It is important
to comprehend the parameters of the prohibition itself. Whereas some claims
may propose to prohibit all facets of participant involvement in a weapons
system, others may be prohibitions specifically addressing some particular
phase of the weapon's evolution or application, to wit; its research, development,
testing, production, stockpiling, deployment or actual use in circumstances of
armed conflict.
A second major category of claims and counterclaims includes those which
bear on weapons limitation. This category considers whether participants
have attempted to create restrictions on their actions within one or more phases
in the weapon's evolution or application. Although a limitation may be keyed
to many types of criteria, some of the more typical include controls on destruc-
tive capabilities and characteristics; numbers of weapons produced, stockpiled
or deployed; geopolitical theaters of deployment or use; participants authorized
to be in possession of weapons systems; objectives of lawful attack; how a weapon
is used against particular targets; and circumstances authorizing a weapon's use.
While the absence of empirical evidence in the field of directed-energy weapons
makes analysis of this second category of claims difficult, at least a preliminary
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evaluation may proceed based upon applicable customary and conventional
international law in addition to possible analogous experience.
Having identified the claimants, their respective interests and the
broad weapons control categories of prohibition and limitation, it may be useful
to qualitatively appraise the claims and counterclaims. Do these claims
incorporate comprehensive or limited interests of the participants? Are the
claims asserted through explicit or implicit means? Claims which are asserted
through explicit means are those communicated by some use or transmission of
language. Claims asserted implicitly are manifested through participant
actions. Yet another qualitative feature is whether the claims and counter-
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claims are oriented to the participant's exclusive or inclusive interests.
Finally, a thorough methodological approach must evaluate the principal
claims and counterclaims through a series of identifiable, fixed criteria. For
purposes of this analysis, claims founded on particular institutional bases
will be tested for their applicability to the factual circumstances surrounding
directed-energy weapons. The assumption implicit in this criterion is that the
stronger the apparent logical connection between the legal basis and the factual
context, the more substantial the claim or counterclaim. A second evluative
criterion will query whether the critical base values or interests of the key
participants are served. This criterion assumes that the greater the number of
critical base values supported by a particular institution, the more persuasive
the claim.
Claims and counterclaims may also be evaluated in terms of available
supportive sanctions. A third important criterion surveys the availability of
credible supportive sanctions. The greater the number of available sanctions
and the stronger their individual credibility among participants, the more
persuasive the claims which depend upon such mechanisms for their enforcement.




Claims and counterclaims may also be evaluated in terms of their potential
for achieving consensus participant support. Claims supported by the greatest
number of participant interests, whether inclusive, exclusive or both, will
typically prevail over those which are supported by one or two isolated, weak
interests. This last criterion may be particularly useful for purposes of compar-
ing the various claims and counterclaims relating to the permissibility or
impermissibility of directed-energy weapons.
It is beyond the scope of this study to exhaustively consider all facets
of the legal policy issues. However, the need for a prospective analysis of
directed-energy weapons demands a survey of principal participant claims and
counterclaims. Potential claims and counterclaims viewed as a whole offer
at least a preliminary perspective of the impact of the directed-energy weapon
on the minimum world public order. They also afford a basis from which it is
possible to extrapolate what institutional modifications may be possible and
desirable for the purpose of pursuing the optimum world public order system.

Ill
CONTROL OF DIRECTED-ENERGY WEAPONS
THROUGH THE COMPREHENSIVE INTERNATIONAL LAW
The conclusion to which we must inevitably come, therefore, is
that outer space, like most of the other areas and resources
open to man, will continue to be used, in comprehensive earth-
space value processes, for many varing activities, both military
and nonmilitary, and scientific and nonscientif ic . The only
limitations upon the scope and nature of these activities, apart
from those which states find necessary to the maintenance of
minimum and promotion of optimum order, will be those determined
by the degree of technological progress and scientific knowledge
about space at the disposal of the most advanced user.
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In analyzing the extent of existing prohibitions and limitations on
directed-energy weapons, it is logical to begin by surveying the comprehensive
international law specifically applicable to the earth-space arena. In the
slightly more than two decades during which man has been active in this
expanded arena, he has undertaken to create a substantial legal regime based
upon specially tailored general principles; a brief experience with participant
custom, usage and practice; and a modest but growing number of formal interna-
tional conventions. To the extent that this evolving body of law has sought
to impose explicit prohibitions or limitations on weapons systems in the




directed-energy weapons. A survey of the comprehensive international legal
regime applicable to the earth-space arena reveals three sets of institutional
bases which may be considered as supportive of claims bearing on the prohibition
or limitation of directed-energy weapons.
A. General Principles and the Evolving Customary Law
The first set of institutional bases subject to examination includes
a composite of general principles, practice, usage and a small body of
customary law specifically applicable to the earth-space arena. These various
institutions considered separately are often of limited apparent value with
respect to controlling participant actions. However, taken together they serve
to constrain or guide at least some types of conduct. More important, they
have served as guidelines for the establishment of the comprehensive conventional
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regime created by the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. An examination of these
institutions affords a better understanding of the actions, expectations and
perspectives of the key participants in the earth-space arena. In particular,
it assists in understanding important constructions and interpretations of
the Treaty regime itself.
The genesis of weapon's control in this body of international law can
be traced back to 1957 when President Eisenhower in his State of the Union
Message noted inherent dangers in the development of outer space missiles and
satellites. President Eisenhower expressed American interest in entering into
"any reliable agreement which would . . . mutually control the outer space
missile and satellite development." In connection with the Eisenhower
message, the United States submitted a proposal to the United Nations General




satellites and missiles under international control and inspection. Pres-
sident Eisenhower's message and its concomitant arms control proposal may
have represented the first disarmament initiative applicable to the expanded
earth-space arena.
In the months that followed this first American initiative, there arose
an increasing international awareness and interest in the problems of arms
control and disarmament in the expanded arena. In August of the same year,
a Western proposal for partial disarmament jointly authored by Canada, France,
the United Kingdom and the United States was submitted to the Sub-committee of
the Disarmament Commission. The proposal, like the Eisenhower initiative,
emphasized the need for an inspection and verification mechanism which would
ensure that objects sent through space were exclusively for peaceful and scien-
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tific purposes. The Soviets promptly rejected the Western proposal and
shortly after, on October 4, 1957, startled the international community with
the first successful launching of an artificial earth satellite, Sputnik I.
Following the orbiting of Sputnik I, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Henry
Cabot Lodge, reiterated the Western partial disarmament proposal. The General
Assembly, acting both in response to Ambassador Lodge's call for a U.N.
technical committee to address the key issues of the peaceful and scientific
use of outer space as well as through its own desire to prevent the arms race
from spreading to space, adopted Resolution 1148 (XII). The resolution,
adopted over the opposition of the Soviet bloc socialist states, incorporated
the Western concept of calling for a study of an inspection system designed to
ensure that all objects launched into space would be exclusively for peaceful
and scientific purposes. Of particular import was key language in the resolution
providing one of the earlier applications of the words "weapons of mass destruc-
tion," in connection with a proposal for international disarmament or arms
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control in the expanded arena.
As a result of these early developments, attention was focused on
international arms control in the expanded arena both in bilateral dialogue
between the superpowers and through multilateral interaction within the context
of the United Nations General Assembly or subsidiary U.N. committees or agencies.
President Eisenhower and Soviet Premier Bulganin entered into an exchange of
correspondence in which each decision-maker asserted participant claims bearing
on the scope and means of international arms control. At issue in the
bilateral dialogue was the matter of linkage which the Soviets argued should
exist between the American proposal for peaceful purposes and uses of outer
space and the traditional socialist negotiating demands for liquidation of
overseas military bases by the Western allies. The Western allies countered
Soviet demands for linkage by proposing referral of the overall issue to a
United Nations ad hoc committee.
In November of 1958, the United States and nineteen other countries
co-sponsored a draft resolution calling for the creation of the ad hoc committee.
The Soviets responded with a substantially revised draft resolution which
eliminated their previous demand for an end to all foreign military bases.
The revised Soviet proposal called for the establishment of a U.N. committee
for cooperation in the study of cosmic space. On December 13, 1958, the
General Assembly despite Soviet block opposition, adopted Resolution 1348
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(XIII) establishing an eighteen member Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space. The resolution sought to establish the applicability of
both the United Nations Charter and the Statute of the International Court of
Justice with respect to activities in outer space. Once again it invoked
language referencing the need to pursue "peaceful purposes" and "peaceful




The resultant ad hoc committee commenced a review of possible alternative
legal regimes which might be applied to encourage the "peaceful" conduct of
space operations. However, the committee was hampered by the lack of Soviet
bloc participation and on December 10, 1959, Ambassador Lodge submitted a
draft resolution recommending U.N. efforts to achieve international cooperation
and the peaceful uses of outer space not be further delayed because of the
impass on disarmament which involved among other things the continuing dispute
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over the linkage issue. Within forty-eight hours, the General Assembly
had unanimously adopted Resolution 1472 (XIV) recognizing "the common
interest of mankind ... in furthering the peaceful use of outer space" and
creating a permanent twenty-four member Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space (COPUOS).
Although the unanimous adoption of Resolution 1472 (XIV) signaled the
first major agreement among the principal space resource participants regarding
the general principles upon which a comprehensive legal regime could be based,
disagreement on both the linkage issue and the composition of the committee
itself prevented further immediate progress. The Western allies submitted a
paper on March 16, 1960 to the Committee on Disarmament calling for joint
studies "to assure compliance with an agreement that no nation shall place into
orbit or station in outer space weapons of mass destruction." A few months
later, on June 27, 1960, the United States proposed to the Ten-Nation Committee
on Disarmament that "the placing into orbit or stationing in outer space of
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vehicles carrying weapons capable of mass destruction shall be prohibited.
This was followed by President Eisenhower's farewell address to the U.N.
General Assembly September 22, 1960 in which he detailed a four point disarmament
proposal known as the "Eisenhower Doctrine." In proposing a ban on weapons,




proposed they be applied to an outer space and celestial body regime.
President Kennedy in an address to the General Assembly in September 1961,
reaffirmed the basic principles of the "Eisenhower Doctrine" referencing the
language "peaceful uses" of space and a prohibition of "weapons of mass destruc-
tion." With the Soviet return to COPUOS in 1961, the General Assembly adopted
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Resolution 1721 (XVI) which commended a number of general legal principles
to states with regard to the exploration and use of outer space. The resolu-
tion reiterated the claim that international law including the U.N. Charter
applied to outer space and celestial bodies. It further proclaimed that
outer space was to be considered free for exploration and use by all states
in accordance with international law and would not be considered subject to
national appropriation. In effect, the vast majority of the world community
speaking through the General Assembly had attempted to prescribe a regime of
res communis omnium vice res nullius for the environs of both near space and
outer space.
The bilateral superpower dialogue regarding possible arms control in the
expanded earth-space arena continued in 1962 with the Soviets proffering a
plan in March of that year which among other things called for a prohibition
in the first stage of "orbiting or placing in outer space special devices
capable of carrying mass destruction weapons." As in previous references to
the term "weapons of mass destruction," it was unclear whether the term applied
to innovative weaponry or merely existing systems.
By May of 1962, a COPUOS meeting in Geneva was constructively moving
toward a more fundamental statement of the evolving international space
regime. Outling U.S. policy three days prior to the meeting of the
Legal Sub-Committee, Secretary of State Dean Rusk indicated that one
of three principal U.S. policy objectives in developing an international regime
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in space was the prohibition of placing weapons of mass destruction in orbit.
Secretary Rusk may have provided at least some clue as to the U.S. interpre-
tation of "weapons of mass destruction" with respect to innovative weaponry
when he referred to such things as "orbiting or stationing vehicles carrying
nuclear weapons, military bases on the moon and the military use of weather
control." Although this reference is less than precise, it provides one of
the earlie.r participant applications of the key terminology to possible types
of weaponry or military activity in the expanded arena.
The continuing but somewhat indecisive political posturing that occurred
during the Legal Sub-Committee meeting in Geneva ultimately resulted in the
1 1 8
adoption of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1802 (XVII). The resolution
represented little real progress and was essentially one more generalized
statement of goals and aspirations of the international community for outer
space. When the Legal Sub-Committee convened in spring of 1963, it renewed
efforts to develop a substantive general enumeration of principles applicable
to outer space. For the first time, major exclusive and inclusive interests
of the participants were coming into alignment and the conditions for consensus
were becoming apparent.
Each of the superpowers had completed testing at least its first generation
ICBM's and could claim possession of a crude, but nevertheless operational,
ballistic missile deterrence force. Each superpower had conducted related
nuclear and thermonuclear tests oriented toward the development of operational
warheads for the new ballistic missile force. Morevover, the problem of
weapons verification was somewhat diminished as an essential Western issue by
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the development of reconnaissance and space-tracking facilities. By
using these facilities, it was possible to evaluate the operational capabilities,
if not intentions, of the opponent participant. These developments, in connec-
tion with great pressures from the international community to cease the
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environmentally dangerous nuclear testing, resulted in the Nuclear Test Ban
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Treaty being signed in Moscow August 5, 1963.
In this spirit and largely because the superpowers had concluded that
orbiting nuclear weapons were less efficient than existent ballistic missile
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forces, Foreign Minister Gromyko announced to the General Assembly on
September 19, 1963, that the Soviet Union was prepared to conclude an agree-
ment banning the orbiting of objects carrying nuclear weapons. U.S. Ambassador
to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson responded that the U.S. had no intention
of orbiting weapons of mass destruction, installing them on celestial bodies
or stationing them in outer space. By October of 1963, seventeen nations of
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the eighteen nation U.N. Disarmament Committee presented Resolution 1884 (XVIII)
to the U.N. Political Committee calling for a ban on orbiting nuclear weapons
and other weapons of mass destruction. The resolution was unanimously approved
October 16, 1963 and called on participants to refrain from placing in orbit
around the earth, delivering to celestial bodies or stationing in outer space
in any other manner, weapons of mass destruction.
While Resolution 1884 (XVIII) represented the most definitive statement
yet regarding weapons control in the expanded arena, the General Assembly again
failed to address the exact parameters of the term "weapons of mass destruction"
|
with respect to innovative weapons in the earth-space arena. Moreover,
neither the tacit bilateral Soviet-Americ >.n agreement nor the multilateral
U.N. Disarmament Committee or General Assembly actions sought to impose concrete
controls on any phase or aspect of weaponry beyond actual deployment of the
ambiguous weapons categories. No serious effort was made to ban or limit
research, development or even testing of such weapons systems. These two major
oversights were a harbinger of the ambiguities and troublesome voids which have
largely set the stage for projection of the current superpower arms race into
the expanded earth-space arena.
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The Eighteenth General Assembly took one further action in 1963 generally
acknowledged to be a cornerstone of the comprehensive international law in the
earth-space arena. After additional debate, the Assembly unanimously adopted
U.N. Resolution 1962 (XVIII) on December 13, 1963 entitled "The Declaration of
Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
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of Outer Space." The Declaration represented the culmination of several
years efforts to achieve a consensus on a comprehensive set of general principles
applicable to space. This "magna carta" of the international legal regime for
space offered nine relatively broad principles.
Although none of the nine principles specifically addressed the issue of
coercion or authorized weapon systems in space, paragraph 1 provided "The
exploration and use of outer space shall be carried out for the benefit and in
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the interests of all mankind." In the second pertinent provision, the
Assembly declared in paragraph 4, "The activities of States in the exploration
and use of outer space shall be carried on in accordance with international law,
125including the Charter of the United Nations. ' These two provisions, coupled
with the rather broad language of Resolution 1884 (XVIII) , were to become
cornerstones of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and accordingly are of some signifi-
cance as a basis for potential claims prohibiting or limiting directed-energy
weapons
.
While the precise juridical impact of this myriad of United Nations
resolutions, multilateral declarations and bilateral exchanges may be less than
clear, a limited body of international customary law seems to have surfaced
through the claims-counterclaims process. In referring to the earlier unani-
mous adoption of General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI), former Deputy Legal




General Assembly resolution proclaims principles of international law - - as
resolution 1721 has done - - and was adopted unanimously, it represents the law
generally accepted in the international community."
While Mr. Meeker's observation may represent something of an oversimplifi-
cation if not an overstatement, it is probably accurate to say that the 1963
Declaration of Principles, in conjunction with the other multilateral and
bilateral initiatives, constitutes an international consensus among space
resource states as to at least two fundamental concepts. First, that the
general body of international law including the U.N. Charter is as applicable
to the expanded earth-space arena as to the traditional terrestrial theaters.
Secondly, that in consequence of continuously expressed, although perhaps
ethereal references to peaceful purposes, peaceful uses and banning nuclear or other
weapons of mass destruction from space, participants harbor some notion that
their interests, both exclusive and inclusive, can be enhanced through control
of coercive devices in this expanded arena.
It is important in examining these early general principles, to observe
that while they may aid in the preliminary formulation of a customary inter-
national law applicable to the expanded earth-space arena, as institutions they
do not offer a viable basis for either the prohibition or limitation of directed-
energy weaponry. These general principles are devoid of either reliable or
credible sanctioning mechanisms. The mechanisms which are available
depend upon the unreliable interest of the individual participant in projecting
an image as a "responsible member" of the world community. Even the limited
effect of this sanction is constrained by the inherent ambiguities of the general
principles themselves. The fact participants from 1957 through the evolution
of the more refined Declaration of 1963 consistently avoided concrete defini-
tions within the context of the expanded arena with respect to terminology such
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as "peaceful purposes" and "weapons of mass destruction" only served to encourage
exclusive, self-serving interpretations. Such interpretations could hardly be
construed as consistent with the establishment of any responsible international
arms prohibition or limitation mechanism.
Claims based upon these concepts may be further blunted by the fact
that if read broadly, these principles are not always aligned with participant
interests. It is true that superpower participants through their tacit
agreement eventually moved to prohibit orbital deployment of nuclear weapons and
other weapons of mass destruction. Yet this agreement was achieved only after
it appeared these systems were relatively inefficient. The relatively more
efficient nuclear armed ICBM forces in conjunction with the development of
technological means which allowed participants to freely reconnoiter and
verify the activities of their adversaries, were the true foundations for
weapons control in space. Hence, the general principles as manifested in these
early resolutions and initiatives can only be safely considered within the
relatively narrow context in which they were drafted. One need only consider the
fact that no participant seriously contended that these principles would act
to prohibit or even limit the transit of intercontinental ballistic missiles
through near space. "" , Nor were these principles interpreted so broadly as to
limit the orbiting of early military reconnaissance and sensing satellite
systems such as SAMOS and MIDAS. In short, the ambiguity and the absence of
credible sanctioning mechanisms eliminates these principles as a persuasive insti-
tutional basis upon which claims to arms control may be founded. These concepts





B. Conventional Regime: The Outer Space Treaty
On the same day that the Eighteenth General Assembly unanimously accepted
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the Declaration of Legal Principles, it adopted Resolution 1963 (XVIII)
requesting COPUOS continue its study of legal problems which arise in connection
with the exploration and use of outer space. The resolution further recommended
the development of an international agreement establishing legal principles to
govern activities in the arena. In response, the Legal Sub-Committee met again
during October of 1964 for the purpose of developing a treaty to provide for
the assistance and return of astronauts. Additionally, the Legal Sub-Committee
turned its attention to a proposed agreement on tort liability resulting from
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space exploration and use. Although major space resource states regarded
these agreements as progress toward a comprehensive legal regime for space, it
was clear the two instruments did not offer the pervasive treaty requested in
Resolution 1963 (XVIII)
.
During the Twentieth Session of the General Assembly, U.S. United
Nations Ambassador Arthur Goldberg proposed consideration of a comprehensive
treaty on the exploration of celestial bodies. Goldberg subsequently advised
the Political Committee that the United States intended to present such a
proposal. His proposals were essentially incorporated by the General Assembly
into Resolution 2130 (XX) which received unanimous approval in December of
129
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1965. In May of 1966, President Johnson announced that the United States
J
would seek a treaty through the United Nations to lay down "rules and procedures
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I for the exploration of celestial bodies. In listing "essential elements"
for such a treaty, the President again invoked language similar to that
previously adopted in the general principles of Resolution 1884 (XVIII) banning
weapons of mass destruction for certain areas of space. He proposed the treaty

provide prohibitions against stationing of mass destruction weapons on
celestial bodies. The President also proposed such prohibitions extend to
weapon tests and military maneuvers on such bodies.
COPUOS undertook consideration of the Johnson treaty proposal the same
month and was soon in receipt of a Soviet counterproposal suggesting the 1963
Declaration of Legal Principles be upgraded to the status of an international
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agreement. On June 16, 1966, both the United States and the Soviet Union
submitted draft treaties. Negotiations among the major space resource states
followed in a surprisingly constructive atmosphere. The U.S. draft treaty
offered a legal regime which covered only celestial bodies. Two provisions in
the American draft specifically related to arms control. Article 8 again invoked
the familiar language regarding prohibition of weapons of mass destruction
stating, "In accordance with the sense of General Assembly Resolution 1884
(XVIII), adopted by acclamation on October 17, 1963, no State shall station on
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or near a celestial body any nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction."
Article 9 of the U.S. treaty proposal reiterated the general principle of
peaceful purposes and sought to limit certain specific military activity on
celestial bodies:
Celestial bodies shall be used for peaceful purposes only. All
States undertake to refrain from conducting on celestial bodies
any activities such as the establishment of military fortifications,
the carrying out of military maneuvers, or the testing of any, type
of weapons. The use of military personnel, facilities or equipment
for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not
be prohibited. ,
_
The Soviet draft treaty, in contrast to the American version, included
the entire space arena. The pertinent arms control provisions of the Soviet
draft were contained in Article IV:
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The Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit
around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or other
weapons of mass destruction and not to station such weapons on
celestrial bodies or otherwise to station them in outer space.
The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used exclusively
for peaceful purposes by all Parties to the Treaty. The estab-
lishment of military bases and installations, the testing of
weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial




Again the key principles of the use of space for exclusively peaceful purposes
and the prohibition of nuclear or any other weapons of mass destruction play
a dominant role in the text. Since the U.S. had previously supported
Resolution 1884 (XVIII) which purported to prohibit nuclear or other weapons
of mass destruction from various other areas in space, no significant objections
were raised to the Soviet plan for a relatively pervasive regime not limited
to celestial bodies. On July 20, 1966, the U.S. accepted the Soviet proposition
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that the scope of the treaty negotiations consider the entire outer space arena.
Remaining differences between the states participating in Treaty
negotiations were relatively minor. Private consultations continued during
the General Assembly session and by December a consensus draft had been
achieved. On December 19, 1966, the General Assembly approved the proposed
draft treaty by acclamation. The Treaty was opened for signature at Washington,
1 3 f-i
London, and Moscow on January 27, 1967. The U.S. Senate gave unanimous
consent to the Treaty's ratification and the agreement entered into force on
October 10, 1967. Known formally as the Treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the
Moon and other Celestial Bodies, it is commonly referred to as the Outer Space
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Treaty. J/
The Treaty provides an institutional framework of international law
applicable to outer space. To a large extent, the final text represents a
law declaratory instrument codifying not only general principles announced through
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General Assembly resolutions in the preceding ten year period, but also space
resource participant practices and customs. Because it is substantially a
document of codification, the Outer Space Treaty is indicative of the state of
international law applicable to the space theater. Accordingly, the Treaty may
constitute a ready institutional basis for claims and counterclaims bearing on
weapons control in the expanded earth-space arena.
As a general principle of international law applicable to the conduct of
national and multinational participant actions in space, the Treaty again invokes
the general principles of peaceful purposes and peaceful uses. In preambular
provisions of the Treaty, reference is made to "the exploration and use of
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outer space for peaceful purposes." " Resolution 1962 (XVIII), the Declara-
tion of Legal Principles, and Resolution 1884 (XVIII) , dealing with the obliga-
tion of states to refrain from the stationing of nuclear weapons or other
weapons of mass destruction in space, are also specifically noted in the
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Preamble to the Treaty.
Immediately preceded by two general articles providing for international
cooperation and a proscription on national appropriation in connection with
outer space exploratory activities, Article III proclaims:
States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the
exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other
celestial bodies, in accordance with international law, including
the Charter to the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining
international peace and security and promoting international
co-operation and understanding.
,
Judging from these and other equally prominent references to "peace," "peaceful
purposes" and "peaceful uses" found throughout the Treaty, it is apparent that
this general principle was of some import to the drafters. Such terminology
might at first glance suggest a possible basis for claims which assert the

-56-
impermissibility of weapons systems in space.
As is exhaustively explored in the legal literature surrounding the
interpretation of the Treaty, significant interpretative differences existed
between socialist and Western state participants as to the precise definition
of the terms "peaceful purposes" and "peaceful uses." The Soviet bloc
position as interpreted through the socialist dialectic of the law of peaceful
coexistence maintained this language was synonymous with "nonmilitary . " This
early Soviet position, articulated even prior to Treaty negotiations, was largely
L predicated upon the policy needs of the socialist states to provide a framework
for interpreting the United States satellite reconnaissance of Eastern bloc
territories as a violation of international law. The Soviets argued that under
a correct interpretation of "peaceful purposes" all military use of outer space,
particularly the use of near space for reconnaissance satellites, was ipso
i 141{jure illegal.
Had the international community concurred that "peaceful purposes" and
"peaceful uses" were synonymous with nonmilitary activity and had such
interpretation been enforcible through the application of reliable sanctions,
the impending generation of directed-energy weapons might well be subject to
prohibition or limitation, at least with respect to near space, through the
general principles of the Treaty. Whether such an interpretation, had it been
adopted, would have withstood the forceful challenge of the claims asserting the
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permissibility of the directed-energy weapon, is quite another question. It
may well be that some of the early efforts of the socialist and Western states
alike to broadly interpret "peaceful purposes" would have been compromised in
any case when confronted with the potent claims based on participant's exclu-
sive national security interests. A participant state in pursuit of its
national security interests might have been inclined to disavow its earlier
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interpretation of these general principles if it considered the deployment or
use of the directed-energy weapon overridingly essential to either the maintenance
of its relative power position among other nations or, even more critically, its
very existence as an independent state.
The second and ultimately prevailing interpretation of "peaceful
purposes" and "peaceful uses," as used in the Treaty and other international
institutions was advanced by the United States. The United States argued that
. . .-,. . - . .142
these terms authorized military activity so long as it was nonaggressive.
Professor P. G. Dernbling, a member of the U.S. delegation to the Legal Sub-
Committee of COPUOS, in a study coauthored by Arons , reiterated the U.S. inter-
pretation noting "(0)ne might conclude that any use of outer space must be
restricted to non-aggressive purposes in view of Article III, which makes
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applicable international law, including the Charter of the United Nations."
Under this view, early U.S. satellite reconnaissance efforts, designed
to ensure national and collective security for the U.S. and its allies by
providing a means of advance warning of a preemptive Soviet attack, could be
fully justified as consistent with international law. The United States
argument was at least in part predicated upon the Antarctic Treaty which also
invokes the terminology of "peaceful purposes" but which has not been inter-
preted so as to prohibit nonaggressive military use or involvement in explora-
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tory or scientific activities.
The most persuasive argument, however , that the use of "peaceful purposes"
and "peaceful uses" should be narrowly interpreted stems from a careful
reading of the constraints on weapons and military activity contained in the
Treaty itself. Pertinent Article IV provides:
States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit
around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any
other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons
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on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in
any other manner.
The Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all
States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes.
The establishment of military bases, installations and forti-
fications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct
of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies shall be forbidden.
The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful






While under the terms of Article IV, states parties are enjoined to use the
moon and celestial bodies for peaceful purposes, there is no application of
such language to near space or even outer space beyond the introductory refer-
ence made to the general principles in the preambular provisions of the Treaty.
Moreover, the second paragraph provides relatively narrow proscriptions with
regard to the establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications,
testing of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers on celestrial bodies.
Indeed these particular prohibitions explicitly exclude near space, outer space
and possibly even the moon itself.
Applying the rule of legal construction inclusio unius est exclusi-o
altevius to the Article IV text and considering the prominently publicized
military activities of the participant state superpowers before, at the time and
subsequent to the adoption of the Treaty, there is little doubt but that
references to the general principles of "peaceful purposes" and "peaceful uses"
of outer space must be interpreted narrowly so as to authorize virtually all
military activity in space not expressly prohibited. A number of legal scholars
in their analyses of the Treaty would seem to confirm this reading of Article IV
146
and the Treaty in general.
In refering to the scope of Article IV and its prohibitions within the
general principle of "peaceful purposes," a former Secretary General of the
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United Nations commented, " (T)he door is not yet barred against military
activities in space. The crux of the difficulty is that space activity is
already part of the arms race, a fact which we have to reckon with until humanity
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reaches the stage of an agreement on full and complete disarmament."
Further corroborating a restricted reading of the Treaty so as to construe a
wide range of military activities as consistent with "peaceful purposes" and
"peaceful uses," a serious but ineffectual effort was mounted by some state
participants in the late 1960's to redraft and extend the scope of Article IV.
Italy in a letter dated September 9, 1968 requested the inclusion of such a
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proposal on the agenda of the 23rd Session of the General Assembly. Affirma-
tive action was not taken on the Italian proposal and it was ultimately
dropped because of tacit assurances from the major space resource states that
deficiencies in the Treaty would not be exploited for unilateral military
advantage.
There appears no strong foundation for claims of weapons prohibition or
limitation based upon an argument that "peaceful purposes" or "peaceful uses"
are synonymous with nonmilitary activity. If, however, military activity
possibly including deployment of arms is authorized under the prevailing inter-
pretation of the Treaty, a juridical analysis must determine whether any
proscriptions do exist to such participant actions. Concomitantly, it must
be determined whether such proscriptions specifically apply to directed-energy
weapons systems and what the precise nature of these controls might be.
The salient language in the Treaty bearing on weapons control is
enunciated in Article IV(1) , "States Parties to the Treaty undertake not
to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any
other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial
bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner. (emphasis added)
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Whether directed-energy weapons are subject to controls of any sort in effect
depends on whether they are considered within these identified categories.
Unfortunately, no provision in the Treaty attempts to define the terminology
"nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction."
This so-called "no bombs in orbit provision" contained in Article IV(1)
is a direct descendant of General Assembly Resolution 1884 (XVIII) . The
unanimous -adoption of this resolution may have been instrumental in both
superpowers incorporating the language in their draft treaties and supporting
its inclusion in the final consensus document. Article IV(1) does make it
reasonably clear that deployment of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons in
orbit is prohibited per se. However, the relative clarity of this proscription
is offset by major ambiguities inherent in the residual text. What constitutes
placing an object "in orbit around the Earth"? What is the meaning of the
words "install" or "station" with regard to proscriptions bearing on the
placement of weapons? In particular, what constitutes "any other kinds of
weapons of mass destruction"? There may even be a question relative to the
less ambiguous language concerning nuclear weaponry. What really constitutes
a "nuclear weapon" for purposes of the Treaty? The answers to these questions
bear directly upon the threshold query of the extent to which the comprehensive
international law applicable to the earth-space regime controls directed-energy
weaponry.
There is little consensus in either academic or political circles as to
precisely what is meant in the use of the language "any other kinds of weapons
of mass destruction." Professor Ogunbanwo offers one of many interpretations in
his analysis of the Treaty. He notes: "The expression 'weapons of mass destruc-
tion 1 should be interpreted to include chemical, bacteriological, and any type
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of weapon which could lead to the same type of catastrophy that a nuclear
152
weapon could lead to." The Ogunbanwo interpretation is founded upon a
belief that a general purpose interpretation of Article IV(1) would effectively
prohibit devices which, like nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons, have
the capability of inflicting damage to extensive geographical areas or injury
to substantial populations. What is not clear from Ogunbanwo 's analysis is
precisely where he draws the line as to what destructive potential the weapon
must actually have before it may be said to be a device which could lead to
"catastrophy." Nor is it clear whether he draws any distinction as to the
precision or discriminating characteristics of a weapon. Would the relatively
discriminating weapon qualify notwithstanding the fact it has destructive
potential comparable with a tactical or even strategic nuclear weapon? Would
it make a difference that a weapon with great destructive potential could still
be precisely trained on a military objective of great strategic value?
A second, if not equally ambiguous interpretation, may be taken to
represent the official U.S. Government perception of the key Article IV(1) lan-
guage. Former United States U.N. Ambassador Arthur Goldberg offered the
following testimony in a dialogue with Senator Carlson at a 1967 Senate
Committee hearing considering the impact of the Treaty on then existing U.S.
space programs:
Senator Carlson. With respect to article IV, will you describe
what is a weapon of mass destruction?
Mr. Goldberg. This is a weapon of comparable capability of
annihilation to a nuclear weapon, bacteriological, (sic) It does
not retate to a convent-tonal weapon, (emphasis added)
Senator Carlson. This sounds ridiculous and wild, but I
think I am correct in stating there was some thought of placing
a satellite over Vietnam to keep that country lighted all night.
Mr. Goldberg. This would have no application.
Senator Carlson. This would have no application to that?
Mr. Goldberg. No. Observation satellites, navigational
satellites, those are not covered by this treaty.
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Senator Carlson. In other words, if we had done that and it
could have been done, and I think it was actually considered in
part of our military operation, it would not be affected?
Mr. Goldberg. It would not be affected by one iota by this
treaty, (sic)
This interesting, albeit somewhat confused and less than articulate dialogue,
illustrates the U.S. view that while the Article IV(1) provisions may proscribe
weapons of comparable annihilative capability to devices using nuclear or
bacteriolo'gical means of destruction, they would not bar the introduction of
a more selective or conventional instrument. The analysis appears to parallel
that of Professor Ogunbanwo to the extent it would define weapons of mass
destruction in terms of annihilative or catastrophic destructive potential
comparable to nuclear or bacteriological devices. However, whereas Ogunbanwo
would apparently apply such standards to all coercive instruments, Ambassador
Goldberg would exclude conventional weapons, notwithstanding the fact some may
154indeed possess tremendous destructive potential of their own.
Another weakness with Ambassador Goldberg's formulation is that it
defines one ambiguous concept in terms of another. He does not make clear
what he has in mind when he refers to a ^conventional weapon." Nevertheless, it
may be inferred from this definition that if a weapon is not a conventional
device, it may qualify as a weapon of mass destruction. The question remains -
if a hypothetical device is neither conventional nor a weapon of mass destruc-
tion because of its characteristics, then how is it classified? The effect of
these open-ended definitions presented by Professor Ogunbanwo and Ambassador
Goldberg is that they offer no concrete criteria for appraising the applicability
of Article IV(1) to innovative weapons which do not lend themselves to classi-
fication within the traditional categories of conventional, nuclear, chemical or
bacteriological weapons.
The most definitive expression of the term offered by the United Nations
itself is found in a resolution of the Commission for Conventional Armaments
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dated August 12, 1948. The resolution defined weapons of mass destruction
as "atomic explosive weapons, radio-active material weapons, lethal chemical
and biological weapons and any weapons developed in the future which have
characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb
or other weapons mentioned above." ' (emphasis added) Some degree of continued
U.N. support for this definitional concept is evidenced by the specific reaffirma-
tion contained in General Assembly Resolution 84B adopted in December of 1977.
This resolution recognizes the problem of adapting the definition of 1948 to
innovative weaponry. The resolution recognizes "that new weapons might be
evolved on the basis of scientific principles other than those used in the
weapons named in the 1948 definition of weapons of mass destruction. "
The fact that General Assembly Resolution 84B (XXXII) purports to
reaffirm the 1948 U.N. definition of weapons of mass destruction while concur-
rently recognizing the advent of new weaponry based upon innovative scientific
principles suggests some basis for arguing that directed-energy weapons may
be proscribed by Article IV(1) of the Treaty. However, at least two grounds
exist upon which to base a counterclaim to this assertion.
First, while Resolution 84B (XXXII) received a substantial degree of
support from the membership of the General Assembly, the vote was far from
unanimous. Although only Albania voted against the proposal, the socialist bloc
states and a number of the third world countries chose to abstain. A claim
; dependent upon a reading of the earlier U.N. definition to include weapons based
[bn scientific principles other than those used in the weapons specifically
mentioned in the 1948 statement, to be persuasive , requires a consensus of at least
hose participants possessing or developing these weapons systems. That claim
s significantly weakened when a substantial bloc of participant states, which
ot only possess the traditional weapons of mass destruction but may be develop-
ng innovative weapons as well, choose to abstain from an effort to interpret
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th e 1948 definition as all inclusive.
A second ground upon which a counterclaim could be based is that even
if Resolution 84B (XXXII) had been unanimously adopted, the 1948 definition
would remain dangerously open-ended. The language in the 1948 definition
"which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the
atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above" requires interpretation. As
long as participants are authorized to render unilateral interpretations of that
language, there is no objective standard for ascertaining which weapons are
proscribed in Article IV(1) as weapons of mass destruction. Although efforts
have been made to quantify the destructive effects of weapons, there is no
indication the international community is prepared to adopt any universal
criteria for appraising weaponry on this basis.
The one thing which all these definitions of weapons of mass destruction
appear to share is a notion that the method and level of destruction is a
principal determinative factor in weapons classification. At the risk of over-
simplification, it may be possible to infer from these statements that the more
indiscriminate and less controllable a weapon tends to be and the greater its
aggregate destructive force, the more likely it will be classified as a
!
"weapon of mass destruction." If such an inference can be drawn, based upon
the projected capabilities of high-energy laser and the partiele-beam weapon,
there would be a persuasive claim to inapplicability of Article IV(1) . If
indeed the extent and degree of destruction to human values and the indiscriminate
character of the device are criteria for classification, it could be argued that
each of these directed-energy devices may be operated with sufficient precision
so as to avoid undesirable ancillary destruction or adverse environmental impact
in areas tangent to the target.
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It is the potential for discriminating and controllable use of the
high-energy laser and particle-beam weapon which makes these instruments
attractive candidates for participant military arsenals. Their probable use
and design does not suggest easy comparison with nuclear, thermonuclear, chemical
or bacteriological weapons which tend to exhibit the potential for ancillary
destruction and injury.
At least one technical writer who has considered the coercive capabilities
of the high-energy laser does not regard it as a weapon of mass destruction.
William Beane in his analysis of the HEL observes:
(T)he laser has other attributes, at least in the eyes of some.
It is a clean, discriminating weapon, not one of mass destruc-
tion. When used where it can deliver lethal energy to a target,
it could disintegrate, incinerate, melt, vaporize or cause to
collapse planes, missiles, warheads, re-entry bodies, buildings
or men, one at a time. Given its speed and precision, it can
be used to do so only if its targets are themselves threatening.
Because the laser is unique, it can be used in unique ways.
(emphasis added)
ljo
While acknowledging the tremendous destructive potential of the high-energy laser,
it is interesting that Beane nevertheless regards its discriminating character-
istics as sufficient to exclude it from the category of weapons of mass destruc-
tion.
Another reference to the question of Article IV(1) applicability to
159directed-energy weapons appears in a 1968 law review article by John Orr.
| In his analysis of the arms control provisions of the Outer Space Treaty, Orr
explores not only the meaning of "weapons of mass destruction" but also the
implications suggested by the language "nuclear weapons." Referring to
weapons of mass destruction," Orr generally concurs with other analysts that the
Treaty prohibits arms which employ bacteriological and chemical agents to reap
1 60
their destruction. He also agrees that Article IV(1) probably does not apply
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to even the most massive of conventional explosive devices, but that in all
other respects the meaning of "weapons of mass destruction" turns upon the extent
of destruction or loss of human life.
Of greater significance, is Orr's analysis of whether an "atomic heat
ray" would be permissible under the Article IV(1) language prohibiting "nuclear
weapons" in orbit around the earth. He notes:
Even a term seemingly so clear as "nuclear weapon" is subject to
conflicting interpretations when read in the context of a particular
military system. One long range proposal for a defensive system
against missiles includes a satellite using a focused beam of radia-
tion from a nuclear reactor as an atomic heat ray to destroy an
enemy missile.
A nuclear reactor used as the source of a radiation beam differs
from the usual nuclear weapon in that it does not explode. While
it is nuclear and a weapon, it is not necessarily therefore a weapon
of mass destruction. Article IV could be read as prohibiting only
nuclear weapons of mass destruction. Some support is found for this
view in the Treaty language "nuclear weapons or any othev kinds of
Weapons of mass destruction .... It could be argued that the use
of "other" implies that nuclear weapons were included only as an
example of what the Treaty provision was actually intended to pro-
hibit - weapons of mass destruction. This being true, then the
status of a nuclear weapon under the Treaty should be decided on





Orr hastens to make clear however, that this argument is not accepted by the
United States Department of State:
In rejecting this argument, the Legal Adviser to the Secretary
of State, Leonard C. Meeker, stated that 'any nuclear weapon is
forbidden in space . . . (e)ven a small one is considered . . .
to be a weapon of mass destruction. ' His interpretation of the
language would read 'other' as assimilating nuclear weapons to
weapons of mass destruction, and prohibiting both.
loz
Although Orr fails to fully explain all the implications and bases for this
argument, he nevertheless suggests an interesting basis for the development of
a claim. It appears an argument exists that the language "nuclear weapons"
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encompasses devices that produce massive destruction in the target area. Such
an argument assumes that perhaps some types of nuclear weapons, particularly
nonexplosive or discriminating devices, may not constitute weapons of mass
destruction. Specifically, despite the fact the PBW or "atomic heat ray" may
depend upon a nuclear reaction to generate a beam, the fact such instrument
may be able to destroy discriminately may remove it from the proscribed
category o.f weapons.
Another view pertaining to which weapons may be proscribed under
Article IV(1) of the Treaty is offered by space law authority Stephen
Gorove. Gorove observes:
It may be presumed that all arms which utilize atomic energy in
accomplishing their intended purpose, irrespective of their size or
destructive force, would be regarded as nuclear weapons. At the
same time, it also may be assumed that conventional weapons do not
come under the category of either nuclear weapons or any other
weapons of mass destruction. While there is no indication in the
Treaty as to how many people must be affected to constitute a
weapon of mass destruction, a group of 20 to 30 people or less
probably would not constitute such a mass. If on the other hand,
bacteriological and chemical weapons were used, even against a
small group, then these weapons would seem to fall under the
category of weapons of mass destruction, (emphasis added)
Gorove 's "assumptions" bring him perilously to conclude all nuclear,
i
bacteriological and chemical weapons are proscribed without reference to their
destructive potentialities. Without further qualification, it would seem such
an analysis would prohibit even nonlethal devices within these categories.
Even the relatively innocuous tear gas, under this analysis, constitutes a
|
proscribed weapon of mass destruction. Moreover, as in the case of other
definitions, the somewhat superficial conclusion is reached that weapons of
mass destruction must automatically exclude all conventional weapons systems
without regard to their destructive potential . Apparently the only questionable
category for Gorove would be instruments of coercion which have not been
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previously classified as nuclear, chemical, bacteriological or conventional.
In this case, he would inquire as to their potential to "affect" some unde-
termined number of people, apparently greater than twenty to thirty in number.
The Gorove interpretation is of little benefit in interpreting Article
IV(1). To the extent that the PBW could be regarded as a nuclear device, it
might be proscribed regardless of its discriminating characteristics. The
high-energy laser, assuming it was not regarded as a chemical weapon and
accordingly proscribed ipso jure, would presumably fall into the nebulous
category of unclassified weapons. If so, under Gorove 's analysis, the HEL
device would then be judged as to its "affect" on the unspecified number of
persons.
Elsewhere in his analysis and with reference to a second major ambi-
guity in Article IV(1) , Gorove propounds a somewhat more concrete interpre-
tation of whether the high-energy laser qualifies as a weapon of mass destruc-
tion:
The primary obligation in paragraph one ^Article IV(1)J concerning
'nuclear weapons and any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction'
is that the states parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in
orbit around the earth any objects carrying such weapons. The phrase
'orbit around the earth' clearly implies that a full orbit rather than
a fractional orbit or suborbital flight is intended. Thus, the pro-
vision is not meant to outlaw the use of ICBM's with nuclear warheads.
At the same time, an orbiting missile killer or laser would he prohib-
itedj regardless of whether or not it was intended for defensive or
offensive purposes, (emphasis added) ,,
Implicit in this pronouncement is Gorove ' s assumption that lasers and other
missile killers" are automatically included as weapons of mass destruction.
Under Gorove 's interpretation, it would seem even the antisatellite inter-
ceptor vehicles currently under development would be proscribed if they had
the capability of destroying a manueverable vehicle notwithstanding the fact
the first generation of such devices will probably destroy their prey by
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exploding shrapnel with conventional charges or, alternatively , through direct
high velocity impact with the target. Gorove ' s analysis of laser and
missile killer weapons in some respects appears to contradict his general
thesis regarding the criterion of destructive "affect" on the undetermined
number of people.
Gorove ' s overall interpretation of Article IV is that it should be
construed so as to prohibit activities which constitute a threat to national
security. He would examine the nature of the activity and determine
whether it should be prohibited. However, his assessment of the laser and
missile killer seems to ignor not only the language of the Treaty itself but
falls error to the unsupported and prejudicial assumption that weapons not
clearly authorized, should when possible, be interpreted as illegal and a
threat to the minimum world public order system. He assumes further that such
weapons pose more than a minimal threat to national security. As indicated
earlier, this is an assumption which if not analyzed fully can produce super-
ficially attractive but legally erroneous results. While there may be merit in
Gorove' s interpretative concept, it would be far more persuasive if its
determination of a weapon's threat to national security was based upon an
indepth analysis of the instrument itself rather than upon assumptions as to
its legality.
Amplifying the ambiguity inherent in Article IV(1) is the issue of
what is meant by "to place in orbit around the Earth." Again the text of the
Treaty and even the travaux-preparatoires offer little guidance in interpreting
this key phrase. As in the case of other ambiguous terminology in Article
IV(1), the analyst must examine other interpretative evidence such as the appar-
ent intentions and conduct of the participants both when entering into and
subsequent to the Treaty's coming into force.
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At issue is the point at which an object may be said to be "in orbit"
for purposes of the prohibition. Is it necessary that the object actually
circumnavigate the earth or is it sufficient that it merely have such potential
if allowed to pursue its natural course? This question may be examined in
light of at least some empirical evidence of participant state actions and
interpretations. Concurrently with the negotiation and entering into force of
the Outer _Space Treaty, the Soviet Union tested its Fractional Orbital Bombard-
ment System (FOBS). The FOBS was designed to launch a nuclear or thermonuclear
warhead into a near earth orbit of about 100 miles altitude. Once the launched
FOBS warhead approached its target and before it had completed one earth orbit,
retrorockets slowed the device causing it to drop on the objective. The
apparent Soviet objective in developing FOBS was to provide a delivery system
which could achieve a surprise nuclear strike. Since the Western distant early
warning system was essentially oriented toward detection of an ICBM or bomber
attack launched through a north polar trajectory, the FOBS would offer the
Soviets the capability of delivering a surprise strike by sending nuclear devices
through the unmonitored Southern Hemisphere. 168
The immediate question was whether the partial orbit of the FOBS violated
Article IV(1). The U.S. Government's interpretation was equivocal at best.
i Ambassador Goldberg called the testing of the FOBS "a matter of great concern"
but offered no comment as to the legality of the Soviet testing under the Treaty
jor any other aspect of international law. 169 The National Aeronautics and
Space Administration offered a definition of "orbit" which seemed however, to
render the FOBS in violation of the Treaty. NASA defined orbit as "the path
of a body under the influence of a gravitational or other force
. . . path rela-
tive to another body around which it revolves." 170 This definition rendered
t least the actual use of the Soviet FOBS in violation of the Article IV(1)

-71-
provisions since it was based on whether a vehicle achieved a path which would
lead to circumnavigation of the earth. The NASA definition disregarded the fact
of whether circumnavigation actually resulted.
In contrast, Gorove argued that "The phrase 'orbit around the earth'
clearly implies that a full orbit rather than a fractional orbit or suborbital
flight is intended." ' The facts suggest at least unofficial if not
official concurrence with this view of FOBS legality under the Treaty. The
Department of Defense issued a statement in November of 1967 that "weapons that
172
do not stay in space for one complete orbit are not considered to be in space."
Subsequently, space technology journalist William Leavitt reported that Secre-
tary of Defense Robert McNamara as well as Secretary of State Dean Rusk had
publicly disclosed their views that the Soviet FOBS did not violate the provisions
r i. m 173
of the Treaty.
Additional views on the interpretation of this language are offered by
Orr in his analysis of the Treaty:
In looking at the entire Treaty to ascertain purpose, the
language of Article I requiring the ' use of outer space . . .
in the interests of all countries' seems to weigh against the
propriety of FOBS. While an ICBM simply passes through space
while travelling between two points on earth, a FOBS vehicle
'uses' space in the sense that a satellite 'uses' space to
remain in orbit.
On the other hand the brief time spent in space by a FOBS
vehicle, more or less corresponding to that spent by an ICBM,
could justify analogizing it to an ICBM, which does not vio-
late the Treaty. In further defense of FOBS, it should be
noted that the United States knew about the probable develop-
ment of the Soviet FOBS during negotiations of the Treaty and
failed to object to it during or since that time.
Orr suggests that the principle of "peaceful uses" invoked by the Treaty may
be an argument against the FOBS. However, he correctly notes the persuasive
value of this argument is diminished by the fact the ICBM which by practice
and tacit mutual consent of the superpowers is rather clearly a permissible
space vehicle. In recognizing the analogy between the FOBS and ICBM, it
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should be remembered that the ICBM's ballistic trajectory is very similar to the
partial orbit employed by the Soviet FOBS. The essential difference is that
the ballistic missile trajectory is sufficiently elliptical to bring it back
to earth by function of its own path whereas the FOBS uses a relatively more
circular orbit which requires inducement to bring the warhead down on target.
The persuasive weight of authority, particularly in view of unilateral
acquiescence by the United States to the FOBS testing, is that a complete orbit
of the proscribed weapon must be completed before Article IV(1) can be invoked.
Hence, regardless of whether the PBW and HEL are classified as weapons of mass
destruction, if they are deployed in only partial orbits, they are not
violative of Article IV(1) of the Treaty. The same is true if they are used
in a ballistic trajectory. It must be said that deployment limited to a
partial orbit or ballistic trajectory would generally not be a cost-effective
way to utilize a directed-energy weapon. Typically, such devices would be of
greatest value if stationed on a relatively permanent basis in near space
where they might be used as the destructive mechanism in either a antisatellite
(ASAT) or antiballistic missile (ABM) system. However, should such devices
eventually be capable of efficient application against land or sea targets, the
exception to the application of Article IV(1) based on the need for a fully
orbiting device would allow an attacker to employ these weapons. A high-energy
laser, for example, might be launched into a nonorbital trajectory sufficiently
high to allow it to engage in a rapid firing attack on enemy positions.
Following the limited time attack, the laser weapon could be retrieved by the
launching state and used in successive attacks aboard new vehicles.
The overridingly important point however, is that once again the Article
IV language in the Treaty has been interpreted narrowly. Again the interpre-
tation renders impermissible only that which is explicitly prohibited.
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The result of this interpretation is simply to further underscore the unreliabil-
ity of the Outer Space Treaty as an institutional basis for persuasive claims
| to arms control.
Other shortcomings and ambiguities in the text of Article IV of the
Treaty tend to confirm the unreliability of this institutional instrument as
an effective means of prohibiting or limiting directed-energy weapons. First,
in what is* admittedly a very narrow constructionistic argument, the language
of Article IV(1) proscribes placement "in orbit around the Earth" of "any
objects carrying" the prohibited weapons. In the same clause, parties under-
take not to "install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons
in outer space in any other manner." ' Interpreted through narrow and strict
construction, it is possible to argue that what is prohibited with regard to
near space is only the delivery system and not the weapon itself.
This constructionistic argument is based upon the internal variance in
the language found in Article IV(1). Read narrowly, it can be argued that the
language prohibits only the orbiting of the "objects carrying" the prohibited
weapon and not the weapon itself. The same sentence explicitly states that it
is prohibited to "install such weapons on celestial bodies" or to "station such
weapons in outer space in any other manner." The argument implies that if
Article IV(1) were meant to proscribe weapons in orbit, it would not have
referred to "objects carrying" but instead to the "weapon" itself as was done
in the case of celestial bodies and outer space.
This sort of constructionist argument obviously tends to defeat the
general purpose of Article IV(1) as well as the peaceful purposes and peaceful
uses intent which pervades the Treaty as a whole. Nevertheless, this construction-
ist argument is possible under a narrow reading of Article IV and is one more




Additional ambiguity can result from varied interpretations of the
terms "install" and "station" as used in Article IV(1). Through narrow interpre-
tations of these terms it is again possible to achieve results which may be
contrary to the general principles of "peaceful purposes" or "peaceful uses" as
employed in the Treaty. A claimant employing a narrow construction of the term
i
"station" for example, might argue that such language was only meant to embrace
actions which involve the placement of a weapon in a relatively fixed location
and that a device the position of which is changed from time to time would there-
fore not fall under the regulatory regime of Article IV(1). Certainly such
tortured interpretation is not endorsed in this study. However, the fact that
such an argument can be posited is evidence of just one more ambiguity in the
Outer Space Treaty's arms control measures.
The language in Article IV is perhaps equally important for what it fails
to say. Article IV(1) bars deployment of certain categories of weapons.
However, it does not address other phases or aspects of the weapons evolution
including research, development, testing or even use. This omission, particu-
larly as regards the testing of weaponry, appears no oversight when examin-
ing other language in Article IV(2) which provides "the testing of any type of
weapons ... on celestial bodies shall be forbidden." If testing of weapons
of mass destruction was to be proscribed by Article IV(1), why didn't drafters
include identical language in both paragraphs?
Finally, despite the prohibition of general classes of weapons, the
Treaty offers no comprehensive system of enforcement and verification. The
Treaty's only sanctioning and enforcement system exists in the limited provisions
afforded in Article IX allowing state parties to "request consultation"
concerning the activity or experiment of another state party in outer space which
the requesting state has reason to believe would cause potentially harmful
interference with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space.
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With a weak enforcement mechanism of this type, participant states are not
likely going to commit themselves to anything other than the narrowist inter-
pretation of Article IV. No state whose national security interest is dependent
upon continued free access to near space will stake its territorial and political
integrity upon as weak a sanctioning system as contained in the Treaty.
Experience suggests these shortfalls coupled with the ambiguous language
of the Treaty, have only served to channel, not inhibit, the military strategies
of the major space resource states. As already noted, the Treaty had little
or no effect on the Soviet development and testing of its FOBS. Perhaps even
more telling is the fact the Treaty was apparently not considered as a viable
institutional basis upon which to claim illegality of the Soviet system. This
is interesting considering that the U.S. had no such system of its own and was
clearly the primary participant against whose interests the FOBS was being
developed. If the Treaty provisions had been a viable arms control basis,
why wouldn't it have been in U.S. exclusive if not inclusive interests to
assert such a claim?
Additional state practice suggesting the Treaty's unreliability as an
arms control institution stems from the significant research, development and
even testing of ASAT systems. At about the time the Treaty was coming into
force, the Soviets commenced testing of a first generation antisatellite
179interceptor vehicle. More recently, the United States has contracted with
the Vought Corporation of Dallas, Texas, and other aerospace concerns to
develop similar if not more sophisticated vehicles with antisatellite destruc-
180
tive capabilities. This significant level of military development and •
testing, notwithstanding the Treaty, graphically illustrates the narrow construc-
tion applied in practice by the principal space resource states to the arms
control provisions of the Treaty. In practice, unless a military activity
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is explicitly prohibited, it is considered permissible under Article IV and the
Treaty's ancillary arms control principles.
Considering the ambiguities in language, an inadequate sanctioning
system and the tendency in practice for states to interpret controls narrowly,
there seems little reason to believe the Outer Space Treaty would apply to
prohibit or limit directed-energy weapons. The characteristics and capabilities
of the directed-energy weapons will probably qualify them as "nuclear weapons or
other kinds of weapons of mass destruction" only under the broadest interpre-
tation of Article IV(1). The terminology "nuclear weapons or other kinds of
weapons of mass destruction" under most interpretations does not appear to
incorporate devices with characteristics and capabilities of either the high-
energy laser or particle-beam weapon. Neither instrument applies its coercive
force through a direct nuclear explosion. Neither can really appropriately be
construed as within the established categories of bacteriological, chemical,
radiological or nuclear devices. Both exhibit potential for being relatively
more controllable and discriminating than most known weapons of mass destruction
in participant arsenals.
Admittedly an argument exists that the deployment of such weapons might
violate the "spirit of the Treaty." It can be argued that directed-energy weapons
are inconsistent with the general principles of "peaceful purposes" and "peace-
ful uses" of space. However, these arguments will not been accepted in
practice as clearly evidenced by the experience with both the Soviet FOBS and the
superpower thrust to develop an ASAT. In short, the claims asserting the
Outer Space Treaty does not apply to prohibit or limit the research, development,
testing, production, stockpiling, deployment and even use of directed-energy
weaponry are far more persuasive than counterclaims to the contrary.
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C. The Contemporary Law of Strategic Arms Control
The third set of institutional bases to be considered as a source of
claims bearing on the control of directed-energy weapons involves the contempo-
rary law of strategic" arms control. Unlike the preceding two sets of bases
considered within the comprehensive international law regime applicable to the
earth-space arena which were multilateral in nature, this third sat of bases
is primarily composed of bilateral institutions. To the extent that partici-
pants may use the strategic arms control law to advance their individual
national security interests or preserve important values, these bilateral
institutions and claims based upon them may be considered oriented toward
exclusive interests.
At the same time, inclusive participant interests may be at work in
the functioning of these institutions. To the extent claims based upon the
law of strategic arms control tend to dampen participant arms competition,
they may serve the inclusive interests in avoiding massive coercion and
seeking resolution of disputes through peaceful, persuasive mechanisms. As
noted previously, strategic arms control measures are generally premised on
the assumption that limitation of weapons systems will discourage the competi-
tion between the superpowers and thereby promote bilateral stability. To the
extent this assumption is realized, it is clear inclusive interests are served.
An examination of these institutions and their derivative claims to
weapons control also suggests they are oriented toward conservation of partici-
pant values. The principal participants, the superpowers, appear to pursue
the control of certain weapons systems to maintain a status quo or at least
slow competition in weaponry. The primary purpose of this exercise is appar-
ently to avoid any unilateral development which would interfere with the
existing balance of power maintained through the strategy of mutual deterrence.
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1. The ABM Treaty
The principal strategic arms control institution having potential
application to directed-energy devices is the Anti-Ballistic Missile or ABM
1 Pi 1
Treaty. ' The ABM Treaty, which entered into force October 3, 1972, consti-
tutes an agreement between the Soviet Union and United States to limit the
deployment of anti-ballistic missile facilities to two sites per participant.
The expressed purpose of the Treaty is to leave unchallenged each participant's
penetration capability of the other's retaliatory missile forces. Precise
qualitative and quantitative limits are placed on the ABM systems deployed.
Since the directed-energy weapons under research and development may have an
anti-ballistic missile potential, the ABM Treaty must be closely examined to
ascertain whether its limitations apply.
Article I of the ABM Treaty provides:
1. Each Party undertakes to limit anti-ballistic missile (ABM)
systems and to adopt other measures in accordance with provisions
of this Treaty.
2. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense
of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such
a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual
region except as provided for in Article III of this Treaty.
1 oZ
The referenced Article III simply prohibits all deployment of ABM systems or
their components except for the two land-based deployments authorized in
accordance with that article. Based upon what is already known about the anti-
ballistic missile potential of the directed-energy weapons currently under
research and development, it might appear at first glance that Article I
imposes concrete limitations upon directed-energy weapons deployed in an anti-
ballistic missile mode. However, certain ambiguities with respect to what is
and what is not an "ABM system" may present an interpretative problem.
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The focus of the interpretative problem with respect to the key term-
inology "ABM system" arises out of the definition stated in Article 11(1) of
the ABM Treaty:
1. For the purpose of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to
counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight
trajectory , currently consisting of:
(a) ABM interceptor missiles, which are interceptor missiles
constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested
in an ABM mode;
(b) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and deployed
for launching ABM interceptor missiles; and
(c) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for
an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode, (emphasis added)
Ioj
The foregoing definition makes it clear that in the first instance an "ABM
system" is one which counters strategic ballistic missiles or their elements,
primarily warheads, while in flight trajectory. Employing this part of the
definition alone, it appears the ABM Treaty proscriptions would be applicable
to directed-energy weapons which are tested or deployed for purposes of
providing an anti-ballistic missile defense.
However, when the remainder of this rather complex definition is examined,
its applicability to innovative weaponry becomes less clear. In an attempt
to clarify the meaning of the term "ABM system," the definition cites certain
specific components including "interceptor missiles," "launchers" and "ABM
radars." Directed-energy weapons do not possess such components. The issue
is essentially whether through the use of the language "currently consisting of"
the participants intended to provide only an example of one possible ABM system
known to the parties at the time of entering the ABM Treaty, or alternatively,
whether Treaty Article 11(1) constitutes an exhaustive or exclusive enumeration
of such components. If the listing of the various components is only
a contemporary example of an existing ABM system which might well be supplemented




Alternatively, if the listing of ABM components was intended to constitute an
exclusive enumeration of such components, then the ABM Treaty would have to be
modified in order to extend to innovative ABM systems not envisioned by the
participant negotiators at the time of drafting.
Unfortunately, the working papers and authoritative documentation
surrounding the ABM Treaty negotiations are classified making it impossible to
accurately assess precisely what participant intentions may have been with
regard to Article 11(1). However, the unclassified portion of the Fiscal Year
1979 Arms Control Impact Statements may provide at least the U.S. perspective
in connection with its discussion of directed-energy weaponry. The pertinent
statement concerning the potential applicability of the ABM Treaty to the
particle-beam weapon provides:
The current PBW programs are not constrained by existing arms
control agreements. However, the BMD (ballistic missile defense)
potential of future PBW' s creates a possible conflict with regard
to the 1972 ABM Treaty. Article V of the ABM Treaty prohibits
the development, testing or deployment of all types of ABM systems
or their components that are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or
mobile land-based. Article III of the ABM Treaty prohibits all
deployment of ABM systems or their components except for the two
land-based deployments permitted pursuant to such article. Article
II defines an ABM system as a 'system to counter strategic ballis-
tic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory; and describes
current systems as consisting of ABM interceptor missiles, ARM
launchers and ABM radars. [Deleted.] Thus PBW's used for BMD
which are fixed land-based could be developed and tested but
not deployed without amendment of the ABM Treaty, and the develop-
ment, testing, and deployment of such systems which are other than
fixed land-based is prohibited by article V of the treaty. „
Although even a portion of this commentary has been deleted for security
reasons, the language suggests that the U.S. perspective of the terminology
"ABM system" as contained in Article 11(1) may include at least the particle-
beam weapon. Whether or not a similar analysis may apply to high-energy




deleted again for security reasons. However, it might be possible to
infer that the same operative interpretation of Article 11(1) would apply to
either type of directed-energy weapons system.
Notwithstanding these inferences regarding the probable United States
interpretation of the scope of Article 11(1) of the ABM Treaty, a strong
counterclaim exists suggesting the inapplicability of this definition to
directed-energy weapons. Agreed Interpretation [e] of the Protocol to the
Interim Agreement contains language which suggests that the ABM Treaty definition
may be narrower than the apparent U.S. perception would admit. This- authori-
tative bilateral interpretation states:
In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy
ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III
of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems
based on other physical principles and including components capable
of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or
ABM radars are created in the future, specific limitations on such
systems and their components would be subject to discussion in
accordance with Article XIII and agreement in accordance with
Article XIV of the Treaty.
, ,J 186
Agreed Interpretation jjil read in pari, materia with Article 11(1) of the ABM
Treaty firmly implies that the original definition was not intended
to extend to "ABM systems based on other physical principles." Certainly
an ABM system which employs either a HEL or PBW device would constitute one
based on other physical principles. Accordingly, it would seem that while
the parties to the Treaty may be obligated to consult pursuant" to their
187
obligations under Articles XIII and XIV, such systems may not be limited
under the terms of the Agreement itself. At very minimum, a counterclaim
of this nature based on Agreed Interpretation l*EJ places the applicability of
the ABM Treaty with regard to directed-energy weapons in grave doubt despite
the apparent U.S. interpretation of Article 11(1).
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If the ABM Treaty's definition of "ABM system" does include directed-
energy weaponry, then Article V(l) would provide a limitation on the develop-
ment, testing and deployment of certain systems. The language does not
provide a complete prohibition however, since it only applies to air-based,
space-based, sea-based or mobile land-based systems. Specifically excluded
from controls under this provision is the fixed or permanent land-based ABM
system for which development, testing and deployment of appropriate ABM
systems may continue within the constraints elsewhere provided. In view
of the probable ease with which the technology involved in a fixed land-based
system could be adapted to a mobile system, even if this limitation does
apply to directed-energy weapons, it appears a less than reliable or credible
control.
Regardless of whether the central substantive provisions of the ABM
Treaty have functional applicability to directed-energy weapons sytems, an
ancillary enforcement provision is almost certainly relevant. Article XII
of the ABM Treaty provides inter alia:
1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with
the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national
technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner con-
sistent with generally recognized principles of international
law.
2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national
technical means of verification of the other Party operating
in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article, (emphasis added)
The significance of the Article XII (1) and (2) language is its explicit law
declaratory authorization for each party to conduct virtually unlimited satel-
lite reconnaissance of the other's resources. Despite the fact the Soviets
once clearly opposed such satellite reconnaissance, it is clear from their
agreement to this language, that their position has changed. Article XII (2)
effectively prohibits any action by the reconnoitered party which might limit
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the capability of the verifying party to ensure compliance with the proscrip-
tions of the Treaty.
While these provisions in no way serve to prohibit or limit the
development, testing or deployment of directed-energy weapons, either in space
or on the earth's surface, they certainly render their use against certain
reconnaissance and remote sensing satellites in contravention of international
law. The major ambiguity may be precisely what space resources constitute
"national technical means of verification." In any case, the apparent commit-
ment to a principle of noninterference is bolstered by the fact identical
language was written into Article V of the five year Interim Agreement on the
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms which entered into force October 3,
1972.
19 °
Since directed-energy weapons are generally still in the developmental
stage, there is almost a complete absence of any state practice which might be
used to illustrate the application of this or any other institution in the
aggregate claims-counterclaims process. However, a much debated and intri-
guing incident occurred in October and November of 1975 which may well portend
of future events. On October 18, 1975, a U.S. Air Force early-warning
satellite and companion support vehicle in orbit over the Indian Ocean, engaged
in monitoring Soviet ICBM silos, were illuminated by an energy source 10 to
10,000 times the intensity typically received from a ballistic missile launch
or natural sources such as forest fires or volcanoes 8 So intense was the
radiation, that infrared sensors aboard the strategically critical satellite
were temporarily blinded. Five similar incidents followed between the
initial October illumination and early December of 1975. On each occasion,
an early-warning satellite was incapacitated by an unknown energy source origi-
191Mting somewhere in the western Soviet Union. On one occasion the intense
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illumination persisted for a period of more than four hours although none of
the incidents resulted in permanent damage to the satellite.
Since the Indian Ocean early-warning satellite had been in service for
more than five years and sensor degradation had been recorded earlier, it
was initially suspected that an avionics malfunction had been the cause of
the incapacitation. However, a few weeks after the initial incident, on
November 17 and again on November 18, two other U.S. Air Force satellites, this
time in far more elliptical orbits, experienced similar incapacitation of their
infrared horizon sensors while over the Soviet Union. Infrared imagery from
defense meteorological satellites was examined for those days during which
the illuminations occurred and no natural sources of strong radiation were
found. The infrared sensors on these satellites were designed to function
with a peak radiation sensitivity at a wavelength of approximately 2.7 microns.
Interestingly enough, this closely approximates the wavelength of high-energy
192hydrogen-fluoride lasers.
Whether or not the Soviets intentionally employed a high-energy chemical
laser to incapacitate these U.S. strategic satellites has since become a
matter of considerable contention. The official United States position
articulated by then Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, was that the
193
satellites had probably been dazzled by the glare from natural gas fires.
The U.S. itself has employed low intensity laser radar located at sites including
Cloudcroft, New Mexico, and Maui, Hawaii, to "interrogate" Soviet reconnais-
sance satellites passing overhead. These laser radar facilities are used to
determine precise orbital parameters of the satellites. They are also used to
determine if the Soviet satellite passing overhead carries a reconnaissance
194
camera by measuring laser energy reflected back from exposed optical systems.
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In view of the U.S. application of laser radar, another possibility seemed to
be that the incidents were nothing more than innocent but perhaps technically
195
bungled Soviet attempts to "interrogate" U.S. satellites.
Some analysts question why, if the Soviets have the means to incapaci-
tate U.S. satellites, they would risk disclosure of so important a capability
in an incident which would net virtually no military or political gain. If
anything, ^incidents such as the 1975 "blindings" might be expected to stimulate
satellite "hardening" and defensive countermeasures. Moreover, the Soviets
might well have expected the United States would counter by initiating
a program to develop its own laser antisatellite capability. Worse yet, if
the U.S. had already secretly developed such capability, the Soviets might have
risked possible retaliation in kind against one of their critical satellites.
Finally, these analysts reason that the Soviets would be far more apt to
conduct such an operation against their own test satellites allowing the
collection of valuable target effect data in a completely controlled experi-
196
ment.
Since the U.S. Defense Department ultimately determined that there was
insufficient evidence to conclude these incidents had been the result of
intentional Soviet actions, there appeared no basis to claim a breach of
Article XII(2) of the ABM Treaty. However, it is implicit from a recently
released compliance report of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
(ACDA)
, that had the 1975 events been the result of intentional Soviet high-
energy lasing of American satellites, such actions might well have been inter-
preted as interference with the U.S. national technical means of verification in




Soviet use of something like laser energy to 'blind' certain
U.S. satellites could be an activity inconsistent with the obli-
gations in Article XII of the ABM Treaty and Article V of the
Interim Agreement 'not to interfere with' or 'use deliberate
concealment measures' which impede verification, by national
technical means, of compliance with provisions of those agree-
ments. In 1975, information relevant to possible incidents of
that nature was thoroughly analyzed, and it was determined that
no questionable Soviet activity was involved and that our moni-
toring capabilities had not been affected by these events. The
analysis indicated that the events had resulted from several
large fires caused by breaks along natural gas pipelines in
the USSR. Later following several reports in the US press al-
leging, a Soviet violation, and in response to questions about
those reports, the US press was informed of those facts by
several US Officials. q7
The October-November 1975 "blinding incident" and the response of
U.S. decision-makers exemplifies the probable claims potential of Article
XII of the ABM Treaty as a means of restraining the use of directed-energy
weapons against at least those satellites used for verification of the
strategic offensive arms listed in the Interim Agreement and ABM systems
addressed in the ABM Treaty. Of equal importance, the incident illustrates
the propensity for conflicting factual interpretations of the same data
concerning events in this area. It may be expected that confusion and the
resulting disputes over the correct interpretation of what in fact occurred
willincrease as directed-energy weapons become a reality in the earth-space
198
arena.
The 1975 incident may also portend of some of the strains, suspicions
and risks which this new weaponry will visit on the minimum public order
199
system. With the advent of this weaponry capable of instantaneously
incapacitating strategically critical defense systems, there will be greater
need than ever for participants to accurately collect, analyze and respond
to the available empirical data. One factor in particular that at least the
Soviet Union and United States should clarify to each others satisfaction, is
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precisely which satellite vehicles are subject to the protection of the ABM
Treaty and Interim Agreement. As one space authority notes, an argument could
even have been made with respect to the 1975 incident, that the satellites
"blinded" were technically not within the protected category of "national
,200
technical means of verification." Since the "blinded" satellites were early
warning satellites and not directly engaged in verification of quantities of
strategic, weapons or ABM systems, they were not subject to special protection
against interference.
2. Ancillary Provisions and Forums for Claims Assertion
As previously noted in connection with Agreed Interpretation [EJ
of the Protocol to the Interim Agreement, certain provisions in the ABM
201
Treaty provide for consultation between the parties. Article XIII of the
Treaty provides for the establishment of a "Standing Consultative Commission"
202
(SCC) between the parties to carry on a dialogue with respect to compliance.
Article XIV of the ABM Treaty provides that each party may propose amendments
to the Treaty and also that there be a periodic review of the ABM Treaty at
203intervals of five years. Since the proceedings of the SCC are not public-
ly disclosed to encourage an open and frank exchange of politically sensitive
positions, it is not possible to ascertain whether the subject of directed-
204
energy ABM systems has been raised by either party in this forum. Since
available technical information strongly suggests that at least the PBW's, if not
certain high-energy laser systems, have been seriously considered for their
operational ABM potential, it would appear likely that if this subject has not
205
as yet been raised in the SCC, eventually it will be.
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The Protocol's Agreed Interpretation [e]
,
by invoking ABM Treaty Articles
XIII and XIV, offers some indication of the extent of the parties' responsibility
to consult or seek appropriate amendments vis-a-vis ABM systems based on other
physical principles. It seems likely that this obligation to consult through
the SCC extends to possible unintended, if not intended, interference with
the protected class of national verification satellites. A key provision
contained in Article XIII of the ABM Treaty provides that the parties will
employ the SCC to "consider questions involving unintended interference with
. 206
national technical means of verification. ' Hence, reading Agreed Inter-
pretation [eJ in pari, materia with the referenced Article XIII of the ABM Treaty,
parties appear to be under an obligation to consult regarding the development of
innovative ABM systems and their components as well as with respect to the
unintended interference with verification apparatus employed to enforce the
Treaty itself. Under this interpretation, either party could, if it elected
to do so, raise the question of a possible directed-energy attack on one of its
ABM verification satellites. There is, however, no publicly available infor-
mation to suggest this has as yet occurred in any of the SCC proceedings.
While the Standing Consultative Commission is available as one bilateral
forum for the consideration of certain claims and counterclaims bearing on the
control of directed-energy weapons, Soviet and American negotiators are clearly
probing alternative approaches. Growing concern over the advanced Soviet
testing and possible future deployment of antisatellite interceptors or
so-called "killer satellites" prompted the Carter Administration as early as
207
' March of 1977 to propose bilateral talks on the question of ASAT's. In a
recent State Department response to a Congressional inquiry, Douglas J.
Bennet Jr., the Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations stated:
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We do wish to point out, in regard to (deleted) inquiry concerning
diplomatic approaches, that the question of arms limitations with
respect to potential anti-satellite activities has in fact been taken
up with the Soviet Union. In his March 9, 1977 press conference,
President Carter indicated that the United States had made certain
suggestions to the Soviet Union with regard to a possible agreement
in this area. This topic was raised with the Soviets in March, and
as Secretary Vance subsequently indicated in public comments, the
United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to establish a bilat-
eral working group to discuss such limitations. In testimony before
the Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee On
October 26, Ambassador Marshall Shulman pointed out that we are now
preparing proposals on this subject. President Carter has also re-
cently stated that he expects negotiations on this topic to commence
soon.
208
What have been termed "preliminary discussions on anti-satellite
209
systems" were conducted in Helsinki from June 8 through June 16, 1978.
According to a U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency release, these
discussions between the Soviet Union and the United States addressed "questions
in connection with limiting certain activities directed against space objects
and incompatible with peaceful relations between states, including the means
210
and systems for conducting such activities." As in the case of other SALT
and ABM related dialogue between the superpowers, no substantive information
regarding the discussions has been made public. However, in view of the fact
that at least second generation ASAT vehicles may rather prominently feature
high-energy lasers as their destructive mechanisms, it is apparent that directed-
energy weaponry is rapidly becoming a germane issue in the contemporary law
of strategic arms control and may soon have to be addressed in this forum
among others.
There also appears to be a third forum developing between the super-
powers for the exchange of claims and counterclaims with respect to the control
of directed-energy weapons. Ongoing U.S. and Soviet negotiations in Geneva
aimed at developing weapons controls applicable to radiological weaponry appear
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to have at least touched the issue of the particle-beam weapon if not the
high-energy laser. Declassified information from the Carter administration's
Fiscal Year 1979 Arms Control Impact Statements indicates that the Soviets have
211
raised the issue of particle-beam weapons in these bilateral talks. The
Soviets have reportedly advocated a ban on the development of particle-beam
weapons which would be employed to affect "biological targets." The evolving
U.S. response to the Soviet proposal is to define and deal with the particle-beam
weaponry on a case by case basis. Relevant bilateral dialogue in radiological
weapons talks is a strong indication that claims bearing on the control of
directed-energy weapons are no longer merely theoretical, but are becoming
matters of fact in the processes of developing the contemporary law of strategic
arms control.
3. Claims Evaluation
The contemporary law of strategic arms control provides a limited
institutional basis for claims asserting control of directed-energy weapons.
Depending upon the scope of the Article 11(1) definition of "ABM system,"
the ABM Treaty regime may apply directly to limit the development, testing and
deployment of directed-energy weapons which are sea-based, air-based, space-
based, or mobile land-based. However, as noted, this claim is subject to strong
counterclaims and is perhaps reliable only to the extent that the superpowers
have in fact specifically agreed to the inclusion of innovative weapons systems
within the context of the Article 11(1) definition.
The more persuasive and reliable claim arising out of the ABM Treaty
stems from Article XII(2). This article provides a relatively concrete basis
for a claim precluding the use of directed-energy weapons in a manner so as to
interfere with national technical means of verification. A claim as to
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impermissible use of either terrestrial or space-based directed -energy weaponry,
whether based on HEL or PBW principles, against national technical means of
verification would be persuasive. Although the Interim Agreement (SALT I)
expired in May 1977, a similar and equally persuasive claim did exist until that
time under that separate agreement. Claims under SALT I would have explicitly
applied to satellite and other systems used for verification of offensive
strategic arms, whereas the Article XII(2) provisions which still remain in
effect only extend protection to verification mechanisms specifically applicable
to ABM systems.
The strategic arms control law also affords important forums for broadening
the institutional foundation for claims to the control of directed-energy
weaponry. While it may be unclear whether the ABM Treaty actually limits the
use of directed-energy weapons in an anti-ballistic missile mode, Agreed
Interpretation fE^J of the Protocol certainly provides an appropriate and logical
means of resolving the issue if in fact there is no understanding between the
superpowers. The Standing Consultative Commission appears an ideal forum
for addressing issues such as the breadth of the "ABM system" definition under
Article 11(1) of the ABM Treaty. With respect to the specific issues involved
in the possible use of directed-energy weaponry against satellites, the on-
going ASAT discussions may afford a useful alternative or supplementary forum
for the development of certain weapons controls. Finally the Geneva talks on
the control of radiological weapons may be a useful forum for at least addressing
the particle-beam weapon.
Claims as to impermissible use of directed-energy weapons founded upon
these institutional bases would generally be expected to serve the exclusive
and inclusive interests of the participants. To the extent that these various
3ases serve to protect a party's national means of verification from an attack
Launched by means of directed-energy weapons or other devices, the participant's
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national security interests are enhanced. To the extent that the agreement
serves to support and maintain the minimum public order and enhance the credi-
bility of the nuclear deterrent, inclusive interests are served as well.
The enforcement mechanism supporting these institutions is a highly
complex set of positive and negative sanctions. It is beyond the scope of
this study to evaluate in detail either the reliability or credibility of all the
sanctions which apply to the strategic arms limitation agreements. However,
empirical evidence generally suggests that at least the ABM Treaty provisions
212
have been observed by the superpower participants.
There are increasingly frequent claims that the Soviet Union has inten-
tionally violated not only the spirit, but also the specific proscriptions
213
of the SALT I Agreement. Should these claims prove persuasive to U.S.
decision-makers, it is likely that the ultimate sanction which will be applied
in response,would be political rejection of the prospective SALT II Agreement.
Such rejection in turn would further stimulate the superpower arms race,
presumably to the disadvantage of both the sanctioning and sanctioned partici-
pants. However, in view of U.S. technological and economic capabilities, a
rejection of SALT II would work to the particular disadvantage of the Soviets.
In summary, the institutional basis for claims seeking to limit the
use of directed-energy weapons in the strategic arms control law is extremely
narrow. Of particular significance in this body of law, is the existence of
certain channels for the creation of appropriate and desirable arms control
applicable to innovative weaponry. Whether and to what extent the law of arms
control is amended to apply to directed-energy weapons will largely depend
upon whether decision-makers perceive participant exclusive and inclusive inter-
ests advanced by such a step. For the present, it seems likely that the partici-
pants will find it beneficial to honor existing and relatively reliable institu-
tional bases prohibiting the use of directed-energy weapons against national
technical means of verification used to enforce the ABM Treaty It is even
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possible that these various bilateral institutions will eventually be expanded
to provide a more pervasive foundation for claims to the control of directed-
energy weaponry.
D. Comparative Evaluation of Claims
Three sets of institutional bases in the comprehensive international
law applicable to the earth-space arena have been examined as potential
sources for claims to the control of directed-energy weapons. Admittedly, the
paucity of empirical case study material increases the vulnerability of any
analysis of subject matter as innovative as this. Nevertheless, an examination
of these bases coupled with a comparative analysis of their relevant arms control
features yields certain preliminary conclusions regarding claims related to
the impermissibility of directed-energy weapons.
None of the existing institutional bases has been developed for the
purpose of controlling weaponry possessing the unique, innovative character-
istics of the directed-energy instrument. Although the travaux-preparatoires
are essentially unavailable for the various strategic arms control agreements,
there is no indication that these institutions, any more than the Outer Space
Treaty or general principles in the customary law were designed with the advent
of directed-energy weaponry in mind. Moreover, there is no assurance that parti-
cipants will expeditiously move to amend or reinterpret these institutions so
as to develop meaningful or desirable controls for innovative weaponry.
Of the institutions considered in the comprehensive international regime,
the contemporary strategic arms control law appears to offer the most promising
set of bases for claims bearing on directed-energy weaponry. The ABM Treaty
affords a basis for a very narrow claim prohibiting the use of directed-energy
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devices against national means of verification. It may even extend to a
limitation on the use of directed-energy weapons for certain kinds of anti-
ballistic missile systems. Although the potential for expanding the scope
of these limitations on weapons use exists in the ABM Treaty and Protocol to
the Interim Agreement, the fact that the Soviet Union and United States
have entered into independent "hunter-killer" satellite talks in Helsinki may
indicate a proclivity toward the development of independent and specially
tailored institutions expressly molded to cope with particular weapons
problems
.
The applicable customary international law principles suggest a strong
disposition toward the use, exploration and eventual exploitation of space
for exclusively peaceful purposes. There is also a general disposition toward
banning nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction from certain areas in
space. These principles, while formally incorporated in the Outer Space Treaty,
are restrictively applied by major space resource states. Neither these
key principles nor the arms control provisions of Article IV of the Outer
Space Treaty have effectively discouraged the superpower participants from
research, development, testing ana even production of coercive instruments
for use throughout the earth-space arena. Although it could be argued that the
Treaty has served to control the orbital deployment of nuclear or other weapons
of mass destruction, it appears the relative inefficiency of these instru-
ments compared with the alternative ICBM delivery system is the actual motiva-
tion for participants keeping the near space theater free of such devices.
In those few instances where states have been forced to interpret and
apply the general principles or arms control provisions in the earth-space
arena, participants have tended to construe the international law narrowly so as
to authorize at least the developed weapons systems. The preliminary Helsinki
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ASAT talks reaffirm this propensity toward narrow construction of the principles
and arms control provisions of the Outer Space Treaty. Participant exclusive
interests in a strong national defense or, alternatively inclusive interests in
minimizing the chance of mutual assured destruction, have been instrumental
in the space resource states interpreting the international law so as to
authorize development and testing of the Fractional Orbital Bombardment
System, the antisatellite interceptor and especially the ICBM's employed in
strategic deterrence forces.
The utility of the general principles and the Outer Space Treaty as
bases for claims to the control of directed-energy weapons is further reduced
by impotent sanctioning mechanisms. Even if the relevant arms control concepts
in these two institutions are expanded so as to apply to the control of directed-
energy weaponry, participants are not apt to risk vital national security
interests to an international law doctrine which offers no credible enforcement
mechanism. In contrast, the law of strategic arms control tends to provide
agreements based upon somewhat more concrete enforcement mechanisms which include
authorized reconnaissance for verification of compliance and permissible uni-
lateral withdrawal in the event of a serious breach by the other party. The
arms control provisions implicit in the general principles or explicitly
established in the Outer Space Treaty are too amorphously structured to provide
for such concrete, credible sanctioning procedures.
Nothing prevents the amendment or reinterpretation of existing interna-
tional law institutions specifically applicable to the earth-space arena.
However, these institutions and others which might be examined do not in their
214
present form support claims to prohibition of directed-energy weapons.
With the exception of the prohibition on the use of directed-energy weapons
against national means of verification of ABM systems and possibly in certain
mobile ABM systems, these same institutions are ineffectual as a means of
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controlling the research, development, testing, production, deployment
or general use of such devices. The ongoing bilateral ASAT negotiations may
produce a new institutional basis for controlling development, testing, deploy-
ment or use of antisatellite instruments including those which might be armed
with directed-energy weapons. It is also possible the Geneva talks on the
control of radiological weapons could result in constraints on a particle-
beam weapon. If either of these agreements is specifically drafted to
incorporate innovative weaponry, it may serve to place the first explicit
controls on directed-energy weapons.
It should be noted however, that neither the ASAT or the radiological
weapons talks were specifically established for the purpose of placing prohibi-
tions or limitations on directed-energy weapons. If controls result, it will be
an indirect consequence of bilateral efforts established for other purposes.
Accordingly, it is almost certain that any such controls would be relatively
narrow in scope excluding many of the possible strategic and tactical applica-
tions of the particle-beam weapon or high-energy laser.
The comprehensive international law applicable to the earth-space arena,
at least in its present state, is largely an ineffectual means of controlling
directed-energy weaponry. Ambiguity, narrow interpretation, unreliable
sanctioning mechanisms and participant interests conspire to prevent applica-
tion of these institutional bases for the purpose controlling this innovative
weaponry. As bases for claims to reliable arms control over either the high-
energy laser or particle-beam weapon, they are of limited utility. The existing
arms control provisions in the comprehensive international law applicable to
the expanded arena will do little to guarantee the stability, much less the
enhancement, of the minimum world public order system.

IV
CONTROL OF DIRECTED-ENERGY WEAPONS
THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
The criteria for a weapon to meet the test of lawfulness may
be summarized by stating that it must not cause a destruction of
values disproportionate to the military advantage gained through
its use. The historical experience in applying the criteria
appears to indicate that weapons will be upheld as lawful except
where there is great disparity between the ensuing destruction
of values and the military advantage gained.
W. T. Mallison Jr. 215
To complete the analysis of prohibitions and limitations applicable
to directed-energy weapons, it is necessary to examine the body of law
specifically concerned with the conduct of armed conflict. Although this
body of law has not been explicitly incorporated into the comprehensive inter-
national law applicable to the earth-space arena, the unqualified language found
? 1 ft
in Article III of the Outer Space Treaty seems authority enough to firmly
establish its universal application in all theaters; terrestrial as well as
extraterrestrial. The preceding chapter examined a broad range of institutional
bases in the comprehensive international law which might afford support to
claims or counterclaims bearing on the control of directed-energy weapons. In
contrast, the following survey of the international law of armed conflict will




sought to impose constraints on the conduct of coercion. Again, this body of
doctrine is best analyzed through its various institutional bases. These bases
should be examined as a possible source of support for claims or counterclaims
bearing on the control of directed-energy weapons in the earth-space areana.
Before proceedings, it is useful to understand the context in which
these claims or counterclaims are made. Claims to weapons control in the law
of armed conflict should not be confused with claims related to the permis-
sibility or impermissibility of the use of force iteself. In the minimum
world public order system, claims bearing on the participant's right to resort
to force are judged under criteria provided in Articles 2(4) and 51 of the
United Nations Charter. Such right must also be evaluated in light of certain
articles found in Chapters VII and VIII of the Charter authorizing participants
217
to engage in limited enforcement actions. Article 2(4) proclaims: "All Members
shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in
218
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."
While Article 2(4) is designed to prohibit the use of force in international
relations, Article 51 of the Charter nevertheless authorizes participants to
exercise their inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if
an armed attack occurs against them. Participants are also authorized to resort
to coercion when acting pursuant to a U.N. or regional mandate under either
219
Chapter VII or VIII for the maintenance and restoration of peace and security.
Regardless of whether a participant resorts to the application of
coercion lawfully in accordance with the Charter or violates the provisions
of Article 2(4), it is subject to constraints imposed by the law of armed
conflict. Whether in the role of aggressor, defender or enforcement authority
acting for the U.N. or some regional organization, each participant is subject
to two fundamental rules. First, it may only attack legitimate objectives and
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second, it may only apply permissible techniques in conducting its coercion.
Under at least traditional international law, violation of either of these
two fundamental rules subjects the participant to various sanctions which
include among others holding responsible participant authorities accountable
as war criminals.
Claims to weapons control tend to focus more on the second of these
rules, to^wit, the techniques or methods applied in the conduct of acts of
coercion. Nevertheless, constraints as to lawful objects of attack relate to
the participant's ability to direct its attack. To that extent, both fundamental
rules are relevant in an examination of the legality of the directed-energy weapon
in the law of armed conflict.
A. The Law of Armed Conflict as an International Regime
1. Principles and Collateral Concepts in the Customary Law
At the root of the international law of armed conflict are a set of
established principles and collateral concepts which have a considerable
bearing on claims relating to both the prohibition per se and limitation of
weapons systems. These general principles and collateral concepts are construed
by international law scholars in many generic classifications. While the
classifications themselves may be of little significance to this study, the
rationale upon which they are founded is important in analyzing the legality
of prospective weapons systems. This rationale including its basic assumptions,
is also important since it has frequently been incorporated into conventional




Professor W. T. Mallison Jr. considering the impact of the customary
law on weapons control refers to the principle of "military necessity."
According to Professor Mallison,
Military necessity should be regarded as legalizing only that
destruction which is necessary to the prompt achievement of
lawful military objectives. More specifically, military
necessity only justifies destruction which is relevant to
the attainment of lawful military objectives and proportion-
ate, in the sense of a reasonable relation between the amount
of the destruction carried out and the military importance of
the object of attack. Based upon past experience, the require-
ments as applied in actual war or hostilities are only that
the irrelevance and disproportionality of the destruction
effected must not be great.
Basic to the principle of "military necessity" is the concept of proportion-
ality. One authority which perceives "proportionality" as a principle
separate in itself observes "acts of war must be based upon a balanced
relation of the means employed to a military end. The means cannot exceed the
221
end. Striking this balance as to whether a means or technique is
reasonable in achieving the end is typically accomplished by an application of
a "reasonable man standard."
A recent unilateral interpretation of the principle of military
necessity is offered by the U.S. Air Force in its publication AFP 110-31,
International Law-The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations: "Military
necessity is the principle which justifies measures of regulated force not
forbidden by international law which are indispensable for securing the prompt
submission of the enemy, with the least possible expenditures of economic
222
and human resources." The Air Force definition assumes that the force
applied by the participant is controllable and that its use is essential to
achieve an expeditious submission of the opponent. It also incorporates the
concept of proportionality to the extent it justifies measures indispensable
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for securing prompt submission of the enemy (the end) with the least possible
expenditure of resources (the means) . It further assumes that it is possible
to ascertain whether or not a measure if forbidden by the international law.
Both conceptualizations of the principle of military necessity establish the
import of the relationship between the techniques invoked by the participant
and the objective to be achieved. Moreover, they emphasize this relationship
is dependent upon certain facts which it is assumed are ascertainable. The
difficulties in applying the principle of military necessity stem in large
part from these assumptions that certain facts are ascertainable.
A second general principle basic to the law of armed conflict is that of
"humanity." Humanity is perceived as mutually exclusive from, but neverthe-
less complementary to, the principle of military necessity. As formulated by the
Air Force AFP 110-31, the principle of humanity "forbids the infliction of
suffering, injury or destruction not actually necessary for the accomplishment
223
of legitimate military purposes." Again there is an element of "proportion-
ality" to the extent that the adverse effects of coercion are not to overreach
the lawful military purpose. Under this principle, it is generally assumed that
civilians or noncombatants should not be lawful objects of attack. This
immunity does not preclude unavoidable casualties occurring during attacks
against authorized military objectives. However, such unavoidable casualties
under the principle of humanity cannot be excessive in relation to the projected
224
military advantage to be gained.
Certain assumptons and ambiguities are apt to cause difficulty in the
application of this principle. The principle assumes that participants are
able to ascertain what adverse effects are "necessary" for attaining the desired




As is apparent, both principles share a tendency to be open-ended.
Both are also firmly rooted in the protection and preservation of key
participant human and material values. With regard to the rationale supporting
these complementary principles, Professor Mallison observes:
Both basic principles, . . . protect important value interests
of the world community. Until war and hostilities are abolished,
the basic principles reflect the interest of states in conducting
war or hostilities (at least for defensive purposes) , but in con-
ducting them with the least possible destruction of human and mate-
rial values. It is wanton and unreasonable destruction which is
made illegal by the principles of military necessity and humanity.
Professor Mallison suggests that there is a point in the conduct of armed
conflict where an increased level of applied destruction and violence is
counterproductive for all participants, no matter what their role or position.
To carry the conduct of armed conflict beyond this point is illogical,
irrational, and in violation of the basic premises of the international law
of armed conflict.
The significance of these principles is that they provide juridical
criteria for determining the legality of particular weapons. In this function,
the principle of military necessity tends to prevail over the principle of
humanity when the two are in apparent conflict. In consequence, weapons are
considered as lawful to the extent that the destruction of resources and personal
injury they produce is absolutely necessary to the attainment of the military
objective. In specfically addressing the legality of innovative weapons
systems, Professor Garner notes:
The employment of new and powerful inventions of destruction or
of new methods is, of course, not to be condemned and ruled out
merely because they are new or because they are more effective
than those formerly employed, as a few sentimentalists in every
age have wished to do. The true test of their lawfulness is rather
whether they can be employed without inflicting superfluous injury
upon those against whom they are employed, whether they 'uselessly
aggravate the suffering of disabled men, ' whether their effect is
cruel and inhumane, and the like. „„,226
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A generally consistent perspective which invokes the concept of propor-
tionality common in both principles is offered by Professors McDougal and
Feliciano:
The permissible or nonpermissible character of the employment of
a particular weapon or mode of attack has in broad principle been
made by decision-makers to turn upon the proportionality between
the deprivation of values incidental to the use of the weapon or
mode of attack and the military advantage accruing to the bellig-
erent user. (O)nly weapons whose use has resulted in incidental
value deprivations obviously superfluous and grossly disproportion-
ate to the ensuing military advantage have been characterized as
nonpermissible and effectively outlawed. Since such weapons are
by definition militarily inefficient-value deprivations necessitate
the expenditure of force - the compromise in favor of military
necessity is obvious.
Professor Mallison more concisely summarizes the criteria for a weapon to
meet the test of lawfulness by simply stating "it must not cause a destruction
of values which is disproportionate to the military advantage gained through
,,228
its use.
Although military necessity and humanity form the two fundamental
principles of the law of armed conflict, other bases have also been suggested
for providing juridical criteria used in appraising the lawfulness of weapons.
Although in certain instances these principles or collateral concepts may be
seen to be adjuncts to or component facets of military necessity and humanity,
certain attributes may tend to vary from the fundamental principles. A
principle which is occasionally mentioned but considered of relatively little
contemporary value is "chivalry." Chivalry as a principle demands armed
conflict be conducted in accord with certain established, traditionalistic
formalities and courtesies. Twentieth Century warfare and the advanced
technology which may produce destructive effects well separated in time and
space from the belligerent using a particular weapon has tended to diminish
229
the impact of this principle. The principle is still applicable with respect
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to prohibitions against the use of poison, dishonorable or treacherous
misconduct, misuse of enemy flags, and other types of perfidy. But with few
exceptions, its applicability to weapons control is marginal.
A set of collateral concepts or principles of considerably greater
relevance to contempoary problems of weapons control has been proffered by the
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Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) . Entitled "progres-
sive principles," these concepts have been employed by SIPRI in its analysis of
various innovative weapons systems which it refers to as "dubious weapons."
SIPRI contends that the fundamental or traditional principles in the law of
armed conflict are not always adequate as measures with which to analyze these
new dubious weapons. Although neither the particle-beam weapon nor the high-
energy laser are specifically included in SIPRI' s detailed analysis of dubious
weapons, it would appear these progressive principles are designed for general
application to contemporary or innovative weapons of modern warfare.
The principle of survival as proffered by SIPRI seeks to delimit the
bounds of military necessity to the extent that when the very existence of
mankind itself may be at stake due to coercive action, military necessity
must yield, even if the self-preservation of the participant state is placed
in jeopardy. Implicit in the principle is the concept that at least some
weapons of mass destruction now possessed by participants, if used in massive
or general coercion, would have major effects on noncombatant participant states
and the world community as a whole. As some evidence of support for such a
principle, the SIPRI study cites U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1653 (XVI)
of November 24, 1961 in which all use of nuclear weapons is condemned as "a
9 31
crime against mankind and civilization."" The resolution notes that such
weapons were directed against not only belligerents, but also "against mankind in
general." While the progressive principle of survival may be of little value
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in actually constraining belligerent actions in cases of massive coercion, it
may present a useful criterion for appraising which weapons systems should
be developed while states are still at peace. In other words, while some level
of rationality prevails, participants may consciously opt for systems which are
less apt to place the survival of mankind in jeopardy in the event war does
occur.
The SIPRI study cites other examples of progressive principles which
it asserts are gaining acceptance in the international law of armed conflict.
It is suggested that a principle of "environment" may be evolving which looks
to the ecological impact of a particular weapons system. While the exclusive
and inclusive participant interests in supporting an optimum natural environ-
ment have been well recognized in the general international law, the law of
armed conflict is only now beginning to incorporate the concept as a juridical
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criterion. As noted by the SIPRI study:
Responsibility for the environment is recognized in the modern
international law of peace. It should also be recognized in times
of war. The value of 'the environment' and the importance of its
preservation should be recognized as belonging to the factors which
should be taken into account in deciding upon the laws of war con-
cerning 'dubious weapons'. Less need to do this existed in former
times. At present, new weapons have become available which threaten
the human environment in its integer biological existence, and
technological developments may bring about the possibility of caus-
ing fundamental changes in the earth's ecology. The time is ripe
to brand specific acts as international crimes of 'ecocide'. The
laws of war should be adopted to this new situation.
iiere, there is no suggestion that the inclusive interests in value
conservation implicit in this principle would prevail over the principle of
military necessity. However, participants developing alternative weapons
systems each exhibiting comparable destructive and operational efficiencies,
may well opt for the system which least impacts upon the environment.
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The third progressive principle suggested by the Stockholm Institute
as a means of appraising the legality of dubious weaponry is referred to as
234
the principle of "threshold." The SIPRI study observes that there is a .
clear threshold between certain weapons of mass destruction, e.g. thermonuclear
devices, and conventional weaponry. This threshold is sufficiently visible
to the participants and the threat of mutual assured destruction of values so
clear, that in an armed conflict, rational combatants will tend to avoid
the first use of the more demolitionary weapons of mass destruction for fear
such action would open the door to further use. In the case of the threshold
between conventional and nuclear weapons, the Stockholm Institute's study
observes, "If this threshold is trespassed, the road is open to the use of all
235
nuclear weapons."
The principle of threshold is based on at least two relatively weak and
generally unsupported assumptions. First, it assumes that weapons of mass
destruction are by their very nature less desirable as instruments of coercion
than conventional weaponry. It assumes that in any armed conflict that weapons
of mass destruction are necessarily apt to bring about greater deprivation of
participant values than conventional weaponry. The principle further assumes
the absence of significant thresholds within a given class of weapons of mass
o o c
destruction. These assumptions have been attacked as unsubstantiated in
fact by a number of authorities with particular reference to prohibitions on
237
chemical devices.'"
Although it is beyond the scope of the present analysis to evaluate
these arguments, suffice it to say that there is a strong case that there are >
weapons which, because of the physical principle upon which they are based, are
classified as weapons of mass destruction despite the fact they may be nonlethal,
controllable and relatively discriminating. Such weapons may be rather clearly
distinguishable from other weapons employing the same general physical principle.
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In certain instances, this distinction may be so apparent as to ensure the
existence of a threshold within the class of weapons itself. Such an intra-
class threshold might function equally well to discourage the use of the more
devastating devices in the class while nevertheless permitting the use of the
more discriminating, controllable weapons which operate on the same physical
principle. A typical example cited by the proponents of this argument would
be the nonlethal gases, e.g. tear gas, which are considered within the classi-
fication of gas or chemical devices and accordingly placed in the category of
weapons of mass destruction. Clearly such categorization appears illogical.
The paramount significance of both the traditional and evolving body
of progressive principles is that they provide a set of juridical criteria for
evaluating innovative weapons systems. When examined carefully, some of these
principles may be based upon assumptions which are not necessarily universally
valid. However, as long as these assumptions are recognized and their limita-
tions acknowledged, the resultant criteria may be invoked as potential institu-
tional bases supporting claims to weapons control.
The preeminent point which seems lost to many who would apply the
criteria suggested by these principles, is that their greatest utility may
be in offering standards upon which comparisons may be made. An appraisal of
the lawfulness of a particular weapon in terms of these various principles,
both fundamental and progressive, is apt to ignor the influence of alternative
devices in reaching a decision as to legality of any given system. A narrow
analysis of an isolated weapons system may also fail to consider competitive
political, diplomatic or military strategies impacting on factual conditions in
the real world arena. At least until such time as the optimum world public




must be judged in terms of a comprehensive analysis which examines alternative
devices within the context of real world strategies.
2. General Weapons Control in the Early Conventional Law
An accurate juridical analysis of directed-energy weaponry presupposes
some understanding of how the general principles have been applied in the
historical context. It is not the purpose of the present study to exhaustively
examine the considerable historical experience concerning the prohibition per
se or limitation of weapons. Nevertheless, a selected examination of this
historical experience with a particular emphasis on the efforts to control
weapons through international convention affords a broad perspective from which
to apply juridical criteria to directed-energy devices. Moreover, the historical
experience aids in understanding how the customary law principles are applied
and interpreted in conventions which might serve as general institutional
bases for claims related to the control of directed-energy weapons.
r
The recent experience in weapons control finds its genesis in the
Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868. Convoked by the Russian Imperial
Government in 1868, the'lnternational Military Commission" addressed itself to
the problem of certain newly developed projectiles which were explosive or
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contained "fulminating or inflammable substances." The Russian Government
was concerned that the smaller of these projectiles, those less than 400 grammes,
tended to cause excessive injury to individual combatants when compared with the
239preexisting alternative, the non-explosive bullet. In prohibiting the use
of such projectiles, the Declaration invoked concepts which have become
/<"




That the only legitimate object which States should endeavor to
accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy;
That for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest
possible number of men;
That this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms
which would needlessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men,
or render their death inevitable;
That the employment of such arms would, therefore be contrary
to the laws of humanity;
240
This language expresses the clear desire of the Commission to place certain
general constraints on the conduct of armed conflict, particularly with
regard to the use of certain arms which evoke adverse and unnecessary
effects. Although the United States and many other states did not participate
in the formulation of this proclamation, it is today generally regarded as part
of the customary international law of armed conflict.
It is clear from the language of the Declaration that the Commission
considered the criteria of military necessity and humanity in appraising the
legality of the innovative explosive bullet. What the St. Petersburg
Declaration also suggests is that the juridical determination of illegality
was at least in part a consequence of the availability of an efficient
alternative instrument of coercion that accomplished the same end without the
same adverse effect upon its targeted victims. Military necessity simply did
not demand the use of an explosive or fulminating bullet to disable or kill
individual field soldiers.
When World War I demonstrated the military advantages of aerial warfare,
241participants exhibited no compunction in reintroducing the explosive bullet.
However, in this instance the explosive bullet was employed against aircraft
and not the footsoldier. In the context of World War I aerial warfare, the
same principles of military necessity and humanity implicit in the St. Peters-
burg Declaration of 1868, served equally well to render permissible the same
weapon in a different set of circumstances. In each case, participants
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compared the relative efficiencies and impact of alternative weapons in the ,
context of the military mission and reached opposite results. Yet in each
instance, the operative principles were at work and affected the juridical
,
analysis of the weapon.
When the European delegates met at the Hague Conference of 1899, a
principal topic of discussion was the use of the balloon to launch projectiles
or explosives. The participants reached agreement "to prohibit, for a term of
five years, the launching of projectiles and explosives from balloons, or
242
by other new methods of a similar nature." Again the principles of military
necessity and humanity were implicit in participant efforts to limit use of
the lighter than air vehicles. As of 1899, no participant state had produced
an especially efficient lighter than air vehicle suitable for carrying on
accurate aerial bombardment. However, the interim nature of the agreement was
a clue to participant expectations that a future comparison of the lighter
than air vehicle with conventional delivery systems might yield very different
results.
Since the Hague Declaration did not restrict research and development,
participant states continued efforts to produce a militarily efficient lighter
than air vehicle. By the time the Hague Conference of 1907 convened, the
major Continental powers had active airship development programs and were not
inclined toward a renewal of previous restrictions on these potentially
243
efficient delivery systems. The airship, unlike previous ground delivery
systems, could operate at altitudes beyond the reach of ground defenses
making it essentially immune from defensive attack. Moreover, it could deliver „
a substantial explosive payload to a distant target with increased accuracy.
Bombardment well beyond the enemy's front lines using something other than
naval combatants was now for the first time a viable possibility. Although
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participant states which considered their geographical vulnerability increased
by the dirigible or which had no development programs of their own favored
renewal of restraints on aerial bombardment, the prospective efficiency of this
244innovative delivery system ensured it lawful combatant status.
The experience surrounding attempts at weapons control by the two Hague
Conferences suggests the existence of an important juridical factor which is
highly influential, if not controlling, in the evaluation of weapons systems.
Dr. M. W. Royse in addressing efforts at the Hague Conferences to regulate
weapons systems posited this thesis:
Such destructive weapons, for instance, as the high explosive
shell, the shrapnel, mines or torpedoes, were retained as legiti-
mate means of warfare, whereas the inefficient expanding and explo-
sive bullets were condemned along with the perfectly useless free
balloons. The proceedings of the Hague Conference (s) demonstrate
rather that a weapon will be restricted in inverse proportion, more
or less, to its effectiveness ; that the more efficient a weavon or
method of warfare the less likelihood there is of its being restricted
in action by the rules of war. (emphasis added) „,-
Recalling the historical experiences with aerial bombardment and events which
resulted in the authorization of the submarine warship, Professor Mallison
acknowledges the Royse thesis, observing, "Thus in the present century
combatant units which have been found to function with military efficiency






The Royse thesis might well be questioned in view of the selected
achievements in both bilateral and multilateral arms control negotiations
since World War II. Any of a number of international agreements have been
247
reached which would appear to control relatively efficient weapons systems.
However, as noted in the preceding chapter, the general tendency is to
interpret the arms control provisions of such agreements narrowly so as to
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authorize those activities or weapons not expressly prohibited. In instances
where there has been progress toward controlling potentially efficient
systems, it appears that either one of the progressive principles acted to
influence the juridical determination or a relatively credible sanctioning
248
system was developed in support of the conventional prohibition or limitation.
Experience since the advent of weapons of mass destruction suggests
that the Royse thesis-contending efficient weapons will be deemed lawful-can
not be applied in a wooden fashion without a careful examination of the facts.
However, it is difficult to lightly dismiss the factual evidence that Royse
and others subscribing to his thesis bring to bear when discussing the histori-
cal experience in testing weapons legality under the international law of armed
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conflict. The thesis seems to emphasize that any juridical analysis
of a weapon should take into account its relative efficiency when compared with
other competitive instruments of coercion. The efficiency of an innovative
weapon may actually be such as to enhance participant claims to its authorized
use on the basis of the principles of military necessity and humanity. To the
extent the efficiency of the weapon permits prompt submission of the enemy with
minimum expenditures of resources and at the same time aids in achieving the
legitimate military purpose with minimum unnecessary suffering, it serves to
enhance claims based on these two fundamental principles.
While the Hague Convention of 1907 produced few if any meaningful
limitations with regard to efficient weapons, it nevertheless articulated two
important general precepts bearing on weapons control. Article 22 of the Annex
to the Hague Regulations for Convention IV provides "The right of belligerents
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to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited." This pronouncement,
while certainly imposing no concrete constraints on any particular or even
general category of weapons, generally supports the limitations implicit in the
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fundamental principles. It establishes a very broad conventional rule for
restraining the means, conduct and weapons employed in armed conflict.
Article 23(e) of the Annex to the 1907 Hague Regulations provides a
second precept bearing on weapons control. This provision states in pertinent
part: "In addition to the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is
especially forbidden- ... To employ arms, projectiles, or material calculated
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to cause unnecessary suffering." This general conventional rule, while again
implicitly incorporating the concepts of military necessity and humanity,
specifically proscribes instruments of coercion which produce "unnecessary
suffering." To some extent, Article 23(e) represents a reaffirmation of the
St. Petersburg Declaration which sought to bar the use of particular weapons which
"uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death
252inevitable." " In determining which weapons or methods of warfare are barred
ipso jure under Article 23(e) , international law looks to the practice of
states. As noted in AFP 110-31:
What weapons or methods of warfare cause unnecessary suffering
^
and hence are unlawful per se , is best determined in the light
of the practice of states. All weapons cause suffering. The
critical factor in the prohibition against unnecessary suffering
is whether the suffering is needless or disproportionate to the
military advantages secured by the weapon, not the degree of
suffering itself.
The doctrine of the avoidance of unnecessary suffering articulated
in Article 23(e) has been repeatedly invoked in the international law of armed
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conflict. It was central to the prohibition of dum dum or exploding bullets.
It has also been cited as the rationale behind prohibitions against the use
of projectiles filled with glass or materials inherently difficult to
detect medically. This doctrine is construed so broadly that it seeks to




also the manner in which they are employed against combatants. In other
words, a weapon may meet the criteria established under Article 23(e) by
exhibiting characteristics which do not tend to cause unnecessary suffering, yet
nevertheless be regarded as unlawful because it is employed in a manner apt to
bring about the same proscribed result.
3. The Impact of Modern Warfare
Understanding the general application of the customary law principles
and certain key provisions in the early conventional law of weapons control,
it is now important to consider the impact of modern warfare on the law of
armed conflict. The general customary law principles and the early conventional
regimes were developed to deal with forms of armed conflict and weapons largely
of a previous era. While in practice they have been applied frequently in the
Twentieth Century, they have not been consistently effective or relevant in
addressing new modes of combat, weapons or participant strategies. Since the
directed-energy weapons are distinctly innovative products of the contemporary
era, the major influences of modern warfare upon the international law of armed
conflict must be considered for purposes of the present juridical analysis.
Perhaps one of the most significant factors of modern warfare to
influence the law of armed conflict is the development of weapons of mass
destruction. Some of the earliest weapons of mass destruction were the
asphyxiating, poisonous and other land warfare gases. The delegates to the
Hague Conference of- 1899 were apparently concerned about these gases and sought
to impose restraints on their use. Nevertheless, gas warfare became prevalent
in World War I after Germany initiated its use in 1915 as an instrument of anti-
trench warfare. The development of these early gases was followed by
research into bacteriological agents. In the hope of discouraging at least the
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first use of these early weapons of mass destruction, a number of major power
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participants developed the Geneva Gas Protocol of 1925. Despite
considerable criticism of its weak enforcement mechanisms, the Protocol
258
remains in effect and has been recently ratified by the United States.
Even more significant that the introduction of these early chemical and
bacteriological agents was the advent of the atomic bomb toward the end of
World War_II. With the success of the U.S. Manhatten Project and the subsequent
surrender of the Imperial Japanese Government brought about by the August 1945
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the world was wrenched into the nuclear age.
Since these initial catastrophic events, nuclear weapons technology has been
achieved by a variety of states. Moreover, the numbers and sophistication of
nuclear and thermonuclear devices has expanded dramatically, particularly
in the case of the superpowers and their most powerful military allies.
The development of these and other weapons of mass destruction has
greatly influenced participant strategies. These weapons and the sophisticated
rapidly delivery systems which have been developed in conjunction with them
have made it possible to strike a single devastating blow to an adversary.
As a result, participant military and political strategies have dramatically
changed. Whereas in earlier periods, the objective of participant state
military action was often dominance over a set objective, the current era is
more apt to be characterized biy more restrained goals, at least in the case
of the nuclear powers. The growth of massive arsenals of sophisticated
thermonuclear and nuclear weapons along with strategic force delivery capability
has often tended to check the military options which might have been previously
available to participants. As observed by the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
:
Although dominance is still an objective in relations between the
great powers and the small states, in their sphere of influence or
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outside that sphere, or among small powers (for example, the conflict
between Israel and the Arab countries), this objective has almost
disappeared in relations among the great powers. If NATO and the
Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) were to wage all-out war, the ques-
tion of victory would have little meaning since such a conflict
would result in mutual destruction before the issue of who was
the stronger could be settled.
The principal role of weapons of mass destruction and in particular,
nuclear and thermonuclear devices, has been in support of the strategy of
deterrence, to wit, preventing the outbreak of war through the threat of
massive retaliation in the event of an armed attack. To amplify the threat
against a potential aggressor, deterrence has been construed to authorize
attacks upon not only military objectives traditionally authorized by the
9 An
general principles, but also civilian population centers as well. To
ensure the credibility of the strategic deterrence forces against a disarming
preemptive first strike, the superpower participants continually upgrade and
improve upon sophisticated delivery systems which are operationally deployed
so as to guarantee effective retaliation even in the event of the feared
preemptive strike. The policy of guaranteeing a massive retaliatory strike
by each superpower against the other in the event of an attack is euphemistically
referred to as "mutually assured destruction" or "MAD.' 1
In circumstances where the strategy of deterrence influences participant
actions, it supersedes both the traditional, and in most cases even the progressive,
principles of the law of armed conflict. For example, in order to ensure the
success of deterrence, the ABM Treaty actually increased the exposure of
otherwise protected noncombatants in participant states to potential nuclear
attack. The rationale for this apparently unlawful or at least illogical
bilateral agreement was to guarantee the credibility of the nuclear deterrent
and effectively enhance the existing "balance of terror" to discourage a
preemptive strike. The premise of the ABM Treaty is that defensive means
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against nuclear retaliation directed against civilian population centers must be
limited so as to ensure the continued credibility of retaliatory deterrence
261
weapons.
Another influence which must be taken into account in any juridical
analysis of innovative weapons, is the Twentieth Century concept of unrestricted
warfare. This influence, like the advent of weapons of mass destruction and
the theory of nuclear deterrence, has tended to decrease the impact of the
fundamental principles on warfare. The concept of unrestricted warfare
entails combatants attacking the aggregate power bases of the enemy state
including; the military establishment, the transportation system, the economic
structure, the ideological foundations, social organization and the population
itself. The objective of the strategy is to dismember key components of the
opponent' s institutional power bases making further conduct of the conflict
increasingly more costly and difficult. In its extreme, such strategy involves
either direct attacks upon civilian population centers, or alternatively,
substantial ancillary destruction and injury to such noncombatants by virtue
of massive assaults on otherwise legitimate targets in the vicinity.
During the American Civil War, General Sherman invoked the strategy of
total or unrestricted warfare against the Confederacy in his infamous march
through Georgia. Said Sherman, "The only possible way to end this unhappy and
dreadful conflict ... is to make it terrible beyond endurance!" General
Sheridan operated on the same premise in conducting unrestricted warfare against
the American Comanche Tribe. '~ The strategy of unrestricted warfare was
exercised to a limited extent in World War I. However, with the development
of the medium and long range bomber, high explosive ordnance and fire bombs,
submarines of greatly increased operational capabilities, and many equally
lethal weapons, most combatant states were exposed to the full force of this
strategy by the onset of World War II. The German V-l and V-2 attacks on England,

-1 18-
the London blitz, the fire bombing of Dresden and Japanese cities and ulti-
mately the atomic • bomb attacks themselves exemplified some of the worst horrors
inherent in the strategy of unrestricted warfare as practiced during the World
n c q
War II. It is apparent in all these actions that noncombatant civilians
were the real victims of the attacks designed to increase the "price" each
participant paid for its continued involvement in the conflict.
Superpower and major power participant state military strategies since
World War II have generally continued to embrace the concept of unrestricted
warfare. The principal qualification to this policy has been with regard to the
use of weapons of mass destruction. The use of weapons of mass destruction
and in particular nuclear or thermonuclear devices has been avoided largely by
reason of the threshold principle — that is a fear that the first use of these
devices will dangerously escalate the conflict to a level of massive coercion
in which there would be unrestrained exchanges of such weaponry among participants.
Both the North Vietnamese attacks on the Republic of South Vietnam and the
American conduct of the war against North Vietnam displayed at least some
characteristics of the strategy of unrestricted warfare. Although the U.S.
aerial war against North Vietnam was by no means totally unrestricted, one
of its objectives was nevertheless to bring the war to the civilian population and
weaken the country's total capability to wage an aggressive war against the
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Republic of South Vietnam. However, a concern for the threshold also appeared
to have been a major reason that the principal nuclear power participant, the
United States, avoided the use of even tactical nuclear devices during the
course of the prolonged conflict.
Soviet military strategy also embraces concepts of unrestricted warfare.
Marshall V.D. Sokolovskiy in addressing the implications of weapons of mass
destruction in a world arena characterized by conditons of political struggle
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proclaimed: "Under these conditions, the political aims of the sides in a future
world war will be achieved not only by the defeat of the armed forces, but
also by complete disorganization of the enemy economy and lowering of the
265
morale of the population." Although there is less evidence that the
strategy of unrestricted warfare is pursued by the less powerful states, any
apparent restraint on their part is probably more a function of lack of
capacity to conduct such warfare and concern for major power intervention than
an altruistic rejection of the policy itself.
By invoking an extremely broad interpretation of the principles of
military necessity and humanity, it is possible to justify unrestricted warfare
in terms of international law. The argument can be made that unrestricted
warfare is justified as necessary to attain the military objective and that the
force employed is proportionate to the military importance of the objective.
i
Moreover, the force used is necessary for the submission of the enemy with the
least expenditure of time, life and physical resources. Such an argument
appears premised on the assumption that the lawful military objective is
broadly interpreted to include the very submission or surrender of the enemy
itself. There is a growing body of empirical evidence however, which suggests
unrestricted warfare is based on an erroneous assumption that the application of
coercive measures against the totality of the enemy's power bases necessarily
produces a more expeditious and efficient termination of the conflict. A
careful review of strategic bombing conducted during World War II now suggests
unrestricted warfare may do little to bring about the early termination of the






B. A Framework for Analys is
Historically, the introduction of innovative weapons or methods of
warfare resulted in denunciation of the cruel effects of the weapon. Pope
Innocent III issued a decretum forbidding the use of the crossbow, arbalest and
? A 7
siege engines against Christians. The Second Lateran Council of the Roman
Church (1139) enunciating its self-rioghteous concern for the then innovative
crossbow, denounced it as "hateful to God and unfit for Christians." In
referring to these and other examples, Professors McDougal and Feliciano
observe:
While these examples may seem quaint today, they illustrate the
natural tendency of those whose expectations are shattered by
'technological surprise' to denounce as 'cruel,' 'inhuman,' and
'illegal,' and to seek to outlaw, the new and unfamiliar weapon.
Yet clearly novelty in itself cannot rationally be equated with
illegality.
26g
It is clear that such simplistic denunciations or declarations have now become
meaningless in an era characterized by the major influences of modern warfare.
The advent of modern warfare requires a more sophisticated framework of
analysis which examines a triad of institutional bases relevant to arms control
in the international law of armed conflict. An analysis and appraisal of claims
bearing on the control of innovative weapons must first consider the customary
law principles within the historical context. It must look to convention and
the applicable practice of states. However, it must also consider important
modifications and supplementary progressive concepts which address the influences
introduced by modern warfare. Accordingly, innovative weapons including
directed-energy devices must be analyzed in terms of the established conventional
and customary law as well as the more recently postulated SIPRI progressive
principles of survival, environment and threshold. While norms implicit in




conflict, they do seem to bring important new criteria to bear which are
particularly responsive to the problems posed by the introduction of weapons
of mass destruction in an arena where the strategies of deterrence and unre-
stricted warfare are widely accepted.
A second institutional basis in the law of armed conflict which must
be evaluated as a possible source for claims bearing on the control of directed-
energy weapons looks to analogous experiences. An examination of analogous
experiences, either in terms of weapons systems themselves or methods of
warfare which in general exhibit similar destructive characteristics may offer
valuable precedents as to the permissibility or impermissibility of directed-
energy devices. Equally important, this mode of analysis may allow new weapons
to be judged on a relative basis against existing weapon systems. This mode
of analysis has the dual advantage of not only subjecting the new weapon to
examination, but also imposing a further legal review upon the existing compar-
able system. In effect, the existing system must be justified in light of
technological developments incorporated into the innovative system. An
analysis should not dismiss the possibility that the innovative weapon may fare
better in such a juridical analysis than the existing system because of
improved efficiency, controllability or precision characteristics.
Finally, an improved framework of analysis for evaluating the legality
of new weapons systems, must take into account claims based on any explicit
treaty or conventional regime which may offer relevant weapons control. .As
noted in the preceding chapter, the comprehensive international law applied in
the earth-space arena, including the law of strategic arms control, does little
to prohibit or limit directed-energy weaponry. Nevertheless, certain recent
developments in the international law of armed conflict suggest that conventional
control mechanisms may be evolving which will potentially affect the legality of
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innovative weapons. Although these developments may not have achieved the
status of established international law, they must nevertheless be considered as
possible sources for claims to the control of directed-energy weapons.
In conducting its reviews of prospective weapons systems, the U.S.
Department of Defense applies a somewhat similar framework of analysis. As
noted in AFP 110-31,
A weapon or method of warfare may not be considered illegal solely
because it is new or has not previously been used in warfare. How-
ever, a new weapon or method of warfare may be illegal, per se
,
if
it is restricted by international law including treaty or interna-
tional custom. The issue is resolved, or attempted to be resolved,
by analogy to weapons or methods previously determined to be lawful
or unlawful. In addition to analogy, the legality of new weapons or
methods of warfare is determined by whether the weapon's effects
violate the rule against unnecessary suffering or its effects are
indiscriminate as to cause disproportionate civilian injury or dam-
age to civilian objects. The military advantages to be secured by
use of the weapon must be compared with the effects caused by its
use. „„„270
With the exception of considering the supplementary progressive principles,
the Air Force formulation for juridical analysis of new weapons incorporates
the same triad framework suggested by this study. It would examine inter-
national law in terms of custom and treaty, analogous weapons systems and
apply certain general principles of the law of armed conflict.
As the three bases of this analytical triad are applied, it is advisable
to weigh one additional variable. While the era of modern warfare has made
massive deprivation of values a possibility in armed conflict, it does not
follow that all armed conflict necessarily results in massive deprivation of
values nor that such conflict will ultimately be escalated to such an extent.
One has only to recall the recent conflict in Southeast Asia to observe that
the mere possession of weapons of mass destruction, adherence to a strategy of
deterrence and the capacity for conducting unrestricted warfare, do not guarantee




The question which arises is whether the criteria and their application
are apt to vary as between circumstances of massive as opposed to limited
coercion. As suggested, superpower and major power participant states appear
to have introduced certain self-serving exceptions to the international law of
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armed conflict with respect to nuclear weapons systems. These exceptions
appear to have been introduced to parry claims that possession, deployment and
use of strategic or tactical nuclear weapons constitute a violation of inter-
national law. The effect of these exceptions seems to have been to supersede
the fundamental principles of the law of armed conflict on the theory that
deterrence forces and the possession of tactical nuclear devices effectively
enhances the maintenance of international peace and discourages massive aggres-
sion.
In juridically evaluating directed-energy weapons, the nature of the
coercion should be considered and the question asked to what extent its scope
may impact upon the lawfulness of attacking particular objectives. It is
also necessary to inquire as to whether the scope of conflict may affect the
legality of the methods employed or the manner in which weapons are used.
Moreover, the fact that otherwise unlawful methods are authorized against
protected objects of attack through current policies influencing the conduct
of modern massive warfare, may prove an important factor in a comparative analysis
of alternative strategic weapons systems. It should be understood that when
the scope of conflict is examined as a variable, massive coercion will be
distinguished from limited coercion by the assumption that in the former,
participants either invoke or threaten to invoke weapons of mass destruction,




C. Application of Controls in the Existing Customary and Conventional Law
1. Claims Based on Fundamental Institutions
In applying the fundamental principles of military necessity and humanity
it is helpful to recall the juridical criteria distilled by Professor Mallison
when he observed "for a weapon to meet the test of lawfulness ... it must not
cause a destruction of values disproportionate to the military advantage gained
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through its use." In placing his criteria in perspective, Professor Mallison
notes, "The historical experience in applying the criteria appears to indicate
that weapons will be upheld as lawful except where there is a great disparity
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between the ensuing destruction of values and the military advantage gained."
Theffi -operative criteria essentially parallel the measures propounded by AFP 110-
31 which would examine whether the weapon violates the rule against unnecessary
suffering contained in Article 23(e) of the Annex to the Hague Regulations of 1907,
or alternatively, whether its effects are indiscrminate as to cause disproportion-
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ate civilian injury or damage to civilian objects.
In specifically applying this criteria, the initial query is whether
the innovative weapon is capable of accurately delivering its coercive force
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to the target. Most indications are that directed-energy weaponry when
operational, will possess targeting accuracy essentially limited only by the
precision capabilities of its optical or radar guidance systems. In addition,
directed-energy weaponry by reason of its physical principle may be designed
so as to prevent the commencement of destructive continuous wave or pulse
energy until such time as guidance systems have firmly locked onto the target
and accurate acquisition is confirmed. Presumably such target acquisition checks
and failsafe firing mechanisms would function through a computer controlled guid-
ance system programmed in advance to execute destructive energy firing orders
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only upon confirmation of designated enemy targets.
The development of high-energy lasers, particle-beam weapons or other
directed energy instruments possessing controllable energy levels or possibly
variable beam widths would also ensure relatively accurate delivery of the
destructive force to the target. This unique mode for the delivery of the
destructive force to the target may make the directed-energy weapon superior
to many alternative systems. While modern land, sea and air delivery systems
utilize advanced guidance concepts including sophisticated ballistics computers
and the low- intensity laser or microwave radar beam rider systems, probably none
could compare more favorably with a fully developed directed-energy system
for at least line-of-sight accuracy. With the directed-energy weapon, it would
no longer be necessary to "lead the target" as required with existing systems.
The zero-time-to-target characteristic of the directed-energy weapon ensures that
the onset of target destruction commences simultaneously with the initiation
of firing, whereas with other systems a time element necessarily ensues which
could result in the target moving or noncombatants entering the preselected
target area.
A second inquiry which aids in application of the fundamental principles
is whether the use of the new weapon would necessarily result in excessive
injury to protected persons or property resources. As noted in AFP 1 10-31 . 6-3 (c)
:
The existing law of armed conflict does not prohibit the use of
weapons whose destructive force cannot strictly be confined to
the specific military objective. Weapons are not unlawful
simply because their use may cause incidental casualties to
civilians and destruction of civilian objects. Nevertheless,
particular weapons or methods of warfare may be prohibited
because of their indiscriminate effects. .276
Virtually any weapon can be used in an unlawful manner, but such use does not
necessarily make the weapon itself per se illegal. The category of weapon which
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is prohibited per se under the collateral concept of indiscriminate weapons
is that device which is incapable of being adequately controlled as a result
of particular design or functional characteristics. Typical examples of
devices violative of this concept are the World War II German V-l and V-2
rockets which possessed guidance systems so primitive that these weapons could
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not be directed to specific targets with any certainty.
The directed-energy weapons currently under research and development,
when operational, will be relatively discriminating. However, the particular
limitations of the HEL, unless corrected, could bring about ancillary injury to
noncombatants located in the vicinity of the target. If a HEL weapon is used
against a military target which is adjacent to an area populated by noncom-
batants, these protected persons could be subject to corneal or other eye damage
and other forms of personal injury caused by indirect exposure to the laser
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source. Observations by scientific journals and high-energy laser author-
ities indicate possible adverse ancillary effects upon friendly combatants not
within the direct field of the beam itself continues to be a matter of concern
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to weapons developers. Presumably if indirect laser energy is sufficient to
threaten friendly armed forces in the vicinity of the battle, it continues to
pose a threat to noncombatants also in the area.
Although there is no available information with regard to possible
ancillary personal injury or property damage resulting from PBW's, it appears
somewhat less likely since the directed beam of particles and not light energy
acts as the destructive force. Unlike light energy which is subject to spreading
and diffusion, the particle-beam can be directed from source to target with
minimal dispersion. In any case, it appears that directed-energy weapons as a
class may still be relatively discriminating as compared to other weapons of
great coercive potential. Tests may very well show the ancillary injury and
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destruction of protected resources is comparatively less with the typical use
of a directed-energy weapon than might be expected by using a nuclear or
high explosive conventional weapon. Even if research and developmental testing
demonstrate that some one or more of the directed-energy devices have a
substantial tendency for producing adverse effects to protected persons or
property in the vicinity of the conflict, such determination would not rule
out the use of the weapon against unmanned vehicles in near space or elsewhere.
A third juridical measure under the fundamental customary and conven-
tional law criteria is whether the weapon's effects would be uncontrollable
or unpredictable in space or time in a manner to cause disproportionate injury
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to noncombatants or damage to protected resources." This measure brings the
collateral concept of proportionality to bear by asking whether the design or
functional characteristics of the weapon are such as to typically bring about
more ancillary personal injury or property damage than warranted by the military
advantages gained from the weapon's use. A typical example might be a delayed
action land or submarine mine which while perhaps efficient as a military
instrument against combatants during the conflict, would cause at least equally
deadly results subsequent to the reestablishment of peace. Unless these devices
are automatically self-defusing within a reasonable period of time ? the potential
deprivation of human and material values resulting from use is disproportionate
to the military advantage gained. They may be said to be uncontrollable in time.
The directed-energy weapon appears to present no problems with regard to
controllability over time. It also will generally be controllable with respect
to space, except with respect to possible ancillary damage to noncombatants or
even nontargeted combatants in the vicinity of the HEL beam and its objective.
Whether such ancillary personal injury would be considered disproportionate would
be a function of the importance of the military objective and the number of
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protected persons adversely affected.
A fourth inquiry which assists in the functional application of the
criteria suggested by customary and general conventional law principles is
whether the use of an innovative weapon would result in unnecessary suffering
28
1
in relation to the military purpose served. ' This measure is a direct test
of Article 23(e) of the Annex to the Regulations for the Hague Convention IV
and the prescriptions contributed to the customary international law by the
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St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868. As again noted in AFP 110-31:
This prohibition against unnecessary suffering is a concrete expres-
sion of the general principles of proportionality and humanity. The
rule reflects interests of combatants in avoiding needless suffering.
Weapons are lawful, within the meaning of the prohibition against
unnecessary suffering, so long as the foreseeable injury and suffer-
ing associated with wounds caused by such weapons are not dispropor-
tionate to the necessary military use of the weapon in terms of
factors such as effectiveness against particular targets and avail-
able alternative weapons.
ZOJ
It is not the degree of suffering which is critical in this instance, but
rather whether the suffering produced is disproportionate or needless to
military objectives sought through an application of the weapon. An example
of a weapon prohibited per* se as causing unnecessary suffering would be the
dum dum bullet. However, as observed previously, some types of otherwise
proscribed weaponry might be considered lawful against a target which does not
lend itself to efficient attack from alternative devices. Military necessity
may function to authorize an otherwise proscribed weapon for use against a
fortified or heavily defended target.
The directed-energy weapon, particularly the HEL, may indeed be subject
to limitations pursuant to customary and conventional law proscriptions against
unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury. In addition to probably not being
cost-effective, the use of the HEL as an antipersonnel device would no doubt
? 8 S
create unnecessary suffering. The International Committee of the Red Cross
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in its 1973 Report on the Work of Experts observes that in addition to possible
temporary or even permanent damage to the cornea, certain other personal injury
may result from the high-energy laser:
As regards the action of lasers on the human body, laser light
may give rise to several damaging effects, including heat, pressure,
possible shock waves (both accoustical and ultrasonic) and protein
generation in the blood plasma. At the present level of understand-
ing, the most important effects on human tissue seem to be heat and
pressure. Tissue ionization, chemical transformations and disturb-
ances of the blood circulation may also occur at the impact site. „,286
The combination of these various physiological effects upon the human body is
no doubt such as to rule the HEL out as an antipersonnel weapon. However,
as an instrument for use against ships, planes, military land-based facilities
or vehicles and spacecraft, the high-energy laser would probably be construed
as lawful. In an antimateriel mission it would compare favorably with most
other weapons as a particularly efficient means of destruction. Incidental
personal injury in connection with destruction of aircraft, spacecraft, ships,
tanks, fortifications or other military objectives would probably not violate
the rule against unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury.
One factor which must be taken into consideration however, is the
unusual characteristic of the high-energy laser to destroy some target
materials more rapidly than others. As noted in connection with the discussion
of the HEL characteristics and capabilities, the laser's force may cause initial
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destruction to components in a target which ablate easily. This characteristic
may cause injury or death to personnel, particularly in the case of an aircraft or
spacecraft, as a result of rapid depressur ization or imploding debris and not
through thermal effect. Since such injury or death may actually be less painful
than that brought on by thermal effect, the use of a HEL weapon against certain
types of manned targets may be no less humane than employing existing weaponry.
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2. Claims Based on Progressive Principles
In the view of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,
a principle is evolving in the customary law if not through the conventional
regimes which addresses the threat a particular weapons system poses to the
2 88
very survival of mankind. The Stockholm Institute observes that the princi-
ple: should be applicable as a criterion in judging weapons which can effect
a massive deprivation of values not only among the combatants, but with
respect to noncombatants and future generations as well.
The characteristics and capabilities of the high-energy laser and parti-
cle-beam weapon do not appear likely to violate the principle of survival.
These directed-energy weapons are sufficiently discriminating so as to be able
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to limit the application of their coercive force against the designated target.
Noncombatant states and their inhabitants are not apt to be affected by high-
energy laser or particle-beam weapon attack, nor are future generations in
combatant states going to experience adverse reactions to the use of these
weapons. In fact, the argument could be made that these weapons may be indirect-
ly supportive of the principle of the survival of mankind.
As will be discussed at a later point in the study, strategic planners
and international decision-makers may wish to seriously consider advanced
directed-energy weaponry as a means of backing away from those devices
presently dominating superpower and major power arsenals which unquestionably
do pose a threat to the world community in the present as well as in future
generations. While the directed-energy weapon when developed could offer
participants the capability of generating tremendous destructive force, such
force would be more controllable than many nuclear, thermonuclear, chemical
and biological weapons systems. To the extent the directed-energy weapon
provides a more controllable, but equally destructive means of ensuring major
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participant national security in the minimum world public order system, it may
well be supportive of the principle of survival.
If a claim to the permissibility of directed-energy weapons can employ
the principle of survival as an institutional basis, so also can at least one
counterclaim. Directed-energy weaponry introduced for the limited strategic
purpose of interdicting reconnaissance vehicles such as the U.S. Air Force's
"Big Bird" satellites or high altitude, supersonic aircraft like the SR-71,
may well threaten the delicate balance of strategic power thereby interfering
with the strategy of deterrence. Additionally, the use of directed-energy
weaponry in an anti-ballistic missile system may well decrease the credibility
of the existing mutual deterrent between the superpowers and concomitantly
encourage the possibility of a preemptive attack. If one participant believes
it could launch a preemptive first strike knocking out the greater portion of
its opponent's retaliatory deterrence force and then simply selectively
incinerate those remaining retaliatory strike forces which escaped preemptive
destruction, the theory of deterrence becomes inoperative. If the directed-
energy weapon is deployed as an ABM system or as a means of destroying early
warning or reconnaissance capability, it would decrease the credibility of the
deterrent.
The ABM Treaty, through its doctrine of noninterference with national
290
means of verification, implicitly recognizes the principle of survival.
Moreover, the concept of the ABM Treaty itself is predicated on the assumption
that any measure which decreases the credibility of the deterrent, may pose
a threat to the participants Interests. Perhaps the preambular language of the
Treaty-"Proceeding from the premise that nuclear war would have devastating
consequences on all mankind"- is the clearest manifestation of the principle of
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survival at work in this particular institution.
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If directed-energy weaponry is deployed or used so as to reduce the
impact of the existing strategy of deterrence, it is likely to contravene the
evolving principle of survival. To this extent it may be said that survival
as a principle is a basis for claims seeking to limit deployment and use of
the directed-energy weapon. Such specif ic limitations would apply to the use of
the directed-energy weapon against reconnaissance systems as well as against the
strategic deterrence forces themselves including such delivery systems as the
ICBM, strategic bombers and even the innovative cruise missile. If the directed-
energy device serves to threaten any of these systems, a claimant could assert
it only acts to increase the possiblity of massive coercion between the super-
powers by increasing the possibility of one participant or the other initiating
a preemptive strike.
This claim is persuasive and would seem to indicate if directed-energy
weapons are to be lawful, they must not contravene the strategy of deterrence.
However, having said this, it is equally important to bear in mind that the
directed-energy weapon may actually be used not to reduce the impact of the
deterrence strategy, but to enhance or strengthen it. If the directed-energy
weapon is developed to the extent where it provides a more controllable and
discriminating substitute for existing weapons of mass destruction used in support
of the major and superpower participant deterrence strategies, it may actually
prove a positive development in the effort to advance, toward an improved
minimum world public order system. Such substitution would of course assume
that directed-energy weapons can be developed which have sufficient destructive
potential to be a credible substitute for nuclear or thermonuclear weapons which
are used by reason of the fact they do indeed create a "balance of terror."
Claims to permissibility of directed-energy weapons based upon the principle of
survival could also be predicated on the deployment or use of these devices in
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support of other institutional mechanisms designed to enhance international
peace and security. In other words, it should not be assumed that deterrence
is the only means by which massive coercion can be prevented. One day it may
be possible to employ directed-energy weaponry as a means of arming an inter-
national enforcement agency for the purpose maintaining the peace.
At least some of these various claims and counterclaims appear to have
persuasive value. Based on the principle of survival, the stronger claims
are those which would best enhance international peace and security, while
decreasing the possibility of massive deprivation of values both in current and
future generations. Specifically, it would seem in both the exclusive and
inclusive interests of the participants to avoid the use of directed-energy
weaponry in a way which would detract from the credibility of the existing
deterrent. Such a claim would have to be specifically implemented through
concrete bilateral or multilateral agreements which might address various
limitations on the use of these devices against strategic forces or support
facilities. Alternatively, claims which might provide for the use of the
directed-energy weaponry as a means of providing a safer substitute for existing
dangerous weaponry in the deterrence forces would seem to have great merit.
A second progressive principle which appears particularly relevant to
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the directed-energy weapon is that which seeks to preserve the environment.
As evidence in support of the evolution of this progressive principle, SIPRI
has recalled a number of of General Assembly resolutions addressing the import
of the natural environment and of avoiding coercive action which might endanger
it. General Assembly Resolution 3264 (XXIX) of December 9, 1974 proclaimed that
"(I)t is necessary to adopt, through the conclusion of an appropriate international
convention, effective measures to prohibit action to influence the environment




the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health."
A concrete application of this principle requires inquiry into the
short and long term ecological effects of the use of the directed-energy weapon.
It is important to examine both the direct effects upon the ecology, such as
any immediate destruction of living or nonliving resources, as well as indirect
effects, such as alteration of weather patterns through possible effects on the
earth's ozone layer. Insufficient information is publicly available to adequately
answer these queries. However, based on the limited data available, it appears
both the high-energy laser and the particle-beam weapon present no major
direct or indirect ecological threat. Certainly target areas in the terrestrial
theaters subjected to the destructive forces of these weapons would experience
thermal, shock and a variety of other related forms of damage. However, based
on presently disclosed data, it appears the use of these devices would not
tend to cause pervasive ecological modification or destruction of environ-
mental values outside the immediate target area. Moreover, it should be noted
that since most authorities are now projecting at least the first operational
deployment of the HEL will come in near space and that problems of beam attenu-
ation may limit its use in terrestrial zones, there may be little or no poten-
tial for an adverse impact upon the environment in the immediate future in any
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case.
From the perspective of ecological and environmental preservation, the
directed-energy weapon may again offer certain comparative advantages over
alternative systems in participant arsenals. Discussing this principle, the
SIPRI observes:
The environment is already threatened by certain existing modern
weapons, in the first place by nuclear weapons, but also by chemi-
cal or bacteriological weapons calculated to destroy crops or to
defoliate trees (herbicides). Certain of these weapons aim at
the destruction of the environment, either as a means of terror-
izing the civilian population, or as a means of denying the foli-
age that may conceal military action. „_
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It would be inaccurate to suggest that directed-energy weapons can necessarily
accomplish all the various strategic and tactical military missions with
effectiveness equal to or better than alternative weapons systems. However, in
those instances where the directed-energy weapon's characteristics and
capabilities are competitive with alternative devices, whether conventional or
weapons of mass destruction, the principle of environment should be invoked in
a determination of comparative efficiency. Whichever weapon tends to exhibit
the least* adverse ecological impact, all other claims being equal, should be
considered the preferred device for use in coercive activity.
Claims to directed-energy weapon permissibility based on a comparative
analysis with alternative systems are generally consistent with participant
exclusive and inclusive interests. In armed conflict, particularly in cases
of massive vice limited coercion, a combatant's exclusive interests tend
to be little enhanced by the use of inefficient weapons or devices which
destroy or endanger environmental resources. Measures taken against an enemy's
natural resources may in isolated cases yield benefit. If a HEL was used to
ignite forest fires or explode petroleum reserves, some immediate advantage
might be gained. However, such obvious misuse of the weapon could
prove counterproductive or even cost-ineffective. It could lead to retalia-
tory steps which would certainly be inconsistent with an attacker's exclusive
interests. Generally, the HEL and PBW can be used so as to avoid such results.
The use of directed-energy devices against environmental values would
also be inconsistent with inclusive interests. It would tend to expand the
conflict causing increased deprivation of values. In addition, since there is
increasing recognition that the earth's ecology is intricately interrelated, it
would be shortsighted of any participant to employ the use of any weapon purely
to perpetrate environmental damage. In the long run, such action might
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could prove counterproductive to the attacking participant's own national
interests which may be indirectly dependent upon the ecological stability and
well-being of its opponent's resources.
Sanctions against the use of directed-energy weaponry for environmental
damage could be based on enforcement mechanisms contained in a specific agree-
ment limiting use of such devices. Alternatively, certain positive sanctions
may even now exist in the form of mutual reciprocity between and among
participant states. As will be further discussed with regard to prospective
conventional developments, it now appears the international law of armed
conflict may be specifically adopting this principle. If so, additional
sanctioning mechanisms including holding participant officials personally
responsible as international war criminals in the event of conventional violations
may tend to constain state military actions and promote compliance with rules
seeking to preserve the environment. Finally, although directed-energy weapons
are probably an inefficient means of causing broad ecological damage,
should they be applied for this purpose, the controls of the Environmental
Modification Treaty may eventually apply to render such use illegal.
A third progressive principle which could influence claims to lawfulness
of directed-energy weapons is the concept of threshold. As noted previously,
the threshold concept assumes that the deployment or use of certain weapons,
particularly those within an explicit class of weapons of mass destruction, may
result in a general escalation of the conflict in which virtually all weapons
of the same classification would be unleashed. The threshold principle as
formulated by SIPRI would be invoked so as to proscribe the use of even those
weapons within the classification which might be applied in a lawful manner, if




From the perspective of the SIPRI, the threshold principle would have particu-
lar importance with regard to nuclear, biological and chemical weaponry.
However, as noted, the basic assumptions upon which the principle is based
are open to challenge.
Without addressing the validity of the principle's assumptions in detail,
it appears the concept of threshold has little persuasive value as a means of
prohibiting or limiting the directed-energy weapon. It may be true that the
use of a relatively low power directed-energy weapon, for example a chemical
laser mounted aboard a killer-satellite, could encourage the use of larger, more
powerful devices. However, even if this is the case, the comparative value of
the directed-energy weapon as a relatively more discriminating and controllable
device cannot be dismissed. If even the larger, more powerful instruments in
the directed-energy class exhibit characteristics of greater discrimination
and control when compared with alternative weapons systems, the application of
the threshold principle in the case of this new category of weaponry may be
ill-advised. To apply the principle so as to strictly prohibit the use of the
HEL or PBW in every case on the theory that to do so would necessarily escalate
the scope of the coercion, may very well prove inconsistent with the maintenance
of the minimum public order. Moreover, it may be counterproductive to efforts
to seek the optimum world public order system in the long run.
Even if the threshold principle is considered valid with respect to
the PBW or the HEL, critical distinctions as to use may be relatively easily
drawn and observed if it is in the interests of participants to do so. For
example, based on the present state of the art, the HEL appears particularly
efficient in space but poses a significant threat of causing unnecessary suffer-
ing in terrestrial theaters, particularly if used in an antipersonnel mode.
If this continues to be the case despite research and development efforts to
eliminate undesirable effects, it should be in participants' interests to
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prohibit the use of the HEL in the terrestrial theaters, at least as an anti-
personnel weapon. At the same time, it would be relatively easy to authorize
the use of the HEL in near space. In other words, a threshold could be keyed
not to the mere use of the weapon, but rather to operational theaters where
it would be prohibited. In such a regime, many of the same sanctions which have
applied in the cases of the other principles could no doubt serve to support
weapons controls.
D. Controls Applicable to Analogous Weaponry: Incendiary Devices
1. Scope and Limitations of the Analogy
A second institutional basis in the law of armed conflict which may
serve as a source for claims bearing on the control of directed-energy weapons
exists through an evaluation of analogous weapons. Evaluation by analogy can
provide an important perspective on the practice of participant states with
respect to rendering weapons or their use in particular circumstances either
prohibited or limited. Claims of unnecessary suffering and superfluous
injury based on both the customary law and conventional regimes must be applied
in the context of the practice of states. Specifically, claims regarding
target selection or legitimate objects of attack are best evaluated in terms
of practical experience. If analogous weapons and coercive circumstances can
be found which are applicable to particular innovative weapons systems, they
tend to greatly improve the accuracy of the juridical evaluation.
At the same time, the limitations and potential pitfalls of evaluating
through analogy should be recognized. It should be acknowledged that while some
facets of a new weapon may be analogous to an existing system, there may be

139-
vast differences in characteristics and limitations. Professors McDougal and
Feliciano in commenting on the analogies sometimes invoked between poison or
poison gas and nuclear weapons, address another basic limitation of analyzing
through comparison:
In particular, it may be noted that the argument about the supposed
nonpermissible character of nuclear weapons is derived principally by
analogy from earlier prescriptions about poisonous gas, poisoned arms
and other weapons causing disproportionate suffering. Analogies are
Important, however, only so far as the policies they suggest are rele-
vant; and analogies suggest only the requirements, again, of compro-
mise between military necessity and humanitarianism. (emphasis added)
The point is clearly made that in examining claims to permissibility or imper-
missibility, it is necessary to evaluate pertinent participant policies which
dictate the possession and ultimate use of the weapons themselves. McDougal
and Feliciano suggest that despite the fact nuclear weapons share certain
features in common with poison gas and poisoned arms, the fact that the latter
category has been prohibited is not determinative of the status of the former.
Military necessity, the influences of modern warfare and a consideration of
certain aspects of humanity continue to be the basic rationale for weapons
control. In evaluating by means of analogy it then becomes important to
examine the operation of these basic factors upon participant policies which
may seek to control the existing, comparable weapons system.
Since the physical principle upon which directed-energy weapons operate
is unique to modern warfare, it is not possible to draw a direct analogy to
any existing weapon. Instead, any evaluation through analogy to existing weapons
must look to particular characteristics, limitations, modes of use or effects
-
which both systems may have in common. To the extent such factors may have had
a bearing on the juridical determination of lawfulness of the existing system,
they may be relevant to a legal appraisal of the innovative weapon.
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A principle consideration implicit in both customary law and conven-
tional principles often seems to be a weapon's effect upon particular targets.
Depending upon the nature and scope of such effects, claims may arise as to
the prohibition of the weapon per se or its limitation as to use against
particularly vulnerable targets which for humanitarian or other reasons merit
special protection. The expected physical effects of the HEL and perhaps the
somewhat less well understood PBW upon targets will entail thermal destruction,
shock waves, and certain causally related destruction or injury. Although no
known weapon presently existing in participant arsenals would necessarily bring
on all these same effects, at least in the same degree or manner, at least one
system should be considered as partially analogous.
A variety of Twentieth Century incendiary weapons may produce at least
some of the same destructive thermal effects. These weapons have been
applied in an extensive number of tactical military roles in several wars and
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have generally caused substantial devastation and loss of life. One of
the more widely used incendiary weapons has been the napalm firebomb which was
originally used by battlefield commanders as an antimateriel weapon, princi-
pally against mobile armor and heavily protected emplacements. Napalm has
proved a relatively efficient means of penetrating such targets. The fire-
bomb has also been used as an antipersonnel weapon and in this connection
exhibits two "advantages." In addition to being capable of quickly blanketing an
extensive area with destructive force, it also evokes a demonstrable negative
299
psychological effect in the personnel against whom it is used. Incendiaries,
particularly the firebombs, have also been employed in a strategic role against
large population centers as demonstrated in the allied raids against Germany
and Japan in World War II.
Incendiary weapons produce particular physiological effects in consequence
of the thermal energy directed on target. Persons receiving burns to more than

141-
60% of their body are apt to die unless given quick and highly specialized
301treatment in a modern burn hospital. Burns which cover more than 5% of
the body surface tend to demand more medical resources than other types of
disabling injury. Burn injuries are considered relatively more painful than
many other combat wounds sustained' by personnel and often tend to require
prolonged treatment. Burn injuries are also inclined to produce permanent
scars, contractures and other types of deformity which may bring about lasting
physical, psychological and emotional repercussions. Many other specific and
generally extremely adverse reactions are typically experienced by those
3Q9
unfortunate enough to be victims of incendiary weapons. Since directed-
energy weapons, particularly the high-energy laser, cause thermal effects
in their targets, there appears a similarity between the incendiary and this
innovative category of weaponry at least with respect to form of destructive
or injurious effects they bring about.
2. Claims to Weapons Prohibition Per Se
Having in mind both the strengths and the weaknesses of the analogy,
the first question is whether incendiaries are subject to prohibition per se.
The particularly heinous effects that incendiary devices may produce with
respect to human and other living resources has undoubtedly been the major
factor in the historical concern of the international community for these
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weapons. However, despite this concern, there exists no pervasive interna-
tional rule against participant development, production, stockpiling, or
deployment of incendiary weapons.
As perhaps some indication of the attitudes of many of the Western »
participant states toward incendiary weapons, the Commission of Jurists
which drafted the Hague Air Warfare Rules of 1923 stipulated in Article 18
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that "the use of tracer, incendiary or explosive projectiles by or against
aircraft is not prohibited, and that this provision applied equally to all
States whether or not they were parties to the Declaration of St. Petersburg
of 1868." (emphasis added) Although the Draft Rules were never implemented,
they are often considered as a consensus statement of participant state views as
of 1923 with respect to certain limitations on aerial warfare and the use
of weaponr-y. In effect, the Draft Rules suggested that incendiary devices
could be used at least in the case of aerial warfare. The Geneva Disarma-
ment Conference of 1932-33 also took up the issue of the lawfulness of the
incendiary. The Draft Disarmament Convention instrument presented at the end
of the conference without opposition was designed to explicitly prohibit both
the use of projectiles intended to cause fire and appliances designed to attack
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persons by fire. The provisions of this convention probably evidence the
r
concern for the adverse affects of the incendiary and participant desires to
emphasize humanity. However, the convention was not adopted and it appears
ultimately, military necessity and efficiency of the weapons system prevailed.
The strongest evidence of the general permissibility of incendiary
weapons stems from an examination of the recent practice of participant states
in combat. Incendiary weapons were used extensively in World War II. They
were also applied by armed forces functioning under the authority of the
United Nations in the Korean conflict. More recently, the U.S. employed
incendiary weapons including napalm in Vietnam. In what may be a unilateral
policy statement with respect to the lawfulness of incendiary weapons, the
U.S. Army's publication FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare provides inter alia,
"The use of weapons which employ fire, such as tracer ammunition, flamethrowers,
napalm and other incendiary agents against targets requiring their use is
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not violative of international law. " (emphasis added) It seems clear




certain kinds of targets.
The SIPRI in its analysis of "dubious weapons" while taking the view
that there is a substantial body of participant support for a prohibition per se
of incendiaries, nevertheless implicitly acknowledges that their existence has
not as yet been outlawed. In commenting on ICRC efforts to develop a prohibition,
the SIPRI report states:
On the basis of the results of an expert conference on napalm and
other incendiary weapons, the ICRC concluded that for the time being,
and without prejudice to any total prohibition formulated subsequently,
the only practicable course open to the ICRC was to concentrate on
restrictions on the use of incendiary weapons. ono
While deploring the current state of the international law with respect to
incendiaries, the SIPRI report acknowledges the current permissibility of
these devices in these words:
They (incendiaries) should be expressly forbidden. Such an express
prohibition is needed in view of the former praxis and the existing
differences of opinion, apparent from national military manuals and
scholarly publications. In view of the repulsive character of the
weapon, the prohibition of incendiary weapons should be general,
with the possible exception of some forms of anti-materiel use.
(emphasis added) __
Moreover, it may be noted that even the recently drafted Protocol I to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 fails to provide any explicit proscription against
. 310incendiary devices.
The failure of the international community to reach a consensus in
support of the prohibition per se of incendiary weapons does not necessarily
guarantee the permissibility of directed-energy weapons. However, it does
suggest that so long as directed-energy weapons are considered efficient means
of destruction for at least some purposes, the Royse thesis will discourage




Incendiary devices have thus far been retained in participant arsenals
because they are able to accomplish some missions more effectively than
alternative weapons systems. There is a military necessity which seems to
authorize their use. Assuming the this could also become the case with either
the high-energy laser or particle-beam weapon, the Royse thesis would tend to
support claims as to permissibility of these innovative systems. At the moment,
it appears there is a good chance that the HEL or PBW may be particularly effective
in air or near space defense systems and to this extent perhaps considered
essential to participant arsenals. In short, despite the horrendous physiologi-
cal effects caused by the HEL, if not the PBW, so long as these devices are
more militarily efficient than alternative systems, it appears unlikely they
will be prohibited per se.
3. Claims to Restricted Use in a Regime of Weapons Control
A point which is sometimes lost in evaluation of weapons control is
that even if a prohibition exists against a weapon per se , certain sanctioning
mechanisms typically function through the international law of armed conflict
to ensure the credibility of the proscription itself. In addressing this
point with respect to nuclear weapons, Professor Mallison observes:
Even if it is assumed that nuclear weapons are unlawful, it seems
clear that they may be lawfully used as legitimate reprisals in retal-
iation to the unlawful use of such weapons. There may also be other
grim situations in which their use should be upheld juridically under




Applied to incendiary weapons or directed-energy devices, Professor Mallison's
observations with respect to nuclear weaponry would suggest that even if a
prohibition per se existed or would be developed, it would not necessarily
function in all cases to bar the application of such instruments of coercion.
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A generally accepted interpretation of the concept of reprisal has
been provided by a United States military tribunal:
Reprisals in war are the commission of acts which, although illegal
in themselves, may under the specific circumstances of the given
case, become justified because the guilty adversary has himself be-
haved illegally, and the action is taken in the last resort, in
order to prevent the adversary from behaving illegally in the future.
It should be understood that the doctrine of reprisal does not constitute
a means to redress violations of general international law, since as previous-
ly observed, the minimum world public order system established through the U.N.
Charter proscribes the use of force except under certain limited and controlled
circumstances. However, if an enemy employs a weapon which has been prohibited
per se against another state, the attacked participant is authorized to resort
to the use of coercive instruments not otherwise permissible in order to compel
the enemy to cease its unlawful actions or to discourage that enemy from again
commiting such violation.
Substantial limitations have been placed upon reprisals by the inter-
national law of armed conflict. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the
recently completed Protocols greatly expand the scope of protection against
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reprisals. Moreover, several resolutions of the U.N. Security Council
have condemned "reprisals as incompatible with the purpose and principles of the
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U.N." Nevertheless, the customary international law of armed conflict and
the practice of states still appear to authorize the application of reprisals
as sanctioning mechanisms albeit under restricted circumstances.
Hence, should the movement to outlaw incendiary weapons succeed or
should a pervasive proscription be developed against directed-energy weapons,
it is likely that limited use of these devices would be authorized in any case
through a strict application of the doctrine of reprisal. Moreover, as already
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indicated, should the directed-energy weapon be found an efficient supplement
to, or substitution for, existing coercive instruments employed in strategic
deterrence forces, it may be authorized on the grounds of being a lawful weapon
of mass retaliation. While retaliation as a doctrine is far broader and less
explicit than reprisal, as long as the strategy of deterrence influences the
national policy of the principal powers, massive retaliation is likely to be
retained as the prophylactic mechanism for discouraging a preemptive first
strike. It is virtually certain that should such mass coercion ever occur,
participants would largely ignor international constraints against particular
weapons if such devices were considered efficient means of conducting strikes
or counterstrikes.
In brief, although there are no pervasive prohibitions against incen-
diary devices, even if there were, claims would still exist to their restricted
use in sanctioning processes. The same thing would apply to any future
prohibition of the directed-energy weapon. Moreover, should these weapons be
found effective in support of strategic deterrence forces, although their
use might otherwise be outlawed, participants would probably not hesitate to
employ them in massive retaliatory counterstrikes. While such use might
strictly constitute a violation of the international law or some specific
prohibition contained in strategic arms control law, this important qualifica-
tion on the implementation of any institution to prohibition per se should be
acknowledged.
4. Claims to Limitation on Use and Target Selection
By far the greatest number and perhaps most persuasive claims vis-a-vis
incendiary weapons are based on the interrelated concepts of method of use and
lawful objects of attack. Since the practice of states generally confirms the
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validity of the Royse thesis, it might be expected that claims to such limitations
upon use are closely correlated with relative efficiency of a given device when
placed in a competitive field of weapons. In other words, limitation of use ,
of the incendiary and possibly the directed-energy weapon would not normally
be expected where the instrument is considered comparatively efficient as
a means of coercion.
The criteria which seems to have been again invoked with respect to
limiting the use of incendiary weapons, however, are the Hague principles
of avoidance of both unnecessary suffering and superfluous injury. In addition,
the customary law concept of minimization of indiscriminate effects also
constitutes a criterion frequently applied in evaluating incendiary devices.
While acknowledging the general permissibility of incendiary weapons, Article 36
of the U.S. Army's FM 27-10 states inter alia:"They (incendiary weapons) should
not, however, be employed in such a way as to cause unnecessary suffering to
individuals." This seems to confirm at least one major participant S view
as to the importance of these criteria with regard to the incendiary weapon s
legal use in battle.
A generally consistent but more concrete interpretation of incendiary
weapons and their proper use is offered in AFP 110-31, with particular reference
to the use of these instruments in air operations. In echoing the Army policy
statement's concern for unnecessary suffering and the potential adverse effects
of incendiaries, paragraph 6-6 (c) enunciates -inter alia:
Controversy over incendiary weapons has evolved over the years partly
as the result of concern about the medical difficulties in treating
burn injuries, as well as arbitrary attempts to analogize incendiary
weapons to prohibited means of chemical warfare. The potential of
fire to spread beyond the immediate target area has also raised con<-
cerns about uncontrollable or indiscriminate effects affecting the
civilian population or civilian objects. Accordingly, any applicable
rules of engagement relating to incendiary weapons must be followed
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closely to avoid controversy. The manner in which incendiary
weapons are employed is also regulated by the other principles
and rules regulating armed force ... In particular, the
potential capacity of fire to spread must be considered in
relation to the rules protecting civilians and civilian objects
.... For example, incendiary weapons should be avoided in
urban areas, to the extent that other weapons are available
and as effective. Additionally, incendiary weapons must not be
used so as to cause unnecessary suffering.
This U.S. Air Force interpretation clearly acknowledges the potential ancil-
lary effects caused by the incendiary's thermal destruction. The principal
concern expressed is that such ancillary destruction could spread from combat
zones to protected noncombatant areas. It is clear that the military
commander considering the use of the incendiary is under an obligation to
carefully weigh its potential for producing ancillary or indiscriminate ,
damage through its inherently uncontrollable effects. The military commander
is enjoined from the use of an incendiary when its application would produce
unnecessary suffering. Moreover, he is directed to consider alternative
weapons when the risk of ancillary damage or injury is deemed too great.
Under Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, the general protection for
noncombatants and their resources has been greatly strengthened. The basic
rule contained in Article 48 for the protection of civilians against hostilities
provides
:
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian popu-
lation and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at
all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants
and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly
shall direct their operations only against military objectives. ^
_
Although it may be sometime before Protocol I is adopted by all major
participants, the Article 48 rule provides a strong indication of the general
consensus in the international law for the strict protection of noncombatants
and their resources. No qualifications or limitations are apparent in this
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article or related provisions in Protocol I which would seem to authorize
the use of even the most discriminating and humane of weapons systems
against protected persons and property. Through this proviso, a significant
control may be evolving and may soon be adopted through acceptance of this
conventional regime.
Limitations on the use of the directed-energy weapon against noncombat-
ants and their resources are based less on analogy to the incendiary than on
the customary and conventional regime. However, analysis by analogy with the
incendiary does suggest possible controls affecting the application of directed-
energy weapons against combatant objectives. Incendiary weapons are often
used with substantial efficiency against materiel targets and combatants in the
immediate vicinity of such targets. Their application against fortifications,
pill boxes and armored vehicles is generally accepted. However, they are also
effective in tactical air support aiding ground troops engaged in close
combat with enemy forces. In this capacity, there can be little doubt but that
the incendiary, despite its adverse physiological effects, is employed in an
antipersonnel mode.
It is this latter tactical use of the incendiary weapon which has caused
the greatest concern to humanitarians concerned with reform of the international
law of armed conflict. In what is undoubtedly an overstatement of the actual
state of the customary law, the SIPRJ observes:
It is self-evident that anti-personnel incendiary weapons violate
many principles of the laws of armed conflict. They may cause unneces-
sary suffering and are indiscriminate in their effects. They are in-
humane and repulsive weapons contrary to 'the laws of humanity and
the demands of the public conscience.'
General participant perspectives of this type have lead to convening a prepara-
tory meeting to organize a conference of governments for the purpose of
developing prohibitions or restrictions applicable to certain conventional
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weapons. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 152 (XXXII) dated December 1977
specifically endorses a recommendation of the Diplomatic Conference on the
Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law to convene a
preparatory conference in 1978 for the purpose of organizing a full conference
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in 1979. Both the Diplomatic Conference and the General Assembly have
recommended that the conference give particular attention to developing more
concrete c.ontrols applicable to incendiary weapons.
In view of the adverse physiological effects caused by incendiaries, it
appears the strongest consensus for limitation will apply to their use in an
antipersonnel mode. If this or even a broader limitation should result from
the 1979 conference of governments, it could have a substantial analogous
impact on the treatment of other weapons which perpetrate thermal damage or
injury. It might be difficult to distinguish the use of an incendiary from
other types of thermal effect weapons including directed-energy devices when
the effects on particular targets are similar in nature.
Authority Philip J. Klass observes that present indications are that
the U.S. Defense Department has no plans to use the HEL in an antipersonnel
mode. In connection with his analysis of HEL characteristics, he notes:
The Defense Department has no plans to try to use high-energy
lasers as anti-personnel weapons according to one Pentagon
official. This view stems from practical realities rather
than humanitarian considerations.
'The high energy laser radiation weapon is simply too ex-
pensive and complex to be considered for use against person-
nel and effective countermeasures are too easy,' this official
believes.
'Any effort to employ radiation weapons against personnel
will bring back the use of the metal shield or a less expen-
sive coated Mylar version to reflect the laser beam back to
its source, ' he added.
Because a radiation weapon is inherently a line-of-sight
device, 'a foot soldier need only hide behind a rock and lob
mortar shell at the expensive high-energy laser weapon. Even
if the shell fails to hit the radiation weapon, it will spew
dust on its optical system, destroying its effectiveness,'
the official added. „„.
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Klass presents the possibility of physical limitations against the use of the
high-energy laser as an antipersonnel weapon. However, there is a distinct
possibility that the HEL attack could be staged from areas superjacent to the
target. Presumably some of these supposed limitations would no longer apply
if the HEL was mounted aboard either an aircraft or orbital space vehicle.
Moreover, the high-energy laser might even be used to create a massive
firestorm
_
in the combat area. This sort of secondary effect of the HEL could
prove highly destructive and perhaps militarily more cost-effective than Mr.
Klass or his Pentagon source would care to admit.
Admittedly, the analogy between the incendiary and the directed-energy
weapon has limitations. The analogy appears to be most persuasive with respect
to the high-energy laser. Too little is known as of this time with regard to
the actual effects of the particle-beam weapon on its target. For this reason,
it is difficult to analogize the incendiary and PBW on the basis of target
effects. However, should it be confirmed the PBW does create essentially
thermal effects upon its targets, the analogy may apply equally well to this
particular directed-energy weapon.
In applying the analogy and considering the controls imposed on
incendiary devices, it is well to remember that the directed-energy weapon is
apt to be considerably more precise and controllable. By controlling the size
of the beam, the amount of energy, or the firing time, the combatant employing the
directed-energy weapon may successfully avoid many of the adverse ancillary
effects characteristic of the incendiary device. Accordingly, even if more
pervasive controls are applied to the incendiary, the directed-energy weapons
may be treated somewhat differently. What does seem clear in the final analysis,
is that directed-energy weaponry, like the incendiary devices currently in
participant arsenals, will probably not be authorized for antipersonnel use.
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E. Evolving Conven tional Law Controls
The juridical triad used in this evaluation of directed-energy weaponry
is completed with a consideration of prospective developments in the law
of armed conflict. The foregoing analysis has suggested that a limited
number of selected controls may already exist both in the comprehensive
international law applicable to the earth-space arena and the law of armed
conflict including, in particular, constraints derived from custom, general
convention and possible analogy. While bases may already exist in the inter-
national law which could support claims to control of directed-energy weapons,
they are less than optimal from at least two standpoints. First, these
various institutional bases were developed for purposes other than controlling
highly innovative weaponry. No matter how apparently relevant the existing
body of law vis-a-vis claims to weapons control, it can still be argued that
it was never developed with an eye toward regulating weapons fundamentally
unique to modern warfare. Secondly, existing bases for the control of
directed-energy weapons are at best a patchwork of untested limitations and
partial prohibitions. These bases do not provide a coordinated or particular-
ly well-balanced regime of controls. Nor do they fully exploit certain
advantages offered by the directed-energy weapon as a means of improving
the minimum world public order system.
It is therefore important to consider certain key developments in
the international law which seek to correct some of the shortcomings in the
existing control regime. These developments, most in their infant stages, do
not as yet constitute either a customary or conventional base for weapons control.
However, they do indicate some important trends in the international law vis-a-
ils innovative weapons control. Despite the import of the existing law, it is
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likely that the most significant controls which will be applied to the directed-
»
energy weapons will be those developed with an eye toward the unique character-
istics of the weapons themselves.
1. Contemporary Criteria for Weapons Control: Protocol I
As a result of demonstrated need for a modification of the international
law of armed conflict, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) held
a Conference of Government Experts in 1971, 1972 and 1973 to draft two supple-
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mentary protocols to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. *~ The principal
issues of concern to the ICRC and most of the participants included improved
enforcement of the 1949 Conventions, problems presented by "wars of national
liberation," a need to clarify ambiguities in the law of armed conflict and
323improving upon protections afforded certain categories of persons. The
first of the two supplementary protocols addresses international conflicts while
the second applies to armed conflict within states themselves. The draft
agreements referred to as Protocols I and II respectively, were taken up and con-
sidered ' by the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of
International Humanitarian Law applicable in Armed Conflicts in four sessions
conducted between 1974 and June of 1977.
The Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference was issued on June 10,
1977 and officially opened for signature December 12, 1977. The Protocols
have been signed by the United States and Soviet Union among other participants.
As of early 1978, the executive branch of the U.S. Government had both Protocols
under review in various administrative departments for purposes of formulating
324
recommendations for possible action by the President. Depending upon
Presidential decision, the Protocols may be subsequently referred to the
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Congress for further review and possible ratification.
Neither Protocol I or II constitutes international law at least with
respect to those states which have yet to ratify. . Nevertheless, they are
the result of an intensive multilateral effort over a period of years and
in certain instances may represent a consensus of participant perspectives
regarding the law of war. Although it is too early to evaluate the true impact
of these two Protocols, pertinent provisions are nevertheless deserving of
consideration as probable future bases for claims to the control of directed-
energy weapons. The pertinent provisions of Protocol I, if adopted by most of
the participant states including the principal military powers, will have a
pronounced influence on claims to weapons control.
The preliminary question in considering Protocol I is its overall
application. After recalling the duties of every state under the U.N. Charter
to refrain from the threat or use of force and expressing the conviction that
neither the Protocol nor the Geneva Conventions of 1949 authorize any act
of aggression inconsistent with the U.N. Charter, the Preamble reaffirms that
both the Geneva Conventions and the Protocol "must be fully applied in all
circumstances to all persons who are protected by those instruments, without
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any adverse distinction based on the nature or origin of the armed conflict."
This language does not appear to qualify the protections or standards of the
Protocol in terms of any particular theater or scope of conflict. It further
reaffirms that the law of armed conflict rejects the concept of "just war" as a
possible defense to the strict application of international legal controls or
protections.
Also indicative that the provisions of Protocol I are applicable on a





1. The High contracting Parties undertake to respect and to
ensure respect for this Protocol in all circumstances.
2. In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other inter-
national agreements, civilians and combatants remain under
the protection and authority of the principles of inter-
national law derived from established custom, from the
principles of humanity and from the dictates of public
conscience.
3. This Protocol, which supplements the Geneva Convention
of 12 August 1949 for the protection of war victims,
shall apply in the situations referred to in Article 2
common to those Conventions . „.
Jib
This language confirms the application of Protocol I to both massive and
limited coercion. Moreover, it appears that Protocol I like other bases in
the law of armed conflict is applicable in the expanded earth-space arena.
Common Article 2 referenced in subparagraph 3, indicates that the 1949 Conven-
tions will be implemented not only in times of peace but also in cases of
declared war or other armed conflict regardless of whether combatant partici-
pants extend recognition to one another or not. Finally, subparagraph 2
appears to be an explicit reaffirmation by participants of their commitment
to the fundamental principles of international law with particular reference
to the principles based on custom, humanity and public conscience. This
language would seem an effort to revitalize many of the fundamental principles
and collateral concepts strained by combatant state violations in recent
international conflicts.
Despite the broad scope of Protocol I, some major power participants have
entered their signatures subject to important reservations excepting nuclear
weapons from the purview of the convention. In stating its reservation to
Protocol I, the United States declared "It is the understanding of the United
States of America that the rules established by this protocol were not intended




The United Kingdom and Northern Ireland in their joint declaration have announced
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an essentially identical reservation.
Reservations such as these bear witness to the strength of continued
major power commitment to the use of nuclear weapons for both deterrence and in
support of NATO's policy of "flexible response" in which Alliance members assert
the right to use tactical nuclear weapons to blunt any attack by the Warsaw Pact's
massive and highly mobile armored forces in central Europe. It is interesting to
note that none of the declarations recorded thus far to Protocol I appear to
except other weapons of mass destruction including the innovative weapons systems
which might share certain characteristics with weapons in the nuclear category.
More specifically, the reservations do not appear to exempt the directed-energy
weapon from whatever control provisions might exist within Protocol I.
Perhaps the most visible criteria for weapons control in Protocol I are
contained in Article 35:
1. In any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict
to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited.
2. It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material
and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury
or unnecessary suffering.
3. It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are
intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, longterm and
severe damage to the natural environment
.
_„„
The first two provisions are a reaffirmation of the general weapons control
principles offered in the customary and conventional international law of armed
conflict. Paragraph 1 virtually parallels the familiar language of Article 22
of the Annex to the Hague Regulations; "The right of belligerents to adopt
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means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited." Although Protocol Article
35(1), like the language in the Hague Annex, is broad and far too ambiguous to be
reasonably enforcible, it reaffirms the international community's general




and how they choose to apply them in armed conflict.
Protocol Article 35(2) coincides with the two versions of Article 23(e)
appearing in the Annexes to the Regulations of the Hague Conventions of 1899
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and 1907. This Protocol article serves to clarify the existing rule by reverting
to the original 1899 English text language and supplementing it with alterna-
tive language found in the French text to the 1907 Annex, propres a causer des
maux superflus, which is more accurately translated "of a nature to cause super-
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fluous (or excessive) injury. This provision endorses the customary law and
conventional law doctrines prohibiting the use of a weapon which needlessly or
unnecessarily aggravates human suffering. With regard to Article 35(2), a
Department of Defense Working Group recounted both the U.S. and two other
perspectives as to whether this provision offered significant change from the
existing law:
(T)his text strongly supports the view that no substantive change
in meaning to existing legal requirements is intended) or effected.
Indeed, the Federal Republic of Germany stated explicitly that they
joined in the text on the understanding that paragraphs 1 and 2
reaffirmed customary law. India noted that it believed these rules
applied to all weapons of whatever type.
Article 35(2) serves to reaffirm both existing criteria and the interpre-
tations of those criteria developed by the practice of states in evaluating the
lawfulness of innovative weapons and their use. This reaffirmation acts to
greatly strengthen the relevance and applicability of claims based upon the
customary law norms, conventional rules and interpretation developed from
practice in the era of modern warfare. A fortiori, as the first comprehensive
restatement of the law of armed conflict since the advent of the expanded
earth-space arena, it greatly enhances claims to weapons control based on exist-
ing institutions as they have been extended to govern the new space theaters.
The third provision in Article 35 is an effort to protect the environment
against methods of warfare apt to cause extreme damage. The predominant issue
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which will surround claims based on Article 35(3) is the meaning of "widespread,
longterm and severe damage." The issue may be partially resolved by reading
Protocol Article 55 in pari materia with Article 35(3). The mutually supportive




Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environ-
ment against widespread, long-term and severe damage. This
protection includes a prohibition of the use of methods or means
of warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause such
damage to the natural environment and thereby to prejudice the
health or survival of the population.
2. Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals are
prohibited. .
The language of Article 55(1) suggests that "widespread, longterm and severe
damage" implies destruction which is apt to prejudice the health or survival of
the population itself through the deprivation of important environmental
resources.
A generally consistent interpretation of this language is offered in
the 1975 report of the United States Delegation to the ICRC Diplomatic Confer-
ence:
According to the Report of Committee III 'long term' was considered
by some to be measured in decades, with reference made to twenty to
thirty years as a minimum and it appeared to be a widely shared
assumption that battlefield damage incidental to conventional war-
fare would not normally be proscribed by the provision. The pro-
vision covers such damage as would be likely to prejudice the con-
tinued survival of the civilian population over a long term or risk
long term health problems . _„,.
This interpretation of Article 35(3) read in pari materia with Article 55
strongly implies that certain weapons of mass destruction, principally nuclear
weapons, would be banned under this environmental control. Depending upon the
intensity of fallout, nuclear weapons may deposit Cesium 137 and Carbon 14 in
amounts which would create possible "long term major health problems." The
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possibility of fallout from the use of nuclear weapons constituting a breach of
Article 35(3) may have been an influential factor in participant state reserva-
tions exempting these devices from the Protocol's controls.
Neither Article 35 nor 55 provides a basis for any comprehensive
prohibition of directed-energy weaponry. Article 35 invokes the words "to
employ" while Article 55 speaks to "use" in applying respective proscriptions.
These terms clearly do not address research, development, testing, production,
stockpiling or even deployment of weapons. A pervasive proscription covering
such phases or aspects in the weapons evolution might more appropriately be
a matter for the comprehensive international law, specifically within the field
of strategic arms control. Nevertheless, Articles 35 and 55, once adopted,
will provide a further basis for claims to limited use of directed-energy weapons.
There is probably also a persuasive claim based on Article 35(2) to
prohibit the use of directed-energy weapons against relatively exposed or
Vulnerable personnel. Just as the thermal effects of incendiaries may lead to
unnecessary suffering and possibly superfluous injury, so also might the
high-energy laser and possibly the particle-beam weapon be suspect when used
against unprotected troops in the field. This claim would not apply however, to
the use of directed-energy weapons against particular targets which can be more
efficiently disabled or destroyed by such devices than with alternative means.
For example, it would probably be permissible under Article 35(2) to apply
directed-energy weapons against space vehicles, aircraft or even tanks regard-
less of the fact they may contain crews subject to the adverse physiological
effects. Under such circumstances, the suffering would no longer be unnecessary
nor the injuries superfluous. This claim for limiting the use of directed-energy
weapons, to wit, prohibiting their application in an antipersonnel mode,




incendiary weapons and the customary and conventional law criteria.
The known characteristics and capabilities of the directed-energy weapon
do not seem inherently inconsistent with either Articles 35(3) or 55. The
HEL and PBW would not be apt to produce widespread, longterm and severe damage to
the natural environment unless intentionally misused to destroy living
resources such as forest lands, animals or crops. The absence of the adverse
effects of nuclear radiation, uncontrollable biological organisms or highly
toxic chemicals characteristic of some weapons of mass destruction, would
appear to enhance claims of directed-energy weapon permissibility under these
environmental criteria. Simultaneously these environmental criteria may
increase the persuasive impact of claims to the impermissibility of existing
weapons of mass destruction which can not be as easily controlled as the HEL or
PBW. The probable significance of these articles with respect to the directed-
energy weapon is to proscribe intentional use against living resources. When
such use is designed to damage the natural environment thereby prejudicing the
health or survival of the population, it will be construed as unlawful under
Articles 35(3) and 55 of the Protocol.
In addition to the articles providing criteria for claims to weapons
control, Article 36 of Protocol I imposes an important new requirement on
contracting parties:
In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon,
means or method of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an
obligation to determine whether its employment would, in some or
all circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other
rule of international law applicable to the High Contracting Party.
This provision is designed to emphasize the individual participant's responsi-
bility for developing, testing, producing, deploying and using only weapons
which meet the juridical criteria for legality. The significant language




by consensus was designed to recognize that limitations on weapon use may be more
effective than attempted comprehensive prohibitions. This is apparently consist-
ent with the long-standing U.S. and Western positions which hold limitations
on specific uses of weaponry are preferable to broad, general prohibitions pev
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Be.
Of import in this requirement to evaluate new weapons, Committee III to the
Diplomatic Conference chose to invoke what might appear to be redundant language,
"new weapon, means or method of warfare." This broad language suggests that
the contracting party's obligation to ascertain permissibility may arise even
prior to the actual research and development of a particular weapons system. It
could be argued that at the point where a physical principle itself exhibits
potential, it becomes a "means or method of warfare." Since it is generally
acknowledged that major power participants have in recent years been considering
the possible applications of new physical principles and concepts of warfare,
this new requirement may have significant repercussions for programs of basic
research and development which previously have been immune from the juridical
criteria of weapons control in the international law.
Since October of 1974, the U.S. Department of Defense has had an
explicit policy of prospective weapons review. DoD Instruction 5500.15 as
implemented in the three major services through specific directives, requires a
review of weapon legality in phases including research, development and acqui-
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sition. Paragraph IV.A(l) of the DoD Instruction provides:
The legal review will take place prior to the award of an initial
contract for production. At such subsequent stages in acquisition
or procurement as the Judge Advocate General concerned determines it
is appropriate to do so, he may require a further legal review of
any weapon.




Each DoD Component having primary responsibility for the engineer- >
ing development, acquisition or production of a weapon will develop
and issue internal plans and regulations which will assure that the
Judge Advocate General concerned is requested to make the legal
review provided for in this Instruction prior to the engineering
development and prior to the award of an initial contract for produc-
tion of that weapon.
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Finally, paragraph IV. D provides:
The Director of Defense Research and Engineering will, during
the research, development, testing and evaluation phases of the
acquisition of a weapon, be responsible for monitoring compliance
by DoD" Components with Section IV. B of this instruction ._. „
J4z
While these various provisions clearly provide a program for review of the
legality of weapons systems at a relatively early stage in their developmental
evolution, they are not as yet in strict compliance with the requirements of
Article 36 of Protocol I. Nowhere is there a requirement which would subject
the "means and method of warfare" itself to juridical review. In each case,
review is tied to a particular weapon or system which has entered at least the
research or even engineering developmental phases.
This brief examination of the apparent inadequacies in what may well be
the most progressive program of prospective weapons review by any country, seems
to underscore the truly innovative features of Article 36 to Protocol I. Never
before have participant states been required to actually evaluate not only the
legality of specific, weapons, but also the more basic "means and methods" of
warfare, very possibly including the underlying physical principles used in
weapons systems themselves. If participant states in fact implement this
article of the Protocol to its fullest logical extent, they will probably be
r
required to undertake prospective reviews of each of the categories of weapons
which appear feasible within the broad area of directed-energy weaponry.
A number of other provisions contained in Protocol I may well offer
certain indirect bases for claims to limited use of weapons systems. One of
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the more apparent bases is contained in the prohibition against indiscriminate
attacks upon protected populations. Article 51(4) provides:
Indiscrminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are:
(a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective;
(b) those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be
directed at a specific military objective; or
(c) those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of
which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol.
and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike
military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without
distinction.
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Article 51(5) continues by elaborating on what is meant by the terminology
"indiscriminate attack":
Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered
as indiscriminate:
(a) an attack by bombardment by any method or means which treates
as a single military objective a number of clearly separated
and distinct military objectives located in a city, town, village
or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians or
civilian objects; and
(b) an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects,
or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation
to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.,,,.
These provisions introduce a relatively specific prohibition against indis-
criminate attack. The rule prominently incorporates the fundamental principles
of military necessity and humanity along with their collateral concept of
proportionality.
A method or means of combat, possibly including among other things a
specific weapon or operative scientific principle inherent in a weapons system,
is proscirbed if it is so imprecise that it cannot be directed against a
specific military objective. While providing an important basis for claims to
weapons control, Article 51 (5) (b) nevertheless acknowledges that it is permis-
sible to employ the use of a weapon even if ancillary injury or damage results,
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so long as such effects are not "excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated." In other words, the military commander
is required under Article 51 to pay close attention to the concept of propor-
tionality between ancillary destruction and the importance of his military
objective.
Despite the use of the term "bombardment" in Article 51 (5) (a), the
open-ended language which immediately follows, "by any methods or means" and
the encompassing language of subparagraph (b) would appear to apply to attacks in
general. Placed in the context of the entire convention, it is clear that the
contracting parties have attempted to draft a comprehensive and generally unquali-
fied set of enforcible protections for noncombatants through this provision. To
construe Article 51 so narrowly as to exclude innovative weapons systems would
seem in contravention of the intentions of the contracting parties. Hence, based
t
on a general purpose interpretation, a claim could be asserted arguing the rule
against indiscriminate attacks on civlian populations applies to most inno-
vative weapons systems including the directed-energy weapon.
The directed-energy weapon is sufficiently controllable and precise as to
generally meet the criteria for authorized use established by Article 51(4)
and 51(5). Article 51 may nevertheless have the effect of making illegal the
use of the directed-energy weapon as a means of coercion available to strategic
deterrence forces. The language of Article 51(6), while not invoking the term
"retaliation," states "Attacks against the civilian populations or civilians by
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way of reprisals are prohibited." It might be argued that the strategic
use of a directed-energy weapon as the means or method of conducting a retaliatory >
second strike against civilian population centers is not a "reprisal" but more
accurately retaliation. •
Despite the generally unqualified language of Article 51, it should also
be recalled that the theory of strategic deterrence seems to generally have

-165-
the effect of superseding conflicting provisions in the international law of
armed conflict. If participant states apply the Royse thesis in conjunction with
the customary and conventional law criteria on a comparative basis, they may find
directed-energy weapons safer and more efficient than existing nuclear or
thermonuclear devices. If this determination is made, directed-energy weapons
might be deployed and if necessary used in retaliatory strikes against population
centers based on the deterrence strategy, notwithstanding Article 51(6). To
transform such a claim into one which is in strict compliance with Article
51 however, it would be necessary for participants to exempt directed-energy
weapons from the purview of Protocol I controls as they have done in the case
of nuclear weaponry.
There is no evidence to suggest that directed-energy weapons in any way
influenced the development of these or other pertinent articles to Protocol I.
Records of the four sessions of the Diplomatic Conference suggest that when
weapons systems came under discussion, not surprisingly, the focus was upon
existing and relatively well understood instruments of coercion. Nevertheless,
claims to control of directed-energy weapons based on Protocol I, once it is
ratified by participant states, will have a greater chance of acceptance than
similar claims which might be grounded upon rules and concepts largely developed
prior to the advent of these innovative devices.
Protocol I claims will be supported by a somewhat improved set of enforce-
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ment measures setforth in detail in Articles 85 through 91. These measures
provide for sanctions which include greater personal accountability of military
personnel for illegal acts. They encourage mutual assistance between parties in
prosecuting violations of the convention. Moreover, the convention establishes
an International Fact-Finding Commission in Article 90. This sanctioning system
is certainly no panacea, but it does represent progress over the enforcement

-166-
mechanisms provided in previous international customary and conventional law.
Whether the various Protocol I claims to weapons control are accepted or
rejected by participants will largely be a function of whether they are consistent
or inconsistent with exclusive and inclusive interests. The greater the number
of exclusive and inclusive values served through a particular institutional basis,
the more persuasive the claims arising out of such doctrinal basis.
Protocol I has generally not lost sight of important principles and collateral
concepts including military necessity, humanity, efficiency and proportionality.
As already noted, these principles and concepts if accurately applied are often
consistent with major exclusive interests. Moreover, if participants analytically
consider the importance of inclusive interests in avoiding massive deprivation
of values and encouraging persuasive resolution of disputes, they may also find
Protocol I equally consistent with these interests. Accordingly, claims based on
Protocol 1 as an applicable new institution in the international law will
generally have substantial persuasive value in the world community.
2. Prospective Developments in Weapons Control
The international law of armed conflict through customary and conventional
criteria provides general guidelines which will probably apply to directed-energy
weapons. However, there are at least two significant initiatives underway which
could eventually result in controls of explicit application. These initiatives
are being respectively keyed to the two generic classifications applicable to
instruments of coercion; conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction.
Since it appears that directed-energy weapons have characteristics and capabil-
ities which may qualify them for either or both of these classifications,
each of these weapons control initiatives should be briefly considered.
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a. Conventional Weapons. A forum for developing further, more specific
,
limitations on particular conventional weapons which may cause unnecessary
suffering or have indiscriminate effects was established in the early 1970 's.
The Conference of Government Experts on Weapons that may Cause Unnecessary
Suffering or have Indiscriminate Effects, convened at the behest of the ICRC,
met in its first session at Lucerne, Switzerland, from September 24 to October
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18, 1974. Forty-nine states, several national liberation movements, repre-
sentatives of the Secretary General of the United Nations and of the Director
General of the World Health Organizations participated. The Conference was
also attended by representatives of a substantial number of private international
humanitarian organizations including the National Red Cross and SIPRI.
The purpose of this preliminary conference was to study the question of
prohibition or limitation of the use of conventional weapons that may bring
i
about unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects. The Conference had
at its disposal a substantial quantity of research data including a series of
U.N. studies on various weapons, a SIPRI report on various incendiary devices
and a comprehensive Report of Experts issued in 1973 under the auspices of the
ICRC. Interestingly enough, the 1973 Report of Experts devoted one of its
chapters to future weapons developments and discussed the high-energy laser
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among other recent innovations.
Although the 1974 Conference did not go so far as to explicitly
classify various innovative weapons systems including the HEL, microwave device
or infrasound weapon as necessarily "indiscriminate" or instruments which cause
"unnecessary suffering," it clearly considered these and other innovative weapons
candidates for possible international control. The Conference report was
subsequently considered by the participating governments as well as the Diplo-
matic Conference. The Conference of Government Experts convened again from
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January 28, 1976 to February 26, 1976 at Lugano and at the four sessions of the
Diplomatic Conferences on the Reaffirmations and Development of International
Humanitarian Law. Although none of these sessions produced a definitive
convention addressing particular weapons, the work of the Government Experts
was considered in the preparation of Protocols I and II. To this extent
it might be said that at least the high-energy laser was known to delegates
attending the Diplomatic Conference. In December of 1977, the U.N. General
Assembly adopted Resolution 152 (XXXII) dealing with incendiary and other
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specific conventional weapons. Although major participant states including
the Soviet Union, United States, the United Kingdom and France abstained, 115
members endorsed the measure without a single negative vote.
The express purpose of Resolution 152 (XXXII) is to establish both a
preparatory and plenary U.N. sponsored Conference of Governments to pursue the
previous efforts of the Conference of Government Experts. While it is unclear
precisely which innovative weapons or concepts will dominate the agenda of the
plenary conference in 1979, it appears likely the subject of directed-energy
weapons will come under discussion. Whether or not this conference is
disposed to imposing substantial controls on directed-energy weapons will clearly
depend in large part on the attitudes of those major power participants which
are seeking development of such weaponry. What these attitudes may be is still
unclear. In any case, it appears there is a good chance the 1979 Conference will
provide an important international forum to consider the issue of whether the
directed-energy weapon may be classified as "indiscriminate" or an instrument
which causes "unnecessary suffering."
b. Weapons of Mass Destruction. A second initiative which may eventually
produce controls applicable to directed-energy weapons is an outgrowth of the
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United Nations Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. General Assembly
Resolutions 3479 (XXX) of December 11, 1975 and 74 (XXXIJ of December 10,
1976 requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to develop an
agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types
of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of weapons. Pursuant to these
and other mandates, the U.N. Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has
issued a report which addresses among other subjects the "prohibition of the
development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruc-
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tion.
The Conference report indicates multilateral discussions are well under-
way on the issue of control over innovative weapons systems. Socialist bloc
participants commenting in the report have generally supported the Soviet
proposals that a prohibition be developed which would apply to "any types of
weapons of mass destruction that were based on qualitatively new principles -
according to their mode of use and the targets to be destroyed or the nature of
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their effects." " The Western power views as articulated by the United
Kingdom, Canada and the United States questioned the Soviet concept of develop-
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ing a single treaty on the subject of innovative weapons systems and principles.
The United Kingdom specifically proposed that the Committee consider negotiating
explicit agreements to preclude development of particular new types of weapons
of mass destruction which were based on new applications of scientific principles.
Subsequently, the Soviets submitted a revised draft treaty which provided
for parallel mechanisms for the prohibition of innovative weapons. The Soviet
proposal included a comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of the develop-
ment and manufacture of new types of systems of mass destruction. The compre-
hensive agreement, according to the Soviet plan, would contain an annexed list
of the specific types of weapons to be prohibited. Secondly, the Soviets
proposed the possibility of supplementing the annexed list from time to time
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as new weapons are developed. Additionally, they proposed a provision allowing
for the possibility of concluding explicit agreements on individual weapons of
mass destruction. Such agreements would be considered and negotiated on a
,
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case by case basis.
The United States maintains that the best way to prevent the development
and deployment of new weapons of mass destruction is to keep the question under
review and draft specific agreements as needed. American delegates particularly
stressed the need to tailor verification and enforcement measures to individual
356
weapons systems.
Discussion in the U.N. report with respect to innovative weapons systems
does not address specific weapons in any detail. Nevertheless, the Soviet
delegation at one point may have explicitly referred to directed-energy weaponry,
In submitting a proposed list of weapons of mass destruction which might appear
in the initial annex to their draft comprehensive treaty, the Soviets included
the following inventory:
radiological means of the non-explosive type acting with the aid of
radio-active materials, technical means of inflicting radiation
injury based on the use of charged and neutral particles to affect
biological targets, infrasonic means using acoustic radiation to
affect biological targets, and means using electromagnetic radiation
to affect biological targets. „_-,
In submitting this inventory, the Soviet delegation emphasized that in the
opinion of its experts, there exists a sufficient technological basis with
regard to these concepts from which to develop weapons of mass destruction.
The proposed Soviet innovative weapons inventory raises at least two
questions. First, how broadly do the Soviets construe the concept of "radio-
logical means" and "technical means . . . based on the use of charged and
neutral particles"? Are these terms so broadly construed as to possibly
include a particle-beam weapon? Second, what is the significance of the Soviet
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reference to developing controls with regard to "biological targets"? Does
this indicate the Soviets are inclined to oppose restraints on the use of
directed-energy or other types of innovative weapons against materiel targets?
The answer to at least the first of these questions has apparently been
revealed through disclosures concerning the United States-Soviet negotiations
o c o
on the control of radiological weapons being conducted in Geneva. Since
the Fiscal Year 1979 Arms Control Impact Statements have indicated Soviet nego-
tiators have raised the issue of the particle-beam weapon during the course of
these talks, it appears they may very well consider this device a type of radio-
logical weapon. If this is the case, Soviet intentions may be to control at
least the PBW by means of its inclusion in the proposed annex to the: draft
convention
.
The limited information made public on the discussions of the working
group on radiological weapons provides no insight as to Soviet rationale or
theory in developing controls limited to the use of innovative weapons against
only biological targets. However, it is clear from disclosures that the Soviet
proposal to control particle-beam weapons presented in the working group
sessions has been keyed to prohibiting only the development and manufacture
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of weapons using "charged and neutral particles to affect biological targets." It
may be inferred from this proposed limitation that the Soviets favor claims
to the general permissibility of the particle-beam weapon at least when it is
developed and manufactured for use against non-biological targets. While the
Soviet proposal would ban the use of the PBW as an anti-environment or antiperson-
nel weapon, it would clearly not affect the many other potential applications
of the device including aircraft and missile defense-.
United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 84A and 84B (XXXII) ' adopted
December 12, 1977, appear to be some of the most recent developments in efforts
to formulate controls applicable to directed-energy weapons. Resolution 84A
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(XXXII) requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue
negotiations with the assistance of government experts for the purpose of
formulating an agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture
of new types of weapons of mass destruction. The Conference is directed to
submit a report of the results achieved to the General Assembly for considera-
tion at its thirty-third session. The resolution also urges all states to
"refrain from any action which would impede international talks aimed at
working out an agreement or agreements to prevent the use of scientific and
technological progress for the development of new types of weapons of mass
destruction and new systems of such weapons." In addition, the resolution
places the topic of control over innovative weapons on the provisional agenda of
the thirty-third session of the General Assembly.
Concomitant Resolution 84B (XXXII) reaffirms the 1948 definition of
weapons of mass destruction. It specifically urges "states to refrain from
o
f. o
developing new weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles."
This resolution requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament "to keep
under review the question of development of new weapons of mass destruction
based on new scientific principles and to consider the desirability of formu-
lating agreements on the prohibition of any specific new weapons which may be
o c o
identified." Again, the Conference is requested to report back to the thirty-
third session of the General Assembly on progress that is made toward developing
an international agreement.
It is somewhat unlikely that these developments through the U.N.
disarmament apparatus will produce any dramatic new prohibitions or limitations
on the directed-energy weapon. Nor is there any suggestion that these resolutions
approach the status of binding international law. Nevertheless, they appear
to manifest a growing concern on the part of the international community for
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the potential threat posed to the minimum world public order system by innova-
tive weapons systems. Moreover, they express the will of the majority of the
international community that principal participants pursue appropriate controls for
these new weapons. In any case, should the directed-energy weaponry introduced
into military arsenals exhibit more the characteristics of weapons of mass
destruction as defined under the reaffirmed 1948 definition than of conventional
weapons, the United Nations disarmament apparatus is clearly available as a forum
for developing whatever controls the participants are prepared to support.
F. Summary
The international law of armed conflict provides three general institu-
tional bases upon which claims bearing on the permissibility or impermissibility
of directed-energy weapons may be founded. These bases include a set of
criteria developed through the general customary and conventional law principles;
analogies with similar weapons systems, principally incendiary weapons, and;
,
certain prospective developments which will soon impact on the law of armed
conflict. An analysis of this triad strongly supports the existence of at
least certain persuasive claims to the control of directed-energy weaponry.
None of the bases examined suggests the existence of any reliable or
credible claim for a comprehensive prohibition per se against such key phases
or aspects in the weapons evolution as research, development, testing, produc-
tion, stockpiling, deployment and use of any directed-energy weapon. In
certain cases it appears that the bases actually operate to affirmatively
authorize the directed-energy weapon as a lawful instrument of coercion. However,
it is equally clear that certain claims to limited control have a firm foundation
in the law of armed conflict. The claims of greatest persuasive value and which
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may very wel] be under serious consideration by the major participants include
those which apply to the use of these weapons against living resources. Related
claims may also be evoling with regard to the use of directed-energy weapons
against protected noncombatants and their property. A latent exception which
would be apt to impact upon these limitations may arise out of any future
strategic applications of the directed-energy weapon in major power deterrence
forces.
The sanctioning mechanisms in support of these potential claims varies
considerably in terms of its reliability and credibility. As in other fields of
the international law of armed conflict, enforcement of claims to the limitation
of such innovative weapons will include the range of positive and negative
sanctions. It is submitted in this study that the strongest factor influencing
the acceptance of claims to weapons control is the extent to which claims are
consistent with participant exclusive and inclusive interests. From this
standpoint, certain claims which tend to impose selective limitations on the
use of the directed-energy weapon are persuasive. Typical of such claims would
be those seeking to control the use of the directed-energy weapons to ensure that
they are not employed in a manner to cause needless suffering, superfluous
injury-or environmental destruction. Concomitantly, broad based claims, particu-
larly those which fail to take into account the potential attributes of the
directed-energy weaponry as a means of avoiding massive deprivation of values,





All our experience suggests that, as long as there is no dependable
comprehensive sanctioning process, states cannot reasonably be
expected voluntarily to renounce the use of the most advanced
technology in their own defense. An effective community sanction-
ing process can, further, scarely hope to dispense with the mili-
tary instrument. Hence in the search for policies designed to
promote minimum order, other and more promising alternatives must
be explored. „..
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The imminent introduction of the directed-energy weapon into the arsenals
of the principal powers will represent a challenge to the minimum public order
system rivaled only by the development of the atomic and hydrogen bombs. Since
the progression of technology can seldom be suppressed and will in its natural
course produce dramatic technological breakthrough from time to time, it should
be no surprise that once again in this century the world community must address
the problems attendant to fundamental change. What is essential at this
juncture is that the general silence which surrounds this impending and most
important of developments be broken.
In the relatively brief period which remains before the decision-makers
must elect from alternative strategies determing the deployment and bases





all its ramifications. Scientists must weigh its effect upon all aspects of the
environment. Government leaders must assess its impact upon both national and
international policy as well as upon a complex set of social values. Military-
chiefs should review its projected effects on strategy and tactics. Drawing
upon these and many other evaluations, the role of the international lawyer
will be to accommodate this new development within the minimum world public
order system. It will be his role to ensure that participants maintain an
equilibrium throughout the period of adjustment and transition to this new
device. Moreover, it will be his professional responsibility to seize upon
those claims which best serve the inclusive interests of the world community
in pursuing a maximum degree of participant value sharing in an earth-space
arena characterized by an absolute minimum of coercion.
Without question, there is an ominous side to the development of such
innovative weaponry as the high-energy laser and the particle-beam weapon.
Nevertheless, we can ill-afford to ignor the opportunities presented by such
events. The world community in the past thirty years has too often ignored
opportunities to improve upon the minimum world public order system. While once
there might have been a chance to prohibit or limit nuclear or thermonuclear
arms, now there is virtually none. At another point we might have avoided the
deployment of the strategic ballistic missile with its deadly warheads. These
opportunities will not again present themselves. The failure to take advantage
of them became a fiat accompli when mutual mistrust and fear, closely interwoven
with ever stronger commitments to strategic deterrence, forced competing partici-
pants to take the next step.
The existence of opportunities and creative policy options is often
difficult to perceive under such circumstances. However, the directed-energy
device despite its limitations and certain adverse effects upon living resources,
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may afford innovative opportunities to all participants seriously interested
in pursuing an improved minimum order system. It is time to seriously weigh
the establishment of a regime which might advance both the exclusive and inclu-
sive interests of the superpowers through the free and open sharing of technologi-
cal information pertaining to directed-energy research and development. While
the ingrained suspicions and ideological barriers between the socialist states
and the Western powers prevent the free exhcange of information regarding the
dynamics of existing weapons of mass destruction, these participants might
nevertheless find it consistent with their respective national security
interests to seek a free exchange of information in this relatively independent
area of technology.
Guaranteed free flow of technological and developmental information
facilitated by credible verification mechanisms could serve to prevent a
potentially dangerous situation which may result from an unanticipated deploy-
ment by one participant of an innovative device exhibiting capabilities compar-
able to a weapon of mass destruction. An equally dangerous situation could occur
if a participant deploys an innovative device having the capability of neutraliz-
ing existing weaponry in its adversary's strategic deterrence forces. Should
the deployment of efficient, operational directed-energy weapons create such
circumstances, the existing equilibrium between the socialist and Western blocs
could rather suddenly be shattered through the failure of a credible deterrent.
The participant initiating the sudden deployment of the innovative weaponry,
may correctly or incorrectly reach the conclusion that it can effectively mount
a preemptive strike against its adversary. Should such event occur, the
participant possessing the perceived advantage could seek to impose severe
demands contrary to the exclusive interests of its adversary. Worse yet, it
could execute the preemptive first strike. in the conviction it would achieve




The complexity of delivery systems and weapons of mass destruction in
participant arsenals may appear to minimize the chances of such worst case
developments. Nevertheless, technological breakthrough and the development of
operational innovative weaponry can not be ignored if for no other reason than
its perceived impact upon the minimum public order. While rational and responsi-
ble decision-makers could be expected to avoid exploiting a sudden perceived
strategic advantage, it is difficult to know how their response might be
altered by other influences such as internal political upheaval or severe
resource shortages affecting the stability of the social and political order.
The risk of a participant clandestinely achieving a technological
breakthrough in innovative weaponry is too great to be ignored. It appears
that at least both superpowers either have achieved, or are in the process of
attaining, technological breakthroughs in directed-energy weaponry. The risks
these efforts pose to the minimum world public order system are such that
participants should seriously consider the alternative of entering into a
technical if not political based dialogue in an effort to avoid sudden destabili-
zation of the strategic deterrent.
A free and open exchange of information pertaining to directed-energy
concepts accompanied by a verification mechanisms may be the most immediately
attainable policy goal. Nevertheless, other imaginative policy alternatives
present themselves for the longer term. While it is unlikely at this juncture
that the major participants would agree to voluntarily arm a multilateral
peacekeeping force with existing weapons of mass destruction, agreement might
be achieved to vest such supranational authority in progressive stages with ever
more potent alternative means of coercive force. Perhaps Professor Gomer's
original concept of the "armed arbiter" first proposed as an international
force equipped with nuclear or biological weapons and ballistic missiles, might
be resurrected and armed instead with directed-energy weapons capable of

-179-
counteracting strategic delivery systems employed in a nreemptive strike.
Alternatively, the third party participant could be equipped with directed-
energy weapons capable of rataliating against a participant initiating a
preemptive strike The arbiter would have no typical national bases of its
own against which to launch a retaliatory strike and therefore could credibly
carry out its role at keeping the peace.
Yet_ another opportunity might arise from the possibility of using the
advanced directed-energy weapon as an alternative means of ensuring national
security interests while each of the superpowers reduces or eliminates stocks
of comparatively less controllable and more dangerous weapons of mass destruc-
tion. In the prevailing international climate, there appears considerable
doubt that the Strategic Arms Limitat Lcn Talks will produce substantial and
lasting reductions in nuclear arms or delivery systems, much less total disarma-
ment. No nuclear equipped participant is inclined to seriously limit its arms
unless there is some absolute assurance its political independence and
territorial integrity will be guaranteed. Although recently developed
methods of verification aid in increasing levels of trust and reduce the chance
of a surprise preemptive attack, they are probably not sufficient mechanisms
by themselves to merit total participant reliance. Indeed the directed-energy
weapon might eventually offer the means of achieving the hitherto missing
sanctioning instrument. By a phased substitution of comparatively more
efficient, controllable and discriminating strategic weaponry in place of
environmentally dangerous and often less precise existing weapons of mass destruc-
tion, all participants may advance both exclusive and inclusive interests
simultaneously.
It is incumbent on decision-makers, and international lawyers in particu-
lar, to consider the broad range of challenges and policy options presented by




suppose to suggest any easily attainable or ultimate solution derived from the
challenges and opportunities of this new weapon, it argues for an immediate,
comprehensive and intellectually objective approach in confronting the problem.
Above all in pondering such approach, we should bear in mind that the time for
ensuring both the continued equilibrium in the minimum public order system and
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A Consideration of the contemporary law of strategic arms control in
the present study has been incorporated as an element of the comprehensive
international law applicable to the earth-space arena. It is recognized that
some legal analysts would classify this particular body of law as part of the
law of armed conflict, considered in Chapter IV of this study. However, since
the law of armed conflict typically applies constraints to participants during
the actual conduct of coercion and since arms control agreements are designed
to function in times of peace, this study has included this body of law under
the comprehensive international law. This study submits that the law of
arms control is more appropriately classified as part of the general international
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